In the absence of any express obligation to repair, the general rule is that neither the dominant or the servient owner (see Jones v Price at [631] and Duke of Westminster v Guild at [700F]) is under any obligation to repair the right of way. Taylor v Whitehead [1781] 2 Doug KB 745 (not reported by LexisNexis®) and Ingram v Morecraft at [51–52] [1863] 33 Beav 49 (not reported by LexisNexis®) suggest that as a matter of common law, the person who has the use of the thing ought to repair

This Q&A assumes that the grantor of the easement owned the freehold interest in the neighbour’s field. It has also been assumed that the land is comprised within the freehold interest of the neighbour’s field. This Q&A will refer to the farmer as the ‘dominant owner’, the owner of the neighbouring field as the ‘servient owner’ and the land over which the right of way is enjoyed as the ‘accessway’. There

‘Parental responsibility’ is defined by section 3(1) of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) as being ‘all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent has in relation to the child and his property’. A person with parental responsibility is entitled as of right to copies of medical records and school reports and the surgery or school should provide these. However, where there is a difficulty, for example because the mother is at a confidential address or has instructed that these documents should not be disclosed to the father, it is open to the father to apply to the court within the existing ChA 1989 proceedings, or where there are no proceedings as a freestanding

At birth, a child must be registered, and the surname that is registered at that time is to be the one which it is intended the child should be known by. If a parent wishes to change the child’s surname following registration, they should consult with any other person who holds parental responsibility for the child. This is the case regardless of whether there is a child arrangements order in place, and regardless of whether that other person sees the child (Re PC (Change of Surname)). Any dispute must be referred to the court for determination. No disputed change of surname should be made unilaterally (Dawson v Wearmouth). A change

Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) enables the court to make orders for financial provision for the benefit of a child against the other parent. ChA 1989, Sch 1 is ordinarily utilised where the parents are not married and, therefore, on separation, there is no scope for an application for financial remedies pursuant to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The powers of the court are more limited

Orders that are made under section 8 of the Children Act 1989, which will include applications for prohibited steps orders, are governed by the Family Law Act 1986 (FLA 1986) in terms of jurisdiction. FLA 1986, s 2 provides that a court shall not make such an order with respect to a child unless it has jurisdiction under the 1996 Hague Convention or the question of making the order arises in or in connection with matrimonial proceedings and the condition in FLA 1986, s 2A is satisfied, or the condition in FLA 1986, s 3 is satisfied. Ukraine is

The first step for the father is carefully to consider the wording of the non-molestation order against him. A non-molestation order is granted under section 42 of the Family Law Act 1996 (FLA 1996) and will contain provisions prohibiting a person from molesting another person. Often a non-molestation order will prohibit the respondent from threatening and harassing the applicant. The order may also contain more specific provisions which would be relevant to the father’s conduct at handover. For further guidance, see Practice Note: Non-molestation orders. The mother may argue that the conduct of the father in recording her at handovers, when she has clearly

It is assumed that one property owner (Y) is bound by a positive covenant to maintain the fence. Accordingly, Y is the covenantor. It has not been confirmed who the covenantee is, ie whether it is the neighbouring property owner (X), or a third party. The extent of the obligation, ie whether or not the obligation to maintain extends to replacing the fence, will depend on the wording of the positive covenant and the circumstances of the disrepair. Drawing a parallel with landlord and tenant disrepair covenants, case law has established

This response considers the planning status of a building following a fire, and the availability of permitted development rights for such properties in England. Unfortunately, if a building has been totally destroyed by fire (or by other means), there is no automatic right to rebuild it. Section 55(1A)(b) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 confirms that ‘rebuilding’ is a building operation requiring planning permission, which means planning permission would be required to reinstate the building, even if it was being rebuilt in an identical form. If a building has been partially destroyed, then whether the remedial works constitute alteration or improvement (which may benefit from permitted development rights) or constitute rebuilding will be a matter

Charging orders Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR 1998), SI 1998/3132, Pt 73 makes provision for a judgment creditor to obtain a charging order over a judgment debtor’s property. A charging order will initially be an interim charging order (CPR 73.4 and CPR 73.6). Thereafter, the court can make a final charging order (CPR 73.10 and CPR 73.10A). Enforcing a charging order If a final charging order has been made and the judgment creditor wishes to satisfy the debt owed to them by way of selling the property, they must obtain an order for sale. The court has the power to order that the

A charging order is a mechanism by which a judgment creditor can obtain security over the interest of a judgment debtor in property. In terms of section 3(4) of the Charging Orders Act 1979 (COA 1979), a charge imposed by a charging order takes effect as an equitable charge and can be imposed over the legal estate or where the property is the subject of a trust of land (ie where it is owned by the judgment debtor and another, or is held in trust for the judgment debtor by a third party) over the beneficial interest of the judgment

Pursuant to section 11(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973), a marriage is void if at the time of the marriage either party was already lawfully married or a civil partner. If a marriage is void, rather than a non-marriage, then the parties are entitled to a decree of nullity and an application for financial provision may be made. It is therefore clear that the party who was unaware of the bigamy at the time of the marriage is entitled to bring a claim. For a while, however, it was less clear whether the guilty party would be able to bring a claim