It appears from the background facts of the question that the terms of the trust were set out in the Will. We assume that the personal representatives (PRs) are not required to exercise any powers held by the deceased person in order to create the trust. If these assumptions are not correct, then the answer will depend on the precise terms of the Will and

Section 28(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) imposes an almost total bar on the court’s jurisdiction to entertain an application made after remarriage. The bar is qualified by the words ‘by reference to the grant or making of that [italics inserted] decree or order’. However, once a final order/decree absolute has been made or granted in relation to (in this case) the husband’s petition, there is no subsisting marriage in relation to which the wife’s first petition may then be progressed. Significantly in the context of this question, MCA 1973, s 28(3) bar does not apply to an application

A well-drafted charge will be able to provide for a percentage uplift for the value of the property without any difficulty. The charge and the loan agreement (as it will always be sensible to reduce the loan agreement to a contract or deed—the benefit of the latter being that no consideration is required for the same to be enforceable) should provide for the appropriate uplift. Provision should also be made to deal with the situation

General principles—privilege and confidentiality One of the more challenging issues a practitioner faces during litigation, and in particular during the disclosure phase of proceedings, is seeking to protect a client’s confidential material and information from being inspected by the other parties and from being put before the court. A key way to achieve such protection for documents relevant to a dispute is to assert that they are privileged. Once it has been established that a document is privileged, it confers a right to withhold that document from inspection. For more general information on the meaning and consequences of a document being privileged, see Practice Note: Privilege—general principles. It is important to note however, that labelling a document as ‘privileged’ does not determine its privileged status. Rather, for such special protection to apply, enabling a client to retain confidentiality and withhold inspection of a relevant document, the criteria for one of the various types of privilege must be specifically met (see below). As a further

Section 22(3) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005) provides that: ‘…(3) Subsection 4 applies if the court is satisfied─ (a) that fraud or undue pressure was used to induce P─ (i) to execute an instrument for the purpose of creating a lasting power of attorney, or (ii) to create a lasting power of attorney, or (b) that the donee (or, if more than one, any of them) of the lasting power of attorney─ (i) has behaved, or is behaving,

It is unclear if the donor has a lasting power of attorney (LPA) for property and affairs (P&A) or health and welfare (H&W) or both. Given that decisions have been made by the attorneys that the donor’s home should be sold (requiring a P&A LPA) and that they should go into a care home (requiring a H&W LPA), it is assumed that both exist and are registered. We assume that there is more

PI & Clinical Negligence analysis: The judgment offers guidance on the meaning of ‘equipment’ under the Employer’s Liability (Defective Equipment) Act 1969 (EL(DE)A 1969), which imposes liability on employers for personal injury to their employees caused by defective equipment negligently manufactured by a third party. The court held that a fire door at the exit of the defendant solicitors’ firm’s office was not ‘equipment’ for this purpose. It dismissed a claim by an employee who had been injured when the door’s handle became detached. The judgment will be of interest to personal injury practitioners, especially given the lack of recent authority on the meaning of ‘equipment’ in EL(DE)A 1969. It contains a useful survey of previous authorities on that issue, as well as addressing the relationship between the ‘six-pack’ health and safety regulations and EL(DE)A 1969 and the impact of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA 2013) on the scope of EL(DE)A 1969. Written by Thomas Westwell, barrister at Devereux Chambers.

We have assumed that the vehicle was not a business vehicle, there is a valid insurance policy in place for the vehicle with its old registration plates and the missed step in registering the new plate was purely administrative and accidental. In the UK, legally you must have a registration plate fitted on your vehicle. For that reason, it is necessary for insurers to know about any number plate changes.

Commercial analysis: Unsuccessful appeal by the defendant travel company in a contract dispute following a cruise holiday. The parties primary dispute turned on when the contract was concluded and therefore which terms were incorporated. The Court of Appeal found that the claimants were correct on the date of formation and incorporation remitting the case to the County Court for quantum assessment. Written by Alexander Whatley, barrister at 3PB Chambers.

Public Law analysis: The claimant had sought permission to appeal against a First-tier Tribunal (FTT) decision refusing her claim for leave to remain in the UK. She maintained that the FTT had wrongly recorded her oral evidence. Both the FTT and Upper Tribunal (UT) refused her permission to appeal after having checked the recording of her evidence. She was granted permission to claim judicial review of the UT’s refusal on the basis that the claim raised important points of practice. However, the parties and the court had overlooked section 11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA 2007). TCEA 2007, s 11A had been inserted by section 2 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. It came into force on 14 July 2022. TCEA 2007, s 11A ousts the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court in judicial review proceedings, subject to a number of specific exceptions. It provides that a decision of the UT to refuse permission to appeal further is, subject to exceptions, final and not liable to be questioned or set aside in any other court. It thereby reversed the Supreme Court’s decision in Cart v Upper Tribunal. Rather than proceed to a full substantive hearing, a preliminary issue trial was conducted to determine whether the court had jurisdiction to determine the claim. Mr Justice Saini rejected the claimant’s attempts to argue that the TCEA 2007, s 11A ouster was somehow ineffective. He also carefully construed the ‘jurisdictional gateways’ in TCEA 2007, s 11A(4), being four circumstances in which such a claim for judicial review could proceed, finding that the claimant had not established the ‘a fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice’ gateway. Written by Jonathan Lewis, counsel at Monckton Chambers.

Construction analysis: This case concerned an adjudication decision, whereby the adjudicator decided that £207,076.00 was due from Morganstone to Birkemp Ltd upon Birkemp’s interim payment application. Birkemp sought to raise cross-claims in its defence in the adjudication, but the adjudicator held that these fell outside of his jurisdiction. Morganstone subsequently issued a Part 8 claim seeking declarations that the adjudication decision was wrong in law and unenforceable, and Birkemp issued a Part 7 Claim seeking enforcement of the award, which was transferred to be dealt with at the same time as the Part 8 Claim. The Judge declined to grant the declaratory relief sought by Morganstone, but also declined to enforce the adjudication award. It was held that the Adjudicator had breached the rules of natural justice due to the failure to consider Birkemp’s cross-claim. Written by Georgia Whiting, legal counsel at Ardmore.

There are several factors to consider when deciding whether or not a consumer credit agreement is regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA 1974). CCA 1974, s 8(1) defines a consumer credit agreement as ‘an agreement between an individual (“the debtor”) and any other person (“the creditor”) by which the creditor provides the debtor with credit of any amount’. According to CCA 1974, s 8(3), a consumer credit agreement is a regulated credit agreement within the meaning of CCA 1974 if it is a regulated credit agreement for the purposes of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order