Land charges are registered to protect the interests, in unregistered land, of a person who does not hold the title deeds and thus, cannot physically control when and how the land is disposed of. A class D(ii) land charge is intended to protect a restrictive covenant which burdens unregistered land. As per Practice Note: Restrictive covenants—nature and characteristics, restrictive covenants bind successors-in-title of the covenantor provided that: • they are properly drafted and comply with certain equitable rules, and • they are recorded by registration of a land charge This means that if the covenant has not

Corporate Crime analysis: Max Hobbs, senior associate at Macfarlanes, considers the key takeaways of the Serious Fraud Office’s (SFO) annual report and accounts for 2023–2024 and what might be expected going forward.

This query concerns whether the owner of land (the servient owner) on which an existing septic tank is situated and over which a neighbour enjoys rights of drainage acquired by prescription is entitled to replace the existing tank with a modern treatment tank and whether the neighbour benefiting from that right of drainage (the dominant owner) can be required to contribute towards the costs of installing and maintaining such new apparatus. Can the servient owner replace the tank? Assuming

Acceptance of a contract may be express or may be inferred from words or conduct: Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Corporation. The test is whether a reasonable person in the position of the offeror would think that the offeree was by his conduct intending to accept the offer: IRC v Fry. Unilateral contracts are usually accepted by conduct. In the case of a bilateral contract, the offeree must make a counter-promise to the offeror which, in an appropriate case, could also be inferred from conduct. Acceptance will only be inferred

On the creation of a discretionary trust any inheritance tax (IHT) due (the entry charge) is primarily taxable on the transferor. If the transferor pays the IHT due, it will be grossed up as it is the ‘loss to the estate’ of the settlor that is relevant. However, it can be agreed that the transferee (the trustees) pay the tax in which case no grossing up is needed. See: IHTM14012. If death occurs within seven years of a chargeable transfer, any additional IHT is payable by the transferee (the trustees) in the first instance. The PRs of the transferor’s estate are also liable to pay the tax if the transferee

This Q&A assumes that: • the settlor to whom the question relates has died and had a UK domicile at the date of his death • the settled property was property subject to a reservation, within the meaning in IHTA 1984, s 102, at the date of the settlor's death • the terms of the discretionary trust provide for the trust to continue, unaffected by the death of a member of the discretionary class of beneficiaries Where section 102 of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (IHTA 1984) applies to property, the effect is that the property subject to a reservation ‘is treated for the purposes of the 1984 Act as property to which he was beneficially entitled immediately before his death’—see IHTA 1984, s 102(3). IHTA

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: The case involved an application by the second respondent’s trustee in bankruptcy (trustee) for a declaration that a property legally and beneficially owned by the first respondent was in fact beneficially owned by the second respondent. His Honour Judge Matthews rejected the trustee’s case and found that there was no sham. In doing so, he provided an overview of the burden and standard of proof, the role of judges, the fallibility of memory, notices to admit, the law relating to resulting trusts, the doctrine of sham and the pleading of fraud. The case also involved: (a) claims by the trustee pursuant to sections 339 (transaction at an undervalue) and 423 (transaction defrauding creditors) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), which raised previously unconsidered issues as to the interplay of those two sections with section 419 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002) and (b) an application made on the final day of trial to strike the claim out on the basis of there having been an abuse of process due to the unavailability of documents. Written by Dale Timson, barrister at Enterprise Chambers.

Striking-off by the Registrar of Companies—process The Registrar has power to strike-off a company if they have reasonable cause to believe that the company is not carrying on business or operation (section 1000(1) of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006)). The Registrar is likely to instigate this process if a company has failed to make its annual statutory filings. Prior to strike-off, the Registrar would have served a series of notices on the company and waited for responses to its notices for a certain period of time. If no responses were received (or if positive confirmation was given that the company was not in operation) a notice would also have been published in the Gazette stating that at the end of a two-month period the company will be struck off the register and dissolved. At the end of that

In answering this Q&A, we have focussed on the general position with regards to the entry into simple contracts (not deeds). We have assumed that the company in question is incorporated in England and Wales (and registered under the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006)) in relation to a document exclusively governed by and subject to the law of that jurisdiction. We assume the company has capacity to enter into the transaction and that it is not ultra vires. For the purposes of this Q&A we have focussed on whether entry into the agreement by the shareholder on behalf of the company is effective to bind the company. We have not considered the position of the shareholder signatory themselves or the third party counterparty. Under CA 2006, s 43, a simple contract may be made by: • a company,

Dispute Resolution analysis: The Privy Council was asked to consider whether the appellant, Tianrui IHC Ltd a minority shareholder (Tianrui) enjoyed personal standing to claim against a company when the directors of the company allot shares for an improper purpose. The Privy Council was particularly concerned with the question of whether Tianrui enjoyed a private right to sue the company for a declaration that the power of the company had been invalidly exercised by the board of directors on the company’s behalf? A natural subsidiary question was whether the possibility of ratification by a general meeting was sufficient to cure the irregular exercise of power by the board. Written by Lauren Godfrey, Barrister at Gatehouse Chambers.

Personal Injury analysis: Phillip Melia, solicitor at Horwich Farrelly, examines a Central London County Court appeal decision in Basir v Larisadeh that prevents courts misinterpreting legislation and making decisions with ‘perverse results’ that saw some claimants rewarded—even after they were found to be dishonest.

Dispute Resolution analysis: The court allowed a defendant local authority to set aside judgment in default so as to defend a claim for damages grounded in breach of data principles where the losses claimed were principally for personal injury. In so doing, the court considered the interplay between the discretion to set aside judgments in default and the principles applying to relief from sanctions, reapplying the orthodox view (relying on Dexi Crediop v Regione Piemonte) that the Mitchell/Denton principles will be relevant to whether the discretion should be exercised in favour of an applicant. Written by Lauren Godfrey, barrister at Hardwicke Chambers.