Local Government analysis: The King’s College NHS Foundation Trust (the Trust) sought permission from the local planning authority (‘Bromley’) for the construction of a new endoscopy unit at the Princess Royal University Hospital. The Bromley planning committee granted the application by a majority of one, against the recommendation of the officer. The claimant, a local resident, sought judicial review of that decision. At an oral renewal hearing permission was granted to bring the claim on one of six grounds, namely the decision was tainted by apparent bias arising from the fact that one member of the committee who had voted in favour (Councillor McPartlan) was also a governor of the Trust. At the substantive hearing, the claimant also relied on Councillor McPartlan’s position as trustee of a small charity ‘Billie’s Fund’ set up following his wife’s diagnosis with leukemia to support various healthcare related causes. Councillor McPartlan had complied with the local ‘Code of Conduct for Councillors’ adopted by Bromley (‘the Bromley Code’), which required that he declare his interests but did not require that he recuse himself. The claim was dismissed by Mr Justice Lane, who held that a fair-minded and informed observer would not consider that there was a real possibility a member of the planning committee was biased. This conclusion was based on a close factual analysis of Councillor McPartlan’s role as governor, and on the fact that he had complied with the Bromley Code which was not itself unlawful or unreasonable. Written by Siân McGibbon, barrister at Landmark Chambers.

In practice, apparent authority (or ostensible authority) describes when a principal is bound by an agent’s act because the principal’s words, conduct or the agent’s position reasonably led a third party to believe the agent had authority, even if no actual authority existed.A case-law doctrine in agency law (see Freeman & Lockyer; Armagas v Mundogas), it turns on: a representation or holding out attributable to the principal (including by appointing someone to a role such as managing director); the third party’s reasonable, good-faith reliance; and a transaction of a kind ordinarily within that role’s scope. An agent’s assertion is not enough. If the third party knows of limits, or is put on inquiry, the principal is not bound.For companies, this operates alongside statutory protections for persons dealing with a company in good faith (Companies Act 2006, section 40; comparable protections under Ireland’s Companies Act 2014). For partnerships, the Partnership Act 1890 attributes acts of a partner in the usual course of business to the firm unless the third party knows of a lack of authority.Usage and effect are broadly consistent across England & Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Ireland, and central to transactional risk and due diligence.

The process by which an employee appeals the decision of an employer (for example following a termination or disciplinary hearing) or Court or Tribunal.

A judicial office created by Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 following Scottish Civil Courts Review, which reported in 2009.

Appeal No. HU/1234/2025 IN THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Between: MAGGIE SMITH Appellant – and – Secretary of state for the home department Respondent ___________________ APPEAL SKELETON ARGUMENT ___________________ 1 Mrs Maggie Smith (‘the Appellant’) appeals against the decision set out in the Respondent’s Reasons for Refusal Letter (‘the RFRL’) dated 14 February 2025. The Appellant appeals under section 82(1)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the refusal of her human rights claim, on the basis that her removal would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, because it would constitute a disproportionate interference with Article 8 ECHR. FACTUAL SUMMARY 2 The Appellant is a French national born 18 January 2000. She is married to Bernie Smith, a British national, born 14 February 1999. The couple met in the UK and married in the UK on 1 January 2024. 3 The Appellant arrived in the UK in 2019 on a student visa, which she varied to a graduate visa in 2022. After her marriage to Mr Smith she sought to switch in-time to a partner visa. She submitted her application on 1 November

The Planning Inspectorate has dismissed an appeal against a Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) surcharge. The appeal was made under the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010, SI 2010/948, reg 117(1)(b) as it was claimed the collecting authority had failed to serve a Liability Notice ‘as soon as practicable’ after the relevant permission was issued.

This Practice Note explains how to appeal to the Crown Court against a sentence imposed by the magistrates’ court. It may be read in conjunction with Practice Note: Appealing a conviction in the Crown Court. For detailed guidance on appealing a sentence imposed in the Crown Court, see Practice Notes: Starting an appeal in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division (CACD) and Criminal appeals—certificates of fitness to appeal from the Crown Court. Asking the magistrates’ to correct minor errors in sentence The magistrates’ court has the power to vary, rescind or set aside a sentence or other order made on conviction (such as costs order, disqualification order and victim surcharge order) if it is the interests of justice to do so save where the Crown Court or the High Court has determined an appeal about that sentence or order. If a minor error in sentence has been made by the magistrates’, practitioners should consider applying to the magistrates’ to vary or correct the sentence, rather than commencing a full appeal against sentence

IP analysis: This is an appeal against the decision issued by the first instance court in a Case Management Conference (CMC) between OnePlus Technology (Appellant) and InterDigital (Respondent). The CMC was part of an infringement proceedings involving Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). The case management decision ruled on, among others, the terms of a confidentiality regime which regulates the disclosure of SEP licensing agreements by the claimant, InterDigital, to other parties. The confidentiality terms for disclosing the licences took a wide form, which prevented individuals from the defendants, OnePlus, who have access to the disclosed agreements from participating in any SEP licensing negotiations for a period of two years. OnePlus appealed the decision arguing that the order should take a narrower, less restrictive form which applies only to licensing discussions with the counterparts in the disclosed agreements. The Court of Appeal carefully evaluated of the nature of the risks of unfairness associated with both the wide and narrow forms of undertaking, and took into account the particular circumstances of this case, including the stage of the proceedings and the evidence available regarding the defendants’ organisation and structure. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal concluded that the wide form undertaking was appropriate and dismissed the appeal. Written by Nigel Lee, associate, patent attorney, and Jonathan DeVile, partner, patent attorney, at D Young & Co LLP.

Family analysis: This was an appeal by the father against a decision of Ms Justice Henke not to impose any sanction on the mother despite her having been found repeatedly to have been in breach of orders made by the court in private law Children Act 1989 proceedings in respect of their child .The basis of the court's decision was that an order of imprisonment or a suspended sentence would have no effect on the mother's attitude or secure future compliance. The appellate court held that the judge was wrong in imposing no sanction and the matter was remitted to the High Court for reconsideration of sentence, re-enforcing the fact that punishment for breach of court orders serves as an essential aspect of upholding judicial authority as well as ensuring compliance. Aimee Jones, senior associate at Sternberg Reed LLP, considers the decision.

Local Government analysis: An appeal was allowed against refusal by the first instance judge to authorise the deprivation of liberty of a child using the inherent jurisdiction of the Family Division. The first instance judge had held that he was precluded from granting permission to the local authority to invoke the inherent jurisdiction on the basis that an alternative order (to authorise placement in secure accommodation) was available under section 25 of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989). That approach was held to be flawed because there was no secure accommodation available to the child for section 25 purposes. Moreover, the first instance Judge had erred in his analysis of whether there was reasonable cause to believe that the child was likely to suffer significant harm if an order was not granted: the Judge’s approach to ‘harm’ was too narrow and failed to consider the potential for emotional and psychological harm, requiring analysis of the background and context. A deprivation of liberty authorisation was granted. Written by Siân Davies, barrister at 39 Essex Chambers.

Dispute Resolution analysis: On appeal, Mr Justice Fancourt has concluded that Chief Insolvency and Companies Court Judge (ICCJ) Briggs erred in his determination of an application the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016, rule 14.8. The judge had been wrong to find that a bankrupt was not bound by a guarantee which appeared to bear his signature following claims by the bankrupt that his signature had been forged. Written by Phillip Patterson, barrister, Gatehouse Chambers.

Local Government analysis: The case London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham v KS and another (SEN) (Special educational needs—other) considers the effects of the First Tier Tribunal (FtT) failing to address evidence provided before them when making a decision. The Upper Tribunal contended that an appeal would be allowed on a point of law based on the failure to address evidence, but emphasised that the decision to allow the appeal had no implication as to the eventual outcome of the case.