Refine By
Clear all filter
About 90774 results for "*"
A lawful development certificate is being sought for a farm dwelling. The property is subject to a planning condition which only allows occupation of the dwelling to a person solely, mainly or last employed in the locality in agriculture. The applicant has lived in the dwelling for over 15 years. The applicant (as the co-owner of the farming enterprise) has employed a farm worker to run the farming operations and has confirmed that he has not been involved with farming activities. The source of the applicant’s current income is unknown but the applicant has confirmed that no income has been derived from the farming operations or by him from any other agriculture or forestry in the last ten years. Would this constitute a breach of the planning condition? Is there any case law on the words ‘solely, mainly or last employed in the locality in agriculture’? As a co-owner of the farming enterprise would this satisfy the planning condition?
Q&As
Section 171B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 states that a breach in a planning condition achieves immunity from
A lawful development certificate was granted for the occupation of a dwelling by someone not employed in agriculture thus rendering the agricultural occupancy condition unenforceable. Can there be any sound reason to refuse a section 73 application to remove the condition?
Q&As
The Local Planning Authority (LPA) in this situation may be relying on the judgment in R v Coventry City Council Ex p Arrowcroft Group Plc, which is sometimes cited to refuse an application under section 73 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990) which seeks to amend conditions which would be inconsistent with the description of development authorised by the original permission. In Arrowcroft, the court held that LPAs can only impose different conditions upon a new planning permission under TCPA 1990, s 73 if they are conditions which the LPA could lawfully have
A lease contains a pre-emption right allowing the landlord to take a surrender for the same price as the tenant is seeking to assign the lease for. The tenant dies and the lease vests in their PRs. The PRs are looking to vest the lease in the beneficiaries under the Will. Will this constitute an assignment which might trigger the pre-emption right?
Q&As
The drafting of the definition of a disposal in the right of pre-emption will dictate what is included as a trigger. The definition of the trigger event should be clearly defined. From the buyer/landlord’s perspective, the definition of a disposal triggering the right of pre-emption
A lease contains an option to renew. The option does not set out a time frame in which completion of the option is to take place. Is there any way of forcing the tenant to complete?
Q&As
A contractual option to take a lease for a further term is a ‘call’ option. It confers a unilateral right on the tenant to call for a renewal lease (often subject to conditions precedent such as all rents being paid up to date and the tenant not being in material breach of covenant). There is no obligation on the tenant to exercise their right, but if they do, the landlord is bound
A lease contains rent review provisions with a rent review date of December 2016 that remains outstanding. The lease allows the landlord to recover outstanding rent that is due following a backdated rent review. In April 2022, a new landlord was assigned the benefit of the lease. Can the new landlord initiate the rent review and are they entitled to recover sums which relate to a period before they were landlord?
Q&As
We have assumed that time is not of the essence, and the rent review can be validly triggered by the current landlord. There is a presumption that time is not of the essence in rent review clauses (United Scientific Holdings v Burnley Borough Council). However, the terms of the relevant lease should be carefully considered, as this presumption can be rebutted by the express words of the lease. If time is not of the essence, this means that the rent review can be triggered many years after the review
A lease defines the ‘estate’ as ‘land now or formerly registered at HM Land Registry’ under a specified title number. The lease contains a reservation permitting the landlord to deal with the estate. If the landlord sells off part of the land, will that land no longer form part of the estate for the purposes of the lease?
Q&As
When a plot of land is subject to a number of leases it is common for the landlord to reserve the right to deal with such parts of it as are not demised. This might extend to a right (such as it would be required) to grant further leases or to impose regulations as to the extent to which the tenants might use or enjoy those other parts without having exclusive possession of them under the terms of the leases. For these purposes it will be necessary to identify the land over which the landlord has those rights. Alternatively, the concept might be used as a means
A lease extension outside of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 was proceeding when all other tenants served a section 13 notice for collective enfranchisement of the property. The lease extension has been suspended by virtue of the enfranchisement. However, the freeholder has been approached by the tenant who was seeking the lease extension, who has asked whether a deed of variation could be entered into to clarify the extent of their demise. The extent of the demise will not be changing. Legally, can this be done?
Q&As
By section 19 of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 (LRHUDA 1993): ‘(1) Where the initial notice [ie the section 13 notice] has been registered in accordance with section 97(1) [ie under the Land Charges Act 1972 (for unregistered land) or Land Registration Act 2002 (for registered land)], then so long as it continues in force: (a) any person who owns the freehold of the whole or any part of the specified premises or the freehold of any property specified in the notice under section 13(3)(a)(ii)
A lease for a term of less than seven years includes a tenant's option to purchase the freehold reversion. Is it a requirement that notice of the option must be registered at the Land Registry or is the option invalid if notice of its existence is not registered against the freehold title?
Q&As
An option for a tenant to purchase the freehold is collateral to, independent of, and therefore, not incident to the relation of landlord and tenant. It relates to the freehold and not the leasehold interest. Regardless of whether
A lease has a clause which states that where the property is subject to a superior lease then, provided a copy of the superior lease is supplied, the tenant will 'observe all of the non-financial covenants on the part of the landlord (as lessee under the superior lease) as set out in the superior lease of the premises, a copy of which has been provided to the tenant prior to the date of this tenancy'. If the superior lease was never in fact provided to the tenant prior to signing, can the landlord enforce it on the tenant?
Q&As
The application and enforcement of any lease covenant is always a matter of interpretation of the covenant, in the context of the lease as a whole, and taking into account the relevant factual background. For guidance, see Practice Notes: Contract interpretation—the guiding principles and Contract interpretation—rules of contract interpretation. As a matter of normal language, where (as here) a
A lease has been executed as a deed, although it is not clear from the face of it that it is a deed. The lease has been registered at the Land Registry with no issues. Does this lead to the conclusion that, although the lease does not use the word deed, it is in fact a deed and the registration is valid?
Q&As
Section 52 of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that all conveyances of land or of any interest therein are void for the purpose of conveying or creating a legal estate unless made by deed. In order to be a valid deed, the document must be in writing, it must be clear on the face of the document that it is intended to be a deed (for example the document could describe itself as a deed), and it must be validly executed as a deed. Some deeds need to be in a specific form pursuant to the Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/1417, r 206. Whether the deed is valid will
A lease has been forfeited by court order and a possession order obtained. Can the locks be changed even if the former tenant objects, or is a writ/warrant needed to prevent an offence under section 6 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 if the tenant is at the property?
Q&As
Eviction of a tenant Section 6(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 (CLA 1977) states: 'Subject to the following provisions of this section, any person who, without lawful authority, uses or threatens violence for the purpose of securing entry into any premises for himself or for any other person is guilty of an offence, provided that— (a) there is someone present on those premises at the time who is opposed to the entry which the violence is intended to secure; and (b) the person using or threatening the violence knows that that is the case.' Under the legislation which governed forcible entry to premises prior to the coming into force of CLA 1977, it had been held that merely removing locks was not unlawful so long as there
A lease has been granted for a term of more than seven years and to take effect in two months' time, when the current lease expires. When should the new lease be registered at the Land Registry—now or when the current lease expires?
Q&As
Nature of a reversionary lease The expression 'reversionary lease' describes a lease under which the right to possession is postponed so as to take effect upon the expiry of an existing lease. Compulsory registration Sections 4(1)(c) and 27(2)(b)(i) of the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002) provide for compulsory registration of a lease which is granted (out of either an unregistered or registered title) 'for a term of years absolute of more than seven years from the date of the grant'. LRA 2002, s 6 provides that the period within