ARCHIVED: This Practice Note has been archived and is not maintained. For the current position, see Practice Note: Obtaining default judgment—general principles—Conditions for a default judgment—the relevant time for filing has expired. A question that causes difficulties for practitioners and the judiciary is whether or not a default judgment can be entered in circumstances in which although the acknowledgment of service or the defence has been filed late, it is filed prior to the court determining the request/application for default judgment. There is currently no definitive answer although that position will change on 6 April 2020. Changes to CPR 12.3—6 April 2020 The interpretation of CPR 12.3 has now been clarified and the changes will come into force on 6 April 2020. The amendments to CPR 12.3 are set out in the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2020, SI 2020/82, r 3. The change means that where an acknowledgment of service or a defence is filed before a judgment in default is entered this will be a bar to the court

This Practice Note provides guidance on the nature and effect of judgments entered in default of an acknowledgment of service or defence (also known as default judgments). It explains the type of judgment that can be entered upon making a request for default judgment and the extent to which a defendant can argue about the amount of a default judgment entered ‘for an amount to be decided by the court’ (CPR 12). It discusses the circumstances in which default judgment will be entered against one of two or more defendants and the consequences of such a judgment. It then deals with the type of default judgment that may be entered upon an application, how to deal with foreign currency judgments and costs orders in default judgments. For guidance on the circumstances in which the court may enter default judgment, see Practice Note: Obtaining default judgment—general principles. For guidance on the procedure for obtaining default judgment, see Practice Note: Obtaining default judgment—procedure. This Practice Note provides guidance on the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions

ARCHIVED: This Practice Note has been archived and is not maintained. This Practice Note considers the video hearings pilot scheme which ran from 30 November 2018 to 30 November 2019. The pilot scheme was set out in Practice Direction 51V and provided for applications to set aside default judgments, obtained under CPR 12, to take place using a video hearing. The pilot scheme only applied where the judgment in default was entered by the County Court for a specified amount of money. The pilot scheme was non-mandatory and for it to apply, the parties had to consent to a video hearing and have the necessary IT equipment required to participate in a video hearing. HMCTS published a news letter providing information on the pilot scheme. See: The 101st Practice Direction update sets out the pilot scheme in its schedule: What is the purpose of the pilot scheme? The purpose of the pilot scheme is to test a procedure for applications to set aside default judgments entered under CPR 12 to be heard

ARCHIVED: The pilot scheme is set out in Practice Direction 51V (CPR PD 51V) and provides for applications to set aside default judgments, obtained under CPR 12, to take place using a video hearing. This is a separate process from that in use during the coronavirus pandemic which allows for remote hearings. For guidance, see Practice Note: Remote and hybrid hearings in civil proceedings. The pilot scheme applies in the Birmingham or Manchester Civil Justice Centres. The pilot scheme will apply unless a party objects or opts out of the pilot scheme. The 115th Update—Practice Direction amendments sets out the pilot scheme in its schedule. The pilot scheme has been extended and will now run until 31 March 2021 as provided for in the 122nd Update—Practice Direction Amendments. This Practice Notice considers the second video hearings pilot scheme. Note that both the first pilot scheme and this one have the same title and the same practice direction reference. For an explanation as to the requirement for the

A payment notice is a notice given under HGCRA 1996, s 110A by a payer (or specified person) or the payee setting out the amount to be paid and how it is calculated. Most standard form contracts provide that the notice is to be given by the payer (or specified person). Where the payer (or specified person) is required to give a payment notice but fails to do so, the payee may give a 'default' payment notice pursuant to HGCRA 1996, s 110B instead.

Payee’s payment notice in default of payer’s notice Reference: [insert appropriate reference to the contract and project] Date: [insert date] To: [insert recipient’s name] Payment due date: [insert

Construction analysis: The court declared that a contractor’s default interim payment notice (given under the JCT Intermediate Building Contract 2011) in the absence of a payment notice from the contract administrator was valid, even though it was not referred to in a covering email (sent in advance of a meeting about the final account). While there was a high threshold for the contractor to meet as to the validity of the notice, it was to be construed in accordance with the contractual and factual background. The court also declared that a valid pay less notice had been given on behalf of the employer, even though it was ‘contingent’ (the sender’s primary position was that the default interim payment notice was not valid). While the sender must have the requisite intention when giving a pay less notice, this was to be derived from the manner in which the notice would have informed the reasonable recipient.

The risk that an issuer will not be able to make future interest (coupon) or capital (principal) payments. Bonds issued by the governments of most developed countries are generally regarded as having an extremely low default risk (AAA).

Where a confiscation order is made against a defendant with realisable assets, the obligation is on them to realise their assets within the time set in the confiscation order, although it is also possible to appoint an enforcement receiver at this stage (see: Enforcement receivers in confiscation—checklist). The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002) creates no specific sanction for non-payment of a confiscation order, instead POCA 2002, s 35 treats an unpaid confiscation order as if it were an unpaid fine imposed by the Crown Court, which is enforceable in the magistrates’ court. Generally speaking, the enforcement of fines is dealt with under fine enforcement provisions in the Sentencing Act 2020 (SA 2020) and Part III of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (MCA 1980). POCA 2002, s 35 enables the Crown Court to fix a term of imprisonment to be served in default of payment of a confiscation order, within a permitted maximum. The statutory scheme thereby ensures that the offender has nothing to gain by failing to comply with the confiscation order.

Property Disputes analysis: This case concerns the provisions of Part I of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 (LTA 1987), which seeks to grant certain residential tenants (qualifying tenants) the right of first refusal when a landlord proposes to make certain disposals affecting the whole or part of a building. In this case, in 2012 the appellants were granted leases over part of the roof space in a block of flats in London (‘the Building’) by a company called Block 6 Ashley Gardens Ltd who was the landlord of the Building (the appellants were directors of the landlord). The qualifying tenants/nominee purchaser claimed the leases were granted without the qualifying tenants of the Building being offered the option to purchase the roof space themselves, pursuant to LTA 1987. At first instance, His Honour Judge (HHJ) Dight agreed with the qualifying tenants and held that they should have had the right to acquire the roof space leases. Mr Justice Richards upheld the decision of HHJ Dight, dismissing the appeal in his judgment highlighting the consequences of failing to honour the rights of qualifying tenants under LTA 1987. Written by Kate Andrews, partner at Hamlins LLP.

Private Client analysis: David Gladstone sought possession of the estate and grounds at Wotton House from the defendant, Leigh White (his former friend, solicitor and attorney). Orders were also sought that the assignments of six investment bonds made by David to Leigh should be set aside as having been procured by Leigh’s undue influence and that Leigh should be removed as a trustee of a settlement made by David for the maintenance, repair and preservation of the grounds at Wotton. Leigh brought a counterclaim based on proprietary estoppel—claiming that there was an understanding between her and David that she would inherit Wotton and two properties in London on his death. Leigh claimed that David had repeatedly assured her since 2007 (both by his words and conduct) that she was the ‘heiress’ to the estate, and that she acted to her detriment in relying on those assurances as she had positioned ‘her entire life on the basis that she was going to inherit Wotton’. Leigh’s claim to such interests failed, largely on the basis that the alleged assurances relied on were not clear enough to establish that it was reasonable for her to rely on them in the way claimed and that she had not suffered any detriment, in all the circumstances. David also succeeded in obtaining orders for possession of Wotton, the return of the bonds and Leigh was removed as a trustee. Written by Mark Lindley, partner at Boodle Hatfield LLP.

What duty is owed by a landlord under the Defective Premises Act 1972 (DPA 1972)? This Practice Note covers the landlord’s duty, when it applies, duty to third parties and trespassers, the need for disrepair, whether knowledge or notification of the defect is necessary and the position when works are carried out during the tenancy. For guidance in respect of the duties under DPA 1972, ss 1(1) and 2A (introduced by section 134 of the Building Safety Act 2022), for a person who takes on work for or in connection with the provision of a dwelling, or other work in relation to a dwelling, and how those duties are applied, and how those duties may be relevant in the context of fire safety defects, see Practice Notes: Defective Premises Act—work in relation to dwellings and Fire safety defect claims for construction lawyers. A landlord's liability to a tenant for the state and condition of premises is generally determined by the terms of the tenancy. However, under DPA 1972, where the lease imposes repairing obligations