Specific issue orders

A specific issue order is an order pursuant to section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) that gives directions for determining a specific question that has arisen, or that may arise, in connection with any aspect of parental responsibility for a child.

It can be used to determine questions about a child's upbringing, such as whether the child should go to a state school or be educated privately or in relation to medical treatment including immunisation, or issues relating to religion. It may also be used to resolve disputes regarding the child’s name or taking the child out of the jurisdiction. A specific issue order can be made on its own or it may be made with another order such as a child arrangements order (CAO).

See Practice Note: Specific issue orders.

ChA 1989 sets out the circumstances in which the court should not make a specific issue order, including, inter alia:

•
where a child is in the care of the local authority
•
where it in any way denies to the High Court the exercise of its inherent

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Specific issue orders