PI & Clinical Negligence analysis: The judgment offers guidance on the meaning of ‘equipment’ under the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 (EL(DE)A 1969), which imposes liability on employers for personal injury to their employees caused by defective equipment negligently manufactured by a third party. The court held that a fire door at the exit of the defendant solicitors’ firm’s office was not ‘equipment’ for this purpose. It dismissed a claim by an employee who had been injured when the door’s handle became detached. The judgment will be of interest to personal injury practitioners, especially given the lack of recent authority on the meaning of ‘equipment’ in EL(DE)A 1969. It contains a useful survey of previous authorities on that issue, as well as addressing the relationship between the ‘six-pack’ health and safety regulations and EL(DE)A 1969 and the impact of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA 2013) on the scope of EL(DE)A 1969. Written by Thomas Westwell, barrister at Devereux Chambers.

We have assumed that the vehicle was not a business vehicle, there is a valid insurance policy in place for the vehicle with its old registration plates and the missed step in registering the new plate was purely administrative and accidental. In the UK, legally you must have a registration plate fitted on your vehicle. For that reason, it is necessary for insurers to know about any number plate changes.

Commercial analysis: Unsuccessful appeal by the defendant travel company in a contract dispute following a cruise holiday. The parties primary dispute turned on when the contract was concluded and therefore which terms were incorporated. The Court of Appeal found that the claimants were correct on the date of formation and incorporation remitting the case to the County Court for quantum assessment. Written by Alexander Whatley, barrister at 3PB Chambers.

Public Law analysis: The claimant had sought permission to appeal against a First-tier Tribunal (FTT) decision refusing her claim for leave to remain in the UK. She maintained that the FTT had wrongly recorded her oral evidence. Both the FTT and Upper Tribunal (UT) refused her permission to appeal after having checked the recording of her evidence. She was granted permission to claim judicial review of the UT’s refusal on the basis that the claim raised important points of practice. However, the parties and the court had overlooked section 11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA 2007). TCEA 2007, s 11A had been inserted by section 2 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. It came into force on 14 July 2022. TCEA 2007, s 11A ousts the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court in judicial review proceedings, subject to a number of specific exceptions. It provides that a decision of the UT to refuse permission to appeal further is, subject to exceptions, final and not liable to be questioned or set aside in any other court. It thereby reversed the Supreme Court’s decision in Cart v Upper Tribunal. Rather than proceed to a full substantive hearing, a preliminary issue trial was conducted to determine whether the court had jurisdiction to determine the claim. Mr Justice Saini rejected the claimant’s attempts to argue that the TCEA 2007, s 11A ouster was somehow ineffective. He also carefully construed the ‘jurisdictional gateways’ in TCEA 2007, s 11A(4), being four circumstances in which such a claim for judicial review could proceed, finding that the claimant had not established the ‘a fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice’ gateway. Written by Jonathan Lewis, counsel at Monckton Chambers.

Construction analysis: This case concerned an adjudication decision, whereby the adjudicator decided that £207,076.00 was due from Morganstone to Birkemp Ltd upon Birkemp’s interim payment application. Birkemp sought to raise cross-claims in its defence in the adjudication, but the adjudicator held that these fell outside of his jurisdiction. Morganstone subsequently issued a Part 8 claim seeking declarations that the adjudication decision was wrong in law and unenforceable, and Birkemp issued a Part 7 Claim seeking enforcement of the award, which was transferred to be dealt with at the same time as the Part 8 Claim. The Judge declined to grant the declaratory relief sought by Morganstone, but also declined to enforce the adjudication award. It was held that the Adjudicator had breached the rules of natural justice due to the failure to consider Birkemp’s cross-claim. Written by Georgia Whiting, legal counsel at Ardmore.

There are several factors to consider when deciding whether or not a consumer credit agreement is regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA 1974). CCA 1974, s 8(1) defines a consumer credit agreement as ‘an agreement between an individual (“the debtor”) and any other person (“the creditor”) by which the creditor provides the debtor with credit of any amount’. According to CCA 1974, s 8(3), a consumer credit agreement is a regulated credit agreement within the meaning of CCA 1974 if it is a regulated credit agreement for the purposes of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order

In the absence of any express obligation to repair, the general rule is that neither the dominant or the servient owner (see Jones v Price at [631] and Duke of Westminster v Guild at [700F]) is under any obligation to repair the right of way. Taylor v Whitehead [1781] 2 Doug KB 745 (not reported by LexisNexis®) and Ingram v Morecraft at [51–52] [1863] 33 Beav 49 (not reported by LexisNexis®) suggest that as a matter of common law, the person who has the use of the thing ought to repair

This Q&A assumes that the grantor of the easement owned the freehold interest in the neighbour’s field. It has also been assumed that the land is comprised within the freehold interest of the neighbour’s field. This Q&A will refer to the farmer as the ‘dominant owner’, the owner of the neighbouring field as the ‘servient owner’ and the land over which the right of way is enjoyed as the ‘accessway’. There

‘Parental responsibility’ is defined by section 3(1) of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) as being ‘all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent has in relation to the child and his property’. A person with parental responsibility is entitled as of right to copies of medical records and school reports and the surgery or school should provide these. However, where there is a difficulty, for example because the mother is at a confidential address or has instructed that these documents should not be disclosed to the father, it is open to the father to apply to the court within the existing ChA 1989 proceedings, or where there are no proceedings as a freestanding

At birth, a child must be registered, and the surname that is registered at that time is to be the one which it is intended the child should be known by. If a parent wishes to change the child’s surname following registration, they should consult with any other person who holds parental responsibility for the child. This is the case regardless of whether there is a child arrangements order in place, and regardless of whether that other person sees the child (Re PC (Change of Surname)). Any dispute must be referred to the court for determination. No disputed change of surname should be made unilaterally (Dawson v Wearmouth). A change

Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) enables the court to make orders for financial provision for the benefit of a child against the other parent. ChA 1989, Sch 1 is ordinarily utilised where the parents are not married and, therefore, on separation, there is no scope for an application for financial remedies pursuant to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The powers of the court are more limited

Orders that are made under section 8 of the Children Act 1989, which will include applications for prohibited steps orders, are governed by the Family Law Act 1986 (FLA 1986) in terms of jurisdiction. FLA 1986, s 2 provides that a court shall not make such an order with respect to a child unless it has jurisdiction under the 1996 Hague Convention or the question of making the order arises in or in connection with matrimonial proceedings and the condition in FLA 1986, s 2A is satisfied, or the condition in FLA 1986, s 3 is satisfied. Ukraine is