When a property is owned by a husband and wife as joint tenants, they both own the entirety of the property and the death of one results in the surviving joint tenant retaining their ownership of the entirety of the property. It is not possible for either the husband or the wife to leave their ‘share’ as a joint tenant in the property to a third party. When a husband and wife separate and commence divorce proceedings, one of the first steps taken is often to sever any joint tenancy so that the parties hold

The order will remain enforceable subject to any supervening Barder events (per Barder v Calouri) which might make it capable of being set aside. Delay of itself is unlikely to satisfy the Barder requirements. Two critical issues may be: • the period of time which has elapsed (and therefore the delay) since the order was made • in the event of a sale under the terms of the original order, whether the party who was originally intended to be the recipient of the lump sum is entitled to receive a fixed share or a percentage share of the net proceeds of sale Much will depend on the circumstances of the case and the exact terms of the order, but factors potentially of note include: • a

The court has a full jurisdiction to approve or reject a financial remedy consent order representing the parties’ agreement (per section 33A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) and the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 9.26). However, the court is neither ‘a rubber stamp’ nor ‘a bloodhound’ or ‘forensic ferret’ (per Pounds v Pounds) and L v L). It is impossible to oust the jurisdiction of the court. The court conducts an independent assessment to enable it to discharge its statutory functions reflecting the criteria listed in the MCA 1973, s 25. The court will, however, be heavily influenced by what the parties

The court's role when considering a draft financial consent order is not simply to act as a rubber stamp. The court has a duty to scrutinise the agreement before it, but may make an order in the terms agreed on the basis of the information set out in the parties' statements of information, unless it has reason to believe that there are other circumstances into which it should enquire. The court will always retain its discretionary role under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Clients should be advised

The Family Court has jurisdiction under section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) to make an order for periodical payments in favour of a party to a marriage or in favour of a child of the family for their own maintenance or for the maintenance of a child. However this power is subject to the provisions of the Child Support Act 1991 (CSA 1991) of which CSA 1991, s 8 curtails the powers of the court to make child maintenance orders. Any child maintenance order made in financial remedy proceedings can thus be superseded after 12 months by either party seeking a maintenance

Where the courts in England and Wales are faced with financial remedy proceedings in which the bulk of the assets are real property based abroad, enforcement can become a significant issue. That is particularly so where the court makes an award for a lump sum, backed with a default order for sale in respect of property based abroad. As a consequence of Brexit and following implementation period (IP) completion day (11 pm 31 December 2020), an added issue is whether the case is covered by the transitional provisions applicable to proceedings issued prior to IP completion day (see below), which will dictate

If the English court had jurisdiction to make the financial remedies order, which by implication it did, it will retain jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcement, even though both parties are now resident abroad. Indeed, this will prove convenient and cost effective in relation to enforcement

An order for sale under section 24A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) must always be ancillary to certain other types of orders specified in MCA 1973, s 24A(1), usually a property adjustment order or a lump sum order. A property adjustment order or a lump sum order (other than one payable by instalments) may not be varied as to its substance. An order for the sale of property under MCA 1973, s 24A may be varied under MCA 1973, s 31(2)(f). The statutory power to vary relates

Section 24A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) provides that the court may make an order for the sale of a property in which either or both of the parties to the marriage has a beneficial interest. The court also has the power to make supplemental provisions as it may think fit pursuant to MCA 1973, s 24A, so that if the difficulty with sale is the result of one party setting an unrealistic asking price, or generally being uncooperative, the other party may apply for sole conduct of sale and vacant possession or for provision that requires the property to be ‘offered for sale to a person, or class of persons, specified

Section 234(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) provides that: ‘Where any person has in his possession or control any property, books, papers or records to which the company [in administration] appears to be entitled, the court may require that person forthwith (or within such period as the court

Two questions arise: • (1) the standing of the local authority (LA) in this case, the Executor and residuary beneficiary have renounced. It is assumed that no others have an entitlement to the grant. The order of priority for the issue of a grant of Letters of Administration with will annexed is dealt with in the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987, SI 1987/2024, r 20 if the LA is owed fees, its right to become involved in the estate administration arises as a creditor once all those with

Section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 (BA 2010) provides: ‘(1) A relevant commercial organisation (“C”) is guilty of an offence under this section if a person (“A”) associated with C bribes another person intending— (a) to obtain or retain business for C, or (b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for C. (2) But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with C from undertaking such conduct. BA 2010, s 8 defines an associated person: (1) For the purposes of section 7, a person (“A”) is associated with C if (disregarding any bribe under consideration) A is a person who performs services for or on behalf of C. (2) The capacity