Pensions analysis: In defined circumstances the Spirit (Legacy) Pension Scheme (‘the Scheme’) provided for a supplement to the scheme pension to be paid to a member until he or she reached ‘State pension age’ (a defined term under the relevant rule). Mrs Alexis had brought a complaint to the Pensions Ombudsman about the date to which her supplement fell to be paid—was it 65 (as the Trustee said) or 66 (as she said)? The Pensions Ombudsman sided with Mrs Alexis. In its judgment on the Trustee’s appeal, the court disagreed. The decision turned on the proper construction of the words ‘State pension age has the meaning given by the rules in paragraph 1 of Part 1 of Schedule 4 to the Pensions Act 1995 (rules for equalisation of pensionable ages for men and women)’. Was that definition static or did it capture post-rule amendments to the relevant statute? Written by James Walmsley, barrister at Wilberforce Chambers.

Once a statutory demand is served failure by the debtor to pay the debt within 21 days of service of the statutory demand or to satisfy or secure it to the creditor's satisfaction, or take the appropriate steps to prevent the creditor from acting further on it, will create a presumption of insolvency (on an inability to pay basis) of the debtor. If the debtor fails to pay the sums demanded within 21 days of service or advertisement of the statutory demand, and no application to set aside the statutory demand has been made within 18 days from the date of service or advertisement, the creditor will be free to present a bankruptcy petition, as the debtor will be

What is a general vesting declaration? Where land cannot be acquired by agreement in the shadow of a confirmed compulsory purchase order (CPO) (under section 3 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (CPA 1965)), there are two routes to acquiring title in and taking possession of the land subject to a CPO: • by service of notice to treat and notice of entry under CPA 1965, s 4–13 • by execution of

Electricity Act 1989 Section 10(1) of the Electricity Act 1989 (EA 1989) provides two methods for electricity supply companies (which are licence holders under EA 1989) to obtain rights over land. The first is by compulsory acquisition of the necessary land or rights under EA 1989, Sch 3. The second is by acquisition of a ‘necessary wayleave’, pursuant to EA 1989, Sch 4. For further information, see Practice Note: Statutory wayleaves and rights of access. Compulsory acquisition Schedule 3 incorporates, with important adjustments, provisions of Part I of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965. EA 1989, Sch 3, para

The private rights are independent of the public rights viz-a-viz the highway. Therefore, the private rights persist. The details of the stopping up order should be examined for any illumination on the extent of the

Property analysis: The court adopted a strict approach when interpreting the scope of the power to make vesting orders under section 181 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925). It held that the power is only available to those who had a legal right or entitlement to land as at the date of a company’s dissolution. Written by Oberon Kwok, barrister at Selborne Chambers.

A strict settlement is a settlement created under the Settled Land Act 1925 (SLA 1925) and its predecessors as a device to ensure that land remained within the family. A strict settlement is a trust that is not subject to an immediate trust for sale (for example where land is gifted to a son in a Will, with the property then to be sold on his death). No trusts under SLA 1925 have been able to be created since 1 January 1997 following the coming into force of section 2 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA 1996).

For the purposes of this Q&A it is assumed that: • the employer owns, or has a proprietary interest in, the utilities that were damaged • the employer’s claim is for loss resulting from the physical damage to the utilities • the sub-contractor has not provided the employer with a collateral warranty, or entered into any contract with the employer Liability for the damage Two related issues arise from the potential claims against the contractor and/or sub-contractor. The first concerns what course of action the employer may adopt. The second concerns the matter of substantive liability for the damage—ie which party is ultimately liable. Regarding the course of action the employer might take, it is in

This Q&A assumes that the subtenant is the current owner of the equipment, and the intention is to transfer ownership in the equipment to the landlord. We have also assumed that the landlord and subtenant are both acting in the course of business. Transferring ownership of the equipment In order to transfer ownership of (or title in) the equipment from the subtenant to the intermediate landlord, the subtenant must agree to sell and the intermediate landlord must agree to buy the equipment. It is not clear what the proposed terms of the ‘deed of surrender’ are, but any agreed sale of equipment must satisfy the usual rules on formation of a valid contract (ie there must be a valid offer and acceptance, valuable consideration, and certainty of

Commentary suggests that where a subtenant seeks to acquire the freehold of a house pursuant to the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 (LRA 1967), the proceedings which arise out of the subtenant’s notice must be conducted by ‘the reversioner’ on behalf of all parties who hold

Tenancies within the LTA 1954 The LTA 1954, s 23 provides that a tenancy is within the LTA 1954 if the whole or a part of the demised premises is occupied by the tenant for the purposes of his business or for those and other purposes. The expression 'business' includes any trade, profession or employment. It also includes any activity carried on by a body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate. Thus, there are three essential conditions if the protection of the Act is to be secured: • there must be a tenancy. A mere licence does not confer statutory protection • the tenant must occupy at least a part of the premises. A lease of a right of way is not in itself within the Act because it is not capable of being occupied within the meaning of

Arbitration analysis: The court set aside an arbitral award pursuant to section 68(2) because the arbitral tribunal had failed to address a defence (limitation) raised by the claimant. Had it done so, it might well have reached a conclusion favourable to the claimant. The court held that Jewish law is not the law of ‘any other country’ and it does not therefore displace English limitation law. Section 13 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) provides that the Limitation Acts apply to arbitrations as they apply to court proceedings and, as the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 (FLPA 1984) did not apply, the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980) applied. Written by Jennifer Haywood, barrister at Serle Court.