We have assumed that, given the reference to communal areas, the property referred to in this question is a block of flats. For two years from completion of the first purchase of a newly built property, cover for defects is provided, under National House Building Council (NHBC) Buildmark, by the builder and it is responsible for rectifying any defects that occur in the property and that are covered by the policy. After this period ends, insurance protection is provided (in accordance with the terms of the

Arbitration analysis: The DIFC Court of First Instance set aside an arbitral award in full where the tribunal’s majority had determined the dispute on unpleaded issues of waiver, variation, estoppel and the claimant’s ability to pay, without giving the respondent an opportunity to address them. Applying Oheo Bank v Parker, the court held that procedural irregularity alone is insufficient: the applicant must establish real unfairness or practical injustice by identifying reasonably arguable submissions that could have affected the outcome. The decision emphasises that tribunals may adopt reasoning not advanced by either party, but must invite submissions where a new, potentially dispositive issue arises, particularly in documents-only proceedings. Practitioners should ensure that the procedural record clearly identifies how additional issues enter the case. Produced in partnership with Tatiana Minaeva, Independent Arbitrator.

Scope of bias and pre-determination in planning cases Bias and pre-determination can be an issue in planning cases where a planning decision-maker, including a local planning authority (LPA) or planning inspector/Secretary of State, is determining a planning application or appeal. Bias arises where a planning officer and/or councillor and/or inspector and/or the Secretary of State (the decision-maker) forms or shows bias against or in favour of a person, company or group, or a particular development. Pre-determination is where the decision-maker approaches a decision with a ‘closed mind’. Planning decision-makers are under a duty to act fairly. Clearly, where a decision-maker is biased or has pre-determined a decision, they will not be acting fairly. The decision will be unlawful and liable to be quashed if challenged by way of judicial or statutory review. Where the impugned decision is that of the Secretary of State or an inspector acting on the Secretary of State’s behalf, the challenge may, in particular, proceed by way of statutory review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA

This Practice Note considers judicial bias and recusal in civil proceedings. It explains the different forms of bias and the legal test for apparent bias. It also considers circumstances in which a judge may be required to recuse themselves, including personal and professional relationships, prior judicial involvement and the conduct of proceedings. It also addresses the position of judges who continue to practise as solicitors or barristers, judicial disclosure of potential conflicts, the procedure for raising a recusal application and waiver of the right to object. This Practice Note should be read in conjunction with Practice Note: Bias and recusal of judges—illustrative decisions, which provides illustrative examples of how the courts have applied the principles governing judicial bias and recusal. Guide to Judicial Conduct The bias/impartiality of those holding judicial office is addressed in the Guide to Judicial Conduct (the Guide). The Guide is described as containing a set of core principles to help judicial office holders reach their own decisions but is not a code. In dealing with the three guiding principles of

This Practice Note provides illustrative examples of how the courts have applied the principles governing judicial bias and recusal. For general guidance on bias and recusal of judges, see Practice Note: Bias and recusal of judges. Case details and analysis Judgment date Summary of decision El Haddad v Al Rostamani [2026] EWHC 1885 (Ch) 21 July 2026 The claimant applied for Rajah J to recuse himself from hearing an application to extend an extended civil restraint order (ECRO). The judge was the named judge under the ECRO and had refused most, although not all, of the claimant’s applications for permission, including applications concerning appeals from his own decisions under the ECRO. The claimant also relied on the judge’s initial proposal of a one-hour time estimate and the fact that the matter had been listed before him because of his familiarity with the proceedings.The application was refused. Applying Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357, [2002] 1 All ER 465 and Otkritie International Investment Management Ltd v Urumov [2014]

Local Government analysis: CPRE (Somerset) (a countryside charity) brought judicial review proceedings challenging a District Council’s decision to grant planning permission for some buildings to store carnival floats. CPRE argued that the decision was unlawful because two of the councillors who had voted in favour of the scheme when it was before the Council’s planning committee were involved with other organisations which supported the scheme, meaning they were either biased or should be held to have predetermined the application. The High Court rehearsed the law on apparent bias and predetermination of decisions. In this case, the High Court held that, contrary to the advice given to the councillors by their monitoring officer, they both had ‘prejudicial interests’ under the terms of the Council’s code of conduct. The court held that, against that backdrop, a fair-minded observer would consider that there was a real possibility of bias. Accordingly, the court quashed the planning decision. Written by Alexander Campbell, barrister at Cornerstone Barristers.

Law360, Expert analysis: On 22 February 2024, in H1 v W, the Commercial Court, King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales removed a sole arbitrator under section 24 of the Arbitration Act 1996 due to justifiable doubts about his impartiality and a real possibility of bias, offering further guidance on the disqualification on arbitrators. Written by Andrew Connelly, associate, and Ian Meredith, partner, at K&L Gates LLP.

Biased assimilation describes the cognitive tendency of decision‑makers to interpret, weigh or recall evidence in a way that favours their existing beliefs, assumptions or hypotheses. In legal practice, it is often discussed in relation to judicial reasoning, fact‑finding by judges and juries, police investigations, credibility assessments in asylum and immigration claims, and decision‑making by public authorities and regulators. The term is drawn from psychology and behavioural science and is not a defined legal term in UK or Irish legislation or case law, but it is increasingly referenced in legal scholarship, judicial training and arguments about fairness, impartiality and due process. Biased assimilation is relevant to issues of apparent bias, procedural fairness, legitimate expectation, rationality and the duty to give adequate reasons, particularly where a decision appears to discount or minimise contrary evidence. It may underpin challenges by way of judicial review, statutory appeal or rehearing, as well as submissions on the proper approach to expert evidence and witness testimony. Usage and understanding of the concept are broadly consistent across England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Ireland, although its impact is mediated through each jurisdiction’s distinct rules on evidence, appeals and standards of review.

Also known as a tender bond (or guarantee). These are used as part of the tender process to guarantee performance by tendering contractors (more commonly in international projects). Bid bonds typically operate so that the surety will pay out to the employer (subject to maximum sum specified in the bond) in the event that the successful tenderer fails to perform the contract—a tender bond gives the employer comfort that tenderers are able to perform the contract on the basis of the bids submitted by the tenderers. They are usually issued as on-demand instruments.

The price at which the trustees can sell a security (usually in a unit trust); the unit price that the life company uses to redeem units from a policyholder.

Collusive conduct between undertakings to avoid competition between bidders in response to an invitation to tender.

The difference between the bid and offer prices, typically of the order of 5% representing a charge levied by a life company or unit trust on each premium paid or unit bought or sold; the difference between the purchase (offer) and sale (bid) price.