The economic torts

The economic torts

Economic torts offer protection for a person’s trade or business from acts which the law considers to be unacceptable. Although it is a fundamental element of business that businesses compete with one another and therefore to this extent, one business may succeed to the disadvantage of another, the economic torts seek to ensure that businesses are protected from acts of unacceptable interference.

The three established categories of economic torts are:

•
procuring a breach of contract (ie, interference with contractual relations) which is also referred to as ‘inducing a breach of contract’. Allied to this is the so-called ‘Marex tort’ a cause of action predicated on the defendant’s alleged intentional violation of the claimant’s rights in a judgment debt, on which, see Practice Note: The Marex tort (interference with a judgment debt)
•
causing loss by unlawful means, sometime referred to as unlawful interference with economic interests (commonly known as ‘unlawful interference’), and
•
civil conspiracy, an agreement between two or more persons either:
1. ◦
  to use means, whether lawful or otherwise, the predominant or real purpose of which is to injure the claimant (ie ‘lawful means conspiracy’

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