IP & IT analysis: Following an unsuccessful libel claim by Tim Yeo, former MP against the Times Newspapers Ltd, what lessons can be learnt about the scope of the Reynolds privilege and the application of article 8 in defamation claims?

IP & IT analysis: How has the court approached the public interest defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 (DA 2013)? Andrew Reeves, senior associate at Squire Patton Boggs, comments on the first detailed ruling on this public interest defence—where the court reiterated that the boundaries of what may be published on matters of public policy are generous.

IP & IT analysis: Adam Wolanski, barrister at 5RB, examines Simpson v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd and explains how the Court of Appeal considered the proposition that the meaning of a defamatory statement does not necessarily establish the intensity of its sting.

This Practice Note has been archived and is for historical purposes only. The defamation costs pilot scheme ended on 31 March 2013. For information on costs budgeting, see: Costs budgeting and costs management—overview. What is it? The Scheme requires parties in defamation proceedings (ie proceedings which include allegations of libel, slander and/or malicious falsehood) to provide the court with a detailed estimate of future base costs ('Costs Budget'). These Costs Budgets are required to be regularly updated by the parties and will then be either approved or disapproved by the court. In effect, they will set the marker for future costs recovery and the court will not depart from an approved Costs Budget without good reason. The purpose of the Scheme is to ensure that the court has sufficient costs information to manage the litigation so that the parties are on an equal footing and the costs incurred by the parties are proportionate to the value of the claim and the reputational issues (and, as from 1 October 2011, public interest issues) at stake. The court

Defences There are a number of substantive defences to a defamation claim, the majority of which are now, since the Defamation Act 2013 (DA 2013), statutory. Any number of defences may be relied upon together in answer to a claim. Truth There is a presumption that defamatory words are false and the burden of proving the words are true lies on the defendant. Proving that the substance of a defamatory statement is true is a complete defence. The defence of truth used to be known as justification, but this received statutory codification under DA 2013, s 2. The defence at common law was abolished and section 5 of the Defamation Act 1952 (DA 1952) was repealed. Pleading and procedural requirements in defamation actions are governed by CPR PD 53B and contain specific requirements for defences of truth. Note that CPR PD 53B replaced CPR PD 53 with effect from 1 October 2019 (see News Analyses: 109th practice direction update—July to October 2019 and New rules for media and communications claims from 1 October 2019). It is the substance or essence

TMT analysis: A defendant sought to strike out a claimant’s claim in defamation on the grounds that he was not responsible for publication of the articles complained of. The claimant also sought to amend his claim to include an alternative pleading that the defendant was responsible for publication under the agency principle. The judge refused to strike out the claim and granted the claimant’s application to amend. The claimant had adduced sufficient evidence to support an inference that either the defendant had participated in publication as editor, or that those who had done so were his agents. It was not possible to exclude that inference at the summary judgment stage. The decision demonstrates that the highly fact sensitive issue of publication will rarely be appropriate for summary determination. Written by Neil O’Sullivan and Niamh Osman, Osborne Clarke LLP.

TMT analysis: Mrs Justice Hill delivered judgment on various interlocutory applications in a complex set of defamation, data protection and harassment claims. The claimant's application to bring in defamation claims relating to publications published outside the one-year limitation period was refused, but other aspects of his amendment application were successful. The defendant was also permitted to amend her defence but was refused permission to withdraw an admission. The judgment provides a helpful summary of the relevant principles for a variety of procedural issues, including amendments to statements of case, withdrawal of admissions, limitation, and abuse of process in the context of collateral proceedings. Written by Neil O'Sullivan and James Sharpley, Osborne Clarke LLP.

The ordinary time limit for defamation and malicious falsehood claims A claimant must bring a claim for defamation within one year from the date on which the cause of action accrues, namely the date on which the defamatory statement is first published (section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980), as inserted by section 5 of the Defamation Act 1996). As confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey, ‘bringing’ the claim means the date on which the claim form is first delivered to the court office, even if the office legitimately refuses to issue it because the whole of the appropriate fee has not been paid. It is irrelevant to the accrual of the cause of action in libel that the claimant was unaware of any publication at the time, and therefore the commencement of the limitation period for their claim. In cases of most types of slander and malicious falsehood, the cause of action will accrue from the date on which financial damage is sustained by the claimant, and the limitation period may not be linked

This Practice Note deals with the practical aspects of bringing a defamation claim such as: identifying a defamatory statement; determining whether the statement is libel or slander; and the suitability of interim relief. It considers the impact of the Defamation Act 2013 (DA 2013) on claimants and defendants and includes tactics on the procedural aspects of a defamation action. Defamation Act 2013 Before the implementation of the DA 2013, defamation actions acquired a reputation for technicality and disproportionate expense, largely because of the central focus on the meaning of defamatory statements. The government reacted to a groundswell of adverse media commentary that English defamation law was too claimant-friendly by enacting DA 2013, which introduced a number of reforms making defamation a tortious action based equally on common law and statute, and abolished several common law defences through codification. Further reading You may wish to refer to Duncan and Neill on Defamation (sixth edition, 2025) available subject to subscription. Was the statement defamatory and did it identify the claimant? At common law, a defamatory statement is defined as one that

These training materials consist of template PowerPoint slides that can be used as the basis of one or more training seminars on defamation law. The training materials reflect the requirements of the Defamation Act 2013 and topics covered include: the distinction between libel and slander; the elements of a defamation claim; damage to reputation and serious harm; publication; defences and remedies. It is anticipated that those providing training will use these slides as a helpful starting point for their presentations and then amend them accordingly to reflect their particular circumstances. The training materials may

A statement or content is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning if it has the potential to lower a claimant’s reputation in the eyes of ordinary right-thinking members of society, expose him to contempt, hatred or ridicule or disparage him in his business, trade or profession.

A state of affairs which entitles a financier to take certain action involving giving notice to terminate a facility or accelerating repayment of a loan. This may arise from a breach of the facility, insolvency, failure to meet financial tests or the occurrence of an adverse event. The events giving rise to a default are usually listed at length in a facility agreement and heavily negotiated.