Privilege against self-incrimination
Produced in partnership with Áine Kervick of Kingsley Napley , Will Hayes of Kingsley Napley and Alice Trotter of Kingsley Napley
Practice notesPrivilege against self-incrimination
Produced in partnership with Áine Kervick of Kingsley Napley , Will Hayes of Kingsley Napley and Alice Trotter of Kingsley Napley
Practice notesBackground
The concept of privilege against self-incrimination, which is commonly referred to as one distinct protection, actually arises from a number of different protections for defendants and witnesses at common law which are 'concerned with the protection of citizens against the abuse of powers by those investigating crimes'.
Those disparate protections can be loosely categorised as:
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a privilege against self-incrimination for witnesses in criminal, civil or other non-judicial investigative proceedings (such as coroners' inquests)
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the right of a defendant not to give evidence at trial; and
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the right to silence of a suspect during a pre-trial criminal investigation
As set out below, the privilege is not absolute and statute has encroached on these various protections in a number of ways.
The privilege against self-incrimination at common law
The privilege against self-incrimination is a long-established common law privilege. The principle derives from common law as a reaction to prisoners being tortured into answering self-incriminating questions which would lead to their conviction in
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