The first step for the father is carefully to consider the wording of the non-molestation order against him. A non-molestation order is granted under section 42 of the Family Law Act 1996 (FLA 1996) and will contain provisions prohibiting a person from molesting another person. Often a non-molestation order will prohibit the respondent from threatening and harassing the applicant. The order may also contain more specific provisions which would be relevant to the father’s conduct at handover. For further guidance, see Practice Note: Non-molestation orders. The mother may argue that the conduct of the father in recording her at handovers, when she has clearly

It is assumed that one property owner (Y) is bound by a positive covenant to maintain the fence. Accordingly, Y is the covenantor. It has not been confirmed who the covenantee is, ie whether it is the neighbouring property owner (X), or a third party. The extent of the obligation, ie whether or not the obligation to maintain extends to replacing the fence, will depend on the wording of the positive covenant and the circumstances of the disrepair. Drawing a parallel with landlord and tenant disrepair covenants, case law has established

This response considers the planning status of a building following a fire, and the availability of permitted development rights for such properties in England. Unfortunately, if a building has been totally destroyed by fire (or by other means), there is no automatic right to rebuild it. Section 55(1A)(b) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 confirms that ‘rebuilding’ is a building operation requiring planning permission, which means planning permission would be required to reinstate the building, even if it was being rebuilt in an identical form. If a building has been partially destroyed, then whether the remedial works constitute alteration or improvement (which may benefit from permitted development rights) or constitute rebuilding will be a matter

Charging orders Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR 1998), SI 1998/3132, Pt 73 makes provision for a judgment creditor to obtain a charging order over a judgment debtor’s property. A charging order will initially be an interim charging order (CPR 73.4 and CPR 73.6). Thereafter, the court can make a final charging order (CPR 73.10 and CPR 73.10A). Enforcing a charging order If a final charging order has been made and the judgment creditor wishes to satisfy the debt owed to them by way of selling the property, they must obtain an order for sale. The court has the power to order that the

A charging order is a mechanism by which a judgment creditor can obtain security over the interest of a judgment debtor in property. In terms of section 3(4) of the Charging Orders Act 1979 (COA 1979), a charge imposed by a charging order takes effect as an equitable charge and can be imposed over the legal estate or where the property is the subject of a trust of land (ie where it is owned by the judgment debtor and another, or is held in trust for the judgment debtor by a third party) over the beneficial interest of the judgment

Pursuant to section 11(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973), a marriage is void if at the time of the marriage either party was already lawfully married or a civil partner. If a marriage is void, rather than a non-marriage, then the parties are entitled to a decree of nullity and an application for financial provision may be made. It is therefore clear that the party who was unaware of the bigamy at the time of the marriage is entitled to bring a claim. For a while, however, it was less clear whether the guilty party would be able to bring a claim

It is presumed that the form of consent order in question is a property adjustment order under section 24(1)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973), combined with an order for sale under MCA 1973, s 24A. Property adjustment orders made under MCA 1973, s 24 may not be varied. However, an order for sale made under MCA 1973, s 24A may be varied under MCA 1973, s 31 only as to the terms of the order for sale and not as to the underlying

This Q&A assumes that the order was made pursuant to an application for financial relief associated with divorce. The Administration of Justice Act 1920 (AJA 1920) makes provision for the registration and thereafter enforcement within the UK of judgments obtained in a superior court of any part of the Commonwealth; the Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 extends the registration system to foreign countries generally. Procedurally, such registration and enforcement is dealt with by CPR 74.1. By CPR 74.2(1)(c), ’judgment’ means any judgment given by a foreign court or tribunal, whatever it may be called, including an order. However, AJA 1920, s 12(1) makes clear that the expression ’judgment’ for the purposes of AJA 1920 means ‘any

Second appeals Where an appeal from a first instance decision in a private children case has been determined, a party would require permission to bring a second appeal (ie an appeal against the decision made on the first appeal). The threshold for obtaining permission on a second appeal is higher. One has to look to the CPR to determine the permission test and the correct procedural route. The Family Procedure Rules (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955 generally apply to appeals from decisions of the Family Court, however, while FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 30.3(1B) and (2) set out when permission to appeal is, or is not, required under FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955 to appeal against a decision or order

Much will depend on the precise terms agreed between the parties, ie whether a core element of the child maintenance was agreed at a fixed amount with no top-up payable at the time of the initial order because the payer’s income did not, at that time, exceed the threshold. Also of significance will be whether, when the core element of child maintenance was fixed, the 50/50 shared care arrangement was already in place. The formula adopted in the order appears to follow the lines advocated by Mostyn J in CB v KB, in particular at para [49], when he said: ‘I suggest that in every case where the gross annual income

In general, the purpose of a capitalised maintenance order is to effect a clean break so as to terminate the financial obligations of each party towards the other in life and/or death by virtue of the provisions of section 25A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). See Practice Notes: Capitalised maintenance—Duxbury calculations and Financial clean break orders in family proceedings. MCA 1973, s 25A(1) provides (emphasis added): ‘Where on or after the grant of a decree of divorce or nullity of marriage the court decides to exercise its powers under section 23(1)(a), (b) or (c), 24[, 24A [24B or 24E]] above in favour of a party to the marriage, it shall be the duty of the court to consider whether it would be appropriate so to exercise those powers that the

Pursuant to section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973), the court has the power to vary its own orders made within financial remedy proceedings, but that power is limited. The types of orders that may be varied are listed in MCA 1973, s 31(2), and include orders for periodical payments and secured periodical payment orders. There is no jurisdiction