Under EU law, free competition designates the state of a market on which mutually independent businesses engage in the same activity, contend to attract consumers and are subject to mutual competitive pressure.

NOTE—The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCCA 2024) received Royal Assent on 24 May 2024 and introduced significant reforms across UK digital markets, competition and consumer law. Certain provisions have come, or are coming, into force in stages. The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 have also been amended to include references to the DMCCA 2024. This Practice Note concerns appeals under sections 46 and 47 of the Competition Act 1998 and should be read alongside the current version of the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015, the Competition Appeal Tribunal Guide to Proceedings 2015 and any applicable Practice Directions and Guidance Notes published by the Tribunal. This Practice Note explains the key procedural stages in bringing or defending an appeal under section 46 or 47 of the Competition Act 1998 before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT or the Tribunal). Sections 46 and 47 of the Competition Act 1998 enable appeals to be brought against decisions of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), as well as other sectoral regulators

Dispute resolution analysis: In Commercial and Interregional Card Claims I Ltd v Mastercard Incorporated, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has held that litigation funding agreements were not damages-based agreements (DBAs) where the funder’s fee was based on a multiple of the funding provided. Alan Watts, partner and global co-head of class actions, Stephen Wisking, partner, Chris Bushell, partner, and Maura McIntosh, professional support consultant, at Herbert Smith Freehills consider the decision.

Competition analysis: The Competition Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) has made its first damages award under the UK’s collective proceedings regime, in favour of a class of around 36 million Apple device users. In a judgment published on 23 October 2025, the Tribunal upheld the claim of class representative Dr Rachael Kent that Apple abused its dominant position by: (1) foreclosing competition in the iOS app distribution services (iOS AD Services) and iOS in-app payment services (iOS IAP Services) markets through various exclusive dealing restrictions and the tying of its payment services to the App Store, and (2) charging excessive and unfair prices, in the form of the commission that it charges app developers by way of a deduction from fees paid by device users to developers (the Commission). Written by Alex Evans, senior associate at Macfarlanes LLP.

Competition analysis: In Alphabet and Others before the Court of Justice, Advocate General Laila Medina issued an Opinion (the ‘Opinion’) on 5 September 2024 concerning the interpretation of the prohibition against abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. The case concerns Google's refusal to facilitate the interoperability of its Android Auto platform with JuicePass, an app which offers features for navigating to, and using, electric car charging stations. The Opinion proposes that dominant undertakings may be required to grant access to their digital platforms, even if the Bronner conditions (being that (i) the refusal is likely to eliminate all competition in the market; (ii) the refusal is incapable of being objectively justified; and (iii) the service is indispensable to carrying out that person's business) are not met. The Opinion, if followed by the Court of Justice, would have significant implications for the technology and digital markets sectors, requiring developers of digital platforms to consider third-party access. It also has the potential to directly affect competition for digital services relating to electric vehicle charging. Written by Rebecca Williams (partner) and Jack Moulder (senior associate) at Watson Farley & Williams LLP.

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is the UK's unified competition body, and with effect from 1 April 2014, brings together the Competition Commission (CC) and the competition and certain consumer functions of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT).

We are strong but fair competitors. We compete vigorously, but also with integrity and in compliance with applicable competition laws. Those laws are designed to protect businesses and consumers from anti-competitive behaviour, and to safeguard effective competition. Competition laws prohibit ‘restraints of trade’, including certain types of agreements or conduct involving competitors, customers or suppliers, or even a single company with a dominant market position. The following are examples of potentially illegal conduct: • competitors agreeing or taking joint actions regarding: — prices, terms, or bids; — product or territory allocations or divisions; — selection of customers

This Practice Note considers the application of UK competition law to employment and labour market issues. In particular, it considers: • the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) ongoing enforcement focus on labour markets and related guidance for employers, HR professionals and recruiters • transactional and merger control considerations relating to employment and labour market restrictions • the legal framework applicable to employment and labour market restrictions under the Chapter I prohibition • competition law issues arising from information sharing between competing employers in relation to pay, benefits and other employment-related terms • wage-fixing and no-poach agreements between businesses competing for workers, including related issues concerning non-compete and non-solicitation clauses • wider international developments concerning competition law restrictions affecting workers and labour mobility This Practice Note therefore provides a high-level overview of the key competition law issues that may arise in the employment context. As competition authorities develop their scrutiny of labour market practices, businesses should ensure that

Competition law affects businesses of all sizes—larger multinational companies operating across a number of territories and small and medium sized businesses. This Practice Note provides a sample list of questions that can be used in order to carry out a high level competition audit. The competition analysis depends to a significant extent on the particular parties and the markets in which they operate. The checklist below is a simplification of the complex issues and you should therefore consider carefully whether each of the sample list of questions are appropriate in the circumstances of the company you are carrying out an audit for. Sample questions • please provide a complete list of the markets [company] operates in. Please provide a brief description of these activities. • for the product/service markets [company] considers it competes in, as identified in response to the bullet point immediately above, please estimate [company’s] market shares. Does it exceed 40%, or are there other indications that [company] may hold a dominant position? • does [company] keep records of market development and factors supporting market definition

Aftermarkets are particularly important to manufacturers of complex technical equipment and other companies that adopt a 'razors and razor blades' type of business model. Competition issues in aftermarkets are not confined to any particular industry sector. Although many of the cases involve the technology sector, aftermarket competition issues have also arisen in a wide range of other areas. Aftermarket cases typically involve: • a primary product (eg equipment, hardware or software), and • an aftermarket good or service (eg parts, repair services, or software support) The key battleground in such cases is the downstream aftermarket, which often generates highly profitable recurring revenue coveted by proprietary equipment manufacturers that use this as a means to recoup their substantial investments in research and development. Independent service organisations (ISOs) or other third parties that offer competing aftermarket goods or services often come into conflict with manufacturers. Manufacturers may attempt to avoid facilitating aftermarket competition by ISOs, and ISOs that operate only in the aftermarket may regard competition from manufacturers as unfair. For example, manufacturers may seek to avoid

Knowing our industry and competitors is beneficial to business success. However, we must ensure that we stay within the boundaries of competition law when we gather information on competitors’ activities, products, or services. These FAQs, which are integral to that effort, give guidance on how we can best achieve our business goals in a way that is consistent with competition law when gathering competitive intelligence. 1 Can I gather information and prepare internal reports about a competitor’s product pipeline? Yes, but only where you have gathered this information from your own analysis (eg observations at trade shows) or from publicly available sources (eg competitor’s website, press reports). 2 If a customer tells

Knowing our industry and competitors is beneficial to business success, but the risk of encountering a competition law issue when conducting this sort of activity is high. This Competition compliance—gathering competitive intelligence quick reference guide is intended to provide general guidance as to the actions you should and should not take when gathering competitive intelligence. The list is not exhaustive.[ For more information, we also have a set of FAQs on gathering competitive intelligence, which you can find [insert details of where to find FAQs].] 1 Conducting your own analysis You are able to conduct your own analysis, but be careful with the information you use. Do Do not Conduct your own analysis of competitor activity (eg observe at public events, trade shows).Gather competitive intelligence from publicly-available sources (eg published news, trade journals, industry analysis, advertisements,