Contract award and challenges

This practical guidance relates to the pre-Procurement Act 2023 regime

This subtopic contains a range of resources for contracting authorities conducting a public procurement exercise commenced before the Procurement Act 2023 (PA 2023) came into force on 24 February 2025. In-scope procurements begun on or after this date are governed by PA 2023. Under the transitional and savings provisions for PA 2023, the previous regimes continue to apply to the extent necessary to allow contracting authorities to complete and manage procurements commenced before PA 2023 came into force (ie ongoing procurements).

This subtopic considers matters that a contracting authority conducting an ongoing procurement will need to address once it reaches its decision on contract award, with particular focus on public procurement procedures under the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR 2015), SI 2015/102. It also examines some of the issues the parties may encounter after a contract has been awarded, for instance in the event of a subsequent modification or legal challenge.

This overview focuses on the law and principles applicable under the pre-PA 2023 regime. For guidance on

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Immigration—Windrush—non-fettering public law principle—section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 (Hippolyte v SSHD)

Immigration analysis: The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal of the High Court’s refusal of judicial review in respect of the respondent Secretary of State’s refusal to grant the applicant indefinite leave to remain (ILR) under the Windrush Scheme. The Home Office’s casework guidance states that the child of a Commonwealth citizen who was settled in the UK before 1 January 1971 must have been continuously resident in the UK since their birth or arrival to qualify under the scheme. The applicant asked the Secretary of State to exercise discretion to waive this requirement, as she had sufficient close ties to the UK that she fell within the ‘spirit’ of the Windrush Scheme. The Home Office failed to consider whether to exercise discretion and the appellant argued that the Home Office had fettered its discretion. The case concerned two key issues: (1) whether the Secretary of State contravened the ‘non-fettering’ principle in public law by failing to exercise her discretion under section 3(1)(b) Immigration Act 1971, which confers a wide discretion on the Home Office to grant leave even where the requirements of the Immigration Rules or published policy guidance are not met, and (2) whether the High Court was wrong to refuse relief under section 31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 (SCA 1981), which applies where it is highly likely that the outcome for the claimant would not have been substantially different had the conduct complained of not occurred. Written by Gill McKearney, knowledge lawyer at Bates Wells.

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