Lump sum orders

Lump sum orders

The court has jurisdiction to order a party to pay a lump sum (or such sums as may be specified) pursuant to sections 23(1)(c) and 23(1)(f) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) and Schedule 5, Part 1 to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA 2004). A lump sum order may be made in favour of the other party, or more rarely for the benefit of a child of the family.

General principles

The court is guided by the MCA 1973, s 25(2)/CPA 2004, Sch 5 Pt 5 factors in considering the appropriate order to make. The first question is whether the payer has resources, within the wide definition given in MCA 1973, s 25(2)(a)/CPA 2004, Sch 5 Pt 5, para 21(2)(a), from which to meet any order. The court must then conduct the statutory exercise to determine whether to exercise its discretion, see Practice Note: Factors considered by the court on financial provision—The section 25 checklist. The court’s first consideration is the welfare of any child of the family, and

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