IP analysis: This is an appeal against the decision issued by the first instance court in a Case Management Conference (CMC) between OnePlus Technology (Appellant) and InterDigital (Respondent). The CMC was part of an infringement proceedings involving Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). The case management decision ruled on, among others, the terms of a confidentiality regime which regulates the disclosure of SEP licensing agreements by the claimant, InterDigital, to other parties. The confidentiality terms for disclosing the licences took a wide form, which prevented individuals from the defendants, OnePlus, who have access to the disclosed agreements from participating in any SEP licensing negotiations for a period of two years. OnePlus appealed the decision arguing that the order should take a narrower, less restrictive form which applies only to licensing discussions with the counterparts in the disclosed agreements. The Court of Appeal carefully evaluated of the nature of the risks of unfairness associated with both the wide and narrow forms of undertaking, and took into account the particular circumstances of this case, including the stage of the proceedings and the evidence available regarding the defendants’ organisation and structure. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal concluded that the wide form undertaking was appropriate and dismissed the appeal. Written by Nigel Lee, associate, patent attorney, and Jonathan DeVile, partner, patent attorney, at D Young & Co LLP.

Family analysis: This was an appeal by the father against a decision of Ms Justice Henke not to impose any sanction on the mother despite her having been found repeatedly to have been in breach of orders made by the court in private law Children Act 1989 proceedings in respect of their child .The basis of the court's decision was that an order of imprisonment or a suspended sentence would have no effect on the mother's attitude or secure future compliance. The appellate court held that the judge was wrong in imposing no sanction and the matter was remitted to the High Court for reconsideration of sentence, re-enforcing the fact that punishment for breach of court orders serves as an essential aspect of upholding judicial authority as well as ensuring compliance. Aimee Jones, senior associate at Sternberg Reed LLP, considers the decision.

Local Government analysis: An appeal was allowed against refusal by the first instance judge to authorise the deprivation of liberty of a child using the inherent jurisdiction of the Family Division. The first instance judge had held that he was precluded from granting permission to the local authority to invoke the inherent jurisdiction on the basis that an alternative order (to authorise placement in secure accommodation) was available under section 25 of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989). That approach was held to be flawed because there was no secure accommodation available to the child for section 25 purposes. Moreover, the first instance Judge had erred in his analysis of whether there was reasonable cause to believe that the child was likely to suffer significant harm if an order was not granted: the Judge’s approach to ‘harm’ was too narrow and failed to consider the potential for emotional and psychological harm, requiring analysis of the background and context. A deprivation of liberty authorisation was granted. Written by Siân Davies, barrister at 39 Essex Chambers.

Dispute Resolution analysis: On appeal, Mr Justice Fancourt has concluded that Chief Insolvency and Companies Court Judge (ICCJ) Briggs erred in his determination of an application the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016, rule 14.8. The judge had been wrong to find that a bankrupt was not bound by a guarantee which appeared to bear his signature following claims by the bankrupt that his signature had been forged. Written by Phillip Patterson, barrister, Gatehouse Chambers.

Local Government analysis: The case London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham v KS and another (SEN) (Special educational needs—other) considers the effects of the First Tier Tribunal (FtT) failing to address evidence provided before them when making a decision. The Upper Tribunal contended that an appeal would be allowed on a point of law based on the failure to address evidence, but emphasised that the decision to allow the appeal had no implication as to the eventual outcome of the case.

A challenge to a decision of the lower courts can be brought in various ways, including by way of appeal, judicial review or an appeal by way of case stated. This Practice Note is concerned with appeals by way of case stated. For detailed guidance on appeals in criminal matters, see: Criminal appeals—overview. For further information on judicial review proceedings, see Practice Note: Judicial review of magistrates' court and Crown Court decisions. Challenging a decision which is wrong in law or in excess of jurisdiction An appeal by way of case stated is an appeal to a superior court on the basis of a set of facts (case) specified by the inferior court (stated) for the superior court to make a decision on the application of the law to those facts. The appeal identifies the decision in issue, the questions of law or jurisdiction on which the opinion of the High Court is asked and should include a succinct summary of the nature and history of the proceedings, the lower court's relevant findings

The High Court’s Queens Bench division has dismissed Richard Slade and Co Ltd’s (Appellant) appeal against Murray (Respondent), maintaining that the Respondent should not bear the costs of two separate bills referred to the ‘counsel’s fees Bill’  and the ‘Hodders fees Bill’ respectively.

Private Client analysis: Costs are a hot topic in litigation over estates. The appeal case of Lumb v Lumb provides a cautionary reminder of the costs risks of probate disputes. Stuart had entered a caveat in the estate of his mother, Mrs Lumb, but not proceeded to advance his claim. His brother, Michael, therefore issued legal proceedings seeking pronouncement in solemn form in favour of Mrs Lumb’s last Will. Michael subsequently applied for summary judgment. This was granted, however, unusually the judge did not grant Michael his costs saying he was required to follow CPR 57.7(5)(b) which required no order for costs unless it was considered there were no reasonable grounds for opposing the Will. Michael appealed this unsatisfactory decision on costs. The appeal court agreed with him, reviewing well known probate cases on costs and interpreting CPR 57.7(5)(b) more narrowly, and in light of the costs ethos of the Civil Procedure Rules.

Life sciences analysis: The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision in favour of AstraZeneca in relation to payments due under an agreement for the development of a new Alzheimer’s treatment drug. The Court of Appeal held that compounds discovered after the collaboration between the two parties had ended were not discovered as part of a programme between the parties, therefore the appellants were not entitled to milestone payments under the agreement. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and Astex Therapeutics was ordered to pay back payments already received and were held not to be entitled to any further payments.

The interests of justice test The single test for allowing an appeal against conviction is whether the conviction is unsafe. If the grounds of appeal submitted refer to fresh evidence which was not adduced at trial, the same test applies. Under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (CAA 1968), the Court of Appeal has the power to admit fresh evidence if it is deemed necessary or expedient in the interests of justice. This applies to appeals against conviction, appeals against sentence and references to the Court of Appeal by the Home Secretary. These powers extend to hearings of applications for leave to appeal as well as the appeal itself or an appeal against the findings of a Newton hearing. CAA 1968, s 23 only comes into operation if a right to appeal under CAA 1968, s 1 exists. Once the Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal against conviction under CAA 1968, s 1, the court has no jurisdiction to hear a subsequent application for leave to appeal, even where the

An independent panel deciding appeals against refusal by the admission authority of admission to a state school.

Appeal No. HU/1234/2025 IN THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Between: MAGGIE SMITH Appellant – and – Secretary of state for the home department Respondent ___________________ SCHEDULE 1 — FINANCIAL EVIDENCE ___________________ Introduction References