Disrepair

Landlord’s repairing obligations

In the absence of any express contractual obligation or the intervention of statute, a landlord's obligations in relation to the fabric of premises demised are limited. At common law, the general rule is that in the absence of express stipulation or of a statutory duty, the landlord is under no liability to put the premises into repair at the commencement of the tenancy, nor normally will they be under any such liability during the continuance of the tenancy, whether the letting is from year to year or for a term of years. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this general principle which arise by statutory intervention or by reason of the circumstances of a particular case by virtue of the common law, see further Practice Note: Landlord and tenant implied repairing obligations and the doctrine of waste — Landlord's repairing obligations and: Landlords' covenants implied at common law in particular circumstances: Hill and Redman's Law of Landlord and Tenant [3444] and Landlords' covenants implied by statute: Hill and Redman's Law of Landlord and Tenant [3461].

Those most relevant statutory obligations on a local authority as

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To be or not to be…the recurring question of when a homelessness application is an application at all (R (Lyrae) v Somerset Council)

Local Government analysis: The High Court has followed the dicta of the Court of Appeal in Rikha Begum (as explained and applied in Minott and Ivory) that the proper approach to whether a further ‘fresh’ homeless application amounts to an application at all involves two stages of inquiry: firstly, is the subsequent application an application at all (‘stage one’), to which the answer will only be ‘no’ if it is based on precisely the same facts as the previous application (disregarding fanciful allegations and trivial facts); and secondly, if it is an application, is it well-founded which involves s.184-type inquiries (‘stage two’). In quashing and remitting Somerset’s refusal to accept a purported second application from Ms Lyrae, Eyre J rejected Somerset’s legal submissions that (i) ‘significant’ new evidence of fact meant evidence of substance which advanced matters relevant to the issue for determination, (ii) that a subsequent application was restricted where it was based on new evidence in support of a previously asserted fact if that evidence was available to the applicant at the time of the previous application, and (iii) that it was highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. He went on to find that Somerset had erred in three respects in their decision, mischaracterising the basis of the review decision, misinterpreting new evidence and carrying out stage two inquiries into the weight of that evidence at stage one. Written by Stephanie Smith, barrister at 4-5 Gray’s Inn Square.

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