Family analysis: Despite still being married to another man at the time of the relevant marriage ceremony, the ‘wife’ in the case successfully resisted the ‘husband’s’ application to strike out her financial remedy application. The wife’s chief legal argument was that, following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wyatt v Vince and its constraining effect on the scope of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, r 4.4(1) concerning strike-out applications, it was no longer possible to strike out the financial remedy claims of a culpable individual pursuant to the authorities concerning bigamy and financial remedy (ie Whiston v Whiston and Rampal v Rampal (No 2)). This argument was rejected and the court found in crystal-clear terms that the Whiston jurisdiction is based on the ex turpi causa principle (a person shall not profit from their wrongdoing) and that the family court is empowered to strike out a claim where it ‘contravenes a rule of public policy to such an extent that to permit it to proceed would be an abuse of process’, provided the strike-out application falls within FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, r 4.4(1) (paras [94], [90]). Accordingly, the Whiston jurisdiction has survived Wyatt. The victory for the husband was pyrrhic, and his application was refused on the basis (inter alia) that he was also aware that the wife was already married at the date of their marriage ceremony. Like the ‘wife’ in Rampal, the husband had not been misled, and there were good public policy reasons for the wife’s financial remedy claims to proceed—indeed, this is the purpose of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 allowing for those claims in respect of a nullity petition (para [98]). David Wilkinson, solicitor at Slater Heelis, looks at the considerations.