Default judgment

Default judgment

A default judgment or judgment in default is a judgment entered without trial where a defendant has failed to respond to a claim. It is an administrative procedure which means judgment is entered without consideration of the merits of the claim.

Default judgments are dealt with under CPR 12 and there are a number of conditions which must be satisfied before the court will enter judgment:

•
the defendant must have been properly served with the claim
•
the defendant must not have responded to the claim, whether by acknowledgment of service or defence, and
•
the relevant time period for responding must have expired

Where the conditions are satisfied, the claimant can apply for a default judgment to be entered. The application can either be by way of simple request or by formal application under CPR 23. The appropriate procedure will depend on the type of claim and the method of service.

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