Limitation in professional negligence claims Solicitors owe duties to their clients in both contract and tort. Under the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980), the limitation period for both contract and tort claims is six years, but time starts to run: • in contract—from the date of breach • in negligence—from the occurrence of damage Damage is capable of occurring later than breach, with the effect that tort claims in negligence can sometimes provide a more generous limitation period than a corresponding claim in contract. For further information, including on the question as to when damage might be said to have been sustained in tort

This Q&A considers a situation where an intestate left two minor children. As such it would seem, in the absence of anyone of higher degree, they were entitled to take out letters of administration to the estate. In those circumstances, we assume that the grant was obtained by someone with parental responsibility (see Commentary: 62 Oath for administration by persons with parental responsibility pursuant to a residence order or child arrangements order for minor children jointly entitled to the whole of the estate: Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents [1609]) lasting until one of the children reaches 18 years of age. It is not clear whether

Dispute Resolution analysis: In a dispute over whether solicitors were in breach of an order to disclose their entire client file to their clients in proceedings under the Solicitors Act 1974 (SA 1974), Costs Judge Nagalingam held that the firm’s failure to disclose WhatsApp messages rendered it in breach. Any items of communication for which a charge had been made necessarily formed part of the file. This included messages sent via WhatsApp, for which systems should have been in place to extract and save their contents. Written by David Juckes, barrister at Hailsham Chambers.

Section 105 of the Law of Property Act 1925 sets out the order in which any surplus monies should be applied following the exercise of a mortgagee’s power of sale. Where there are subsequent incumbrancers, the surplus proceeds should be passed to them

Where an overpayment of periodical payments has been made, two routes for recoupment are provided for by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). First, MCA 1973, s 38 provides for orders for repayment to be made after cessation of an order by way of remarriage. Secondly, MCA 1973, s 33 provides for orders for repayment of maintenance orders to be made where there has been a change of circumstances of either party. It is presumed that the former does not apply to the circumstances under consideration. On the brief facts outlined in the question, it is difficult to determine whether they might amount to a ‘change of circumstances’. MCA 1973, s 33 is not regularly encountered

Interest does not accrue on a lump sum made in the financial remedy order until that lump sum has become payable under its own terms and subject to the order having taken effect upon the final divorce order (ie, on whichever is the later date). Lump sum orders for not less than £5,000 automatically carry interest at 8% until satisfied, unless the court otherwise orders (Judgments Act 1838, Judgment Debts (Rate of Interest) Order 1993, SI 1993/564, s 17 and County Courts (Interest on Judgment Debts)

This Q&A assumes that the stock transfer form complies with sections 554 and 768–790 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), and the Stock Transfer Act 1963. The transfer of the legal title to shares in a company will take effect on the date of the entry of the transferee in the register of members of the company. A duly executed, dated and unconditional contract for the transfer of shares (which may include a

On an application for financial remedies, the court has the power to divide up the assets of parties to a marriage. This can include pension assets. This is now ordinarily done by way of a pension sharing order (under section 24B of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973)), which has the effect of separating out a defined proportion of the existing pension and creating a new pension fund for the benefit of the receiving party. The court also has the power to make pension attachment orders, where the pension remains the property of one party, but the provider of the pension is required to pay a proportion of the income from the pension to the other party when the pension is

Section 30 of the Family Law Act 1996 (FLA 1996) provides that where one spouse (or civil partner) has the right to occupy a dwelling-house, for example because they are the legal and beneficial owner as in the scenario of this question, the other spouse (or civil partner) has home rights. The non-owning spouse can protect those home rights by registering a charge with the Land Registry. Such a registration often does not indicate that the non-owning spouse actually intends to occupy the property, but rather is important protection for the non-owning spouse against third parties such as potential purchasers. There are certain restrictions

Paragraph 6 of the SRA Code of Conduct for Firms 2019 deals with conflicts of interest, in conjunction with SRA guidance dated 29 October 2019. Client conflict may exist where a solicitor’s separate duties to act in the best interests of two or more clients conflict (known as ‘conflict of interest’ in the SRA 2019 regulatory

Divorce petition and dispensing with service In some cases, the simplest and often the most cost-effective method will be for the petitioner to apply for a divorce under section 1(2)(e) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and for an order dispensing with service of the petition. For details of how to apply to dispense with service, see Practice Note: Service of applications for matrimonial and civil partnership orders within the jurisdiction (pre-DDSA 2020). Note that full enquiries must be made in an effort to trace the respondent. The court will not lightly make an order dispensing with service. Failure to make full enquiries of the respondent's whereabouts may result in the court treating it as a defect in service

Following remarriage, there is an almost absolute bar found in section 28(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) on the court’s jurisdiction to entertain a fresh financial remedy application on divorce etc. This extends to financial provision orders and property adjustment orders, but not to pension sharing orders. The bar does not extend to capital applications made prior to remarriage, but proceeded with thereafter. For this purpose, an application is considered made