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Although each uses it quite freely, neither the rules nor the Act which they amplify (the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002)) contains a definition of the word 'disposition'. This is unlike, for example, section 2(6) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 (LP(MP)A 1989) which adopts the definition in section 205(ii) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925) namely that it 'includes a conveyance and also a devise, bequest, or an appointment of property contained in a will.' It is immediately apparent from the use of the word 'includes' that the list which follows it gives examples rather than stands as an exhaustive definition. Even though both deal with the subject of land, one cannot apply the definition of a word in one Act to another. If Parliament intended to do so, it could have included it in the extensive collection of definitions in LRA 2002, s 132. The
Q&As
There is no statutory definition of ‘a robot’ in England and Wales and there is no recognised global legal definition of the term. Some jurisdictions have looked to introduce their own definition, for example, South Korean law defines a robot in the following way: ‘An intelligent robot is an autonomous machine that understands its external environment independently, that operates and reacts alone.’ However, this and other attempts to define the term have not been adopted by the criminal or civil law regimes in England and Wales. There is also no one agreed definition of robot among roboticists. The various definitions reflect specific research interests or design paradigms. Some roboticists qualify robots as mechanical objects that can do three things—they can sense, think and act. A technology does not ‘act’ by offering information in comprehensible form. ‘Acting’ means to have physical influence and therefore a software
Q&As
The term ‘beneficiary’ in relation to jurisdiction is referred to in Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, Brussels I (recast) in: • Articles 7(6) and 25(3) of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, Brussels I (recast) when dealing with trusts, and • section 3 of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, Brussels I (recast) (starting at Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, Brussels I (recast)) and Articles 26 and 31(4) of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, Brussels I (recast) in relation to Insurance contracts However, there is no definition of beneficiary within the regulation. It may be that the term is not defined within the regulation as the term beneficiary would be a defined term within either the trust instrument or the insurance contract. The definition would, therefore, be taken from the underlying trust instrument or insurance contract and so a definition is not required within the regulation. Trusts When dealing with a trust, the court with jurisdiction will generally be that where the trust, rather than the beneficiaries, is domiciled (Article 7(6)
Q&As
Cremation is defined at regulation 2(1) of the Cremation (England and Wales) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/2841 (SI 2008/2841, reg 2(1)) as ‘the burning of human remains’. Crematorium is defined in the Cremation Act 1902 (CA 1902) as ‘any building fitting with appliances for the purposes of burning human remains’. Alkaline hydrolysis does not
Q&As
Signed or executed as a deed The wording of section 1(2) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 (LP(MP)A 1989) confirms that an instrument must make clear on its face that it is intended to be a deed. LP(MP)A 1989, s 1(2) states: ‘(2) An instrument shall not be a deed unless— (a) it makes it clear on its face that it is intended to be a deed by the person making it or, as the case may be, by the parties to it (whether by describing itself as a deed or expressing itself to be executed or signed as a deed or otherwise)’ Therefore, an instrument that describes itself as being executed by deed, and an instrument that describes itself as being signed by deed will both constitute deeds (provided the other requirements in (LP(MP)A 1989, s 1(2) are met). From the wording
Q&As
Since the introduction of the SRA Accounts Rules 2019, there is no longer any express requirements regarding agreed and fixed fees. The SRA removed the concept of agreed fees and therefore the 2019 Rules now treat all money for fees equally. While the Account Rules may not distinguish between fixed and agreed fees, there are still specific costs obligations
Q&As
As explained in Practice Note: SDLT chargeable consideration—leases, the SDLT on rent for a lease is calculated by reference to a formula based on the net present value of the rent paid over the term of the lease. Practice Notes: SDLT—general reliefs and exemptions and SDLT—holding over explain that overlap relief is available to prevent a double charge to SDLT where one lease is replaced with another (over substantially the same premises) and the periods of the leases overlap. There are two provisions providing for overlap relief set out in paragraphs 9 and 9A of Schedule 17A to the Finance Act 2003 (FA 2003)—the first deals with the general circumstances where there has been a grant of a further lease; the second with the specific scenario of a backdated
Q&As
The key dates to consider for the purposes of service differ depending on whether acting for the claimant or the defendant: • claimant—the effected date of service as set out in CPR 7.5 • defendant—the deemed date of service as set out in CPR 6.14 We refer you to the decision in T & L Sugars Ltd v Tate & Lyle Industries Ltd, in which Flaux J disagreed with the reasoning of the decision
Q&As
The implications of using different terminology are likely to depend on the specific circumstances as interpreted by the relevant court. This Q&A considers the implications of using different terminology in a contract in the context of both contract formation and contract interpretation. Contract formation A contract will only be capable of being enforced if it an offer has been accepted. An acceptance is a final and unqualified expression of assent to the terms of an offer. This means that the following will not generally be sufficient to constitute acceptance: • mere acknowledgement of receipt of the offer • assent to an offer, which contains two alternative
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It is trite to say that where one of the ‘expressions’ above is used in a statute or document, its precise meaning will depend on the specific context. For example, in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Newnham College, Cambridge, Hoffman LJ considered the meaning of the word ‘occupation’ and observed (in the context of a VAT case): ‘In choosing the concept of occupation, Parliament must have been aware that it came with a well understood meaning… I do not think that there was ever a time when a mere physical presence on land for the purpose of making use of it, like playing a round of golf, would have been regarded as occupation. Furthermore, other parts of [the VAT statute] … show that Parliament was well aware that ‘occupation’ of land and ‘use’ of land are different concepts…. [A person in ‘occupation’ must have] … “the right to occupy property as if that person were the owner and to exclude any other person from enjoyment of such
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In answering this Q&A, we have assumed that by the Court of Protection’s ‘approved professional list’ the Q&A is referring to the Court of Protection’s list of panel deputies. The process of applying for a deputyship
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Forfeiture is the right by a landlord to determine a lease in the event of some default by the tenant. There needs to be a provision for forfeiture in the lease. It is most commonly encountered with fixed term commercial leases where typically the lease will have been drafted to contain specific provisos permitting forfeiture in the event of rent arrears for a certain period, bankruptcy of the lessee or breach of other covenants. The two main methods for effecting forfeiture are: • peaceable re-entry (namely, going in and changing the locks), or • issuing and serving a possession claim Peaceable re-entry Forfeiture by peaceable re-entry is only permissible with commercial premises. Most residential premises have the benefit of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 (PEA 1977) which makes it a criminal offence to evict a tenant without a court order. A property is classified