The claim for reasonable financial provision is under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (I(PFD)A 1975) and not the ACTAPS Code. The Practice Guidance Notes to the ACTAPS Code which are available here, are useful in explaining that the Code does not form part of the CPR 1998, for the purposes of pre-action conduct or otherwise. Clause

We have assumed for the purpose of this Q&A that the proposed reduction of capital is to be carried out in order to return capital directly to shareholders pursuant to section 641(4)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), ie, it is a repayment of paid-up share capital in excess of the company's wants. CA 2006, ss 691(2), 691(3) require that on a share buyback the shares are paid for on purchase (other than where they are purchased for the purposes of or pursuant to an employees' share scheme) and case law suggests that this payment must be in cash. For further information on these requirements, see Q&A: Is it possible for a private company limited by shares to defer payment for shares that it buys back (eg, using loan notes or redeemable shares)? Is it possible for such a company to

One of the most important aspects of pension sharing is to ensure prompt implementation so that the original intention of the court, when making the pension sharing order, is not distorted by changes in valuation or other factors. One of the prime responsibilities of the family lawyer acting for the person with the benefit of the pension credit is to ensure that the pension sharing order is implemented. If a pension sharing order is made in respect of a member’s rights under a scheme, the trustees or managers of the scheme must discharge their liability for the pension credit within the implementation period. The implementation period (section 34 of the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 (WRPA 1999)) is a period of four months beginning with the later of: • the day on which the pension sharing order takes effect, and • the

A pension sharing order must be expressed as a percentage of the pension arrangement’s cash equivalent (CE) value—it is not possible to fix an amount and the CE figure that is eventually shared will invariably be different on implementation (calculated on valuation day) than the figure that was obtained for disclosure purposes (calculated on the valuation date). This follows the provision in section 21A(1) of the Matrimonial

A pension sharing order in respect of a pension arrangement that is already subject to pension sharing in respect of the same marriage or as between the same parties is not permitted (see the specific restriction in section 24B(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973)). It is also not possible to make a pension sharing order in respect of a pension arrangement that is subject to a pension attachment order (see MCA 1973, s 24B(5)). We are not aware of any relevant restriction upon the making of a

Case study A landlord wants to recover possession of premises occupied by a tenant for over 20 years. There is no written tenancy agreement. The tenant has had exclusive possession for that period, but has not paid any money as rent. The tenant has maintained the landlord’s weapons in lieu of rent (as the landlord runs a shooting range). Is this likely to be a periodic tenancy (within the protection of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (LTA 1954)) or a tenancy at will? If it is a periodic tenancy, how can the period be ascertained, bearing in mind that services have been rendered instead of rent? The Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (LTA 1954) The tenant has been in possession for a period of over 20 years without a written tenancy agreement. No rent has been paid although the tenant has maintained weapons in lieu of rent. It is not clear whether the tenancy is in

The issue in this Q&A is whether a person acting under an ordinary power of attorney can resign the directorship of the principal who granted the power. The Q&A therefore considers: • ordinary powers of attorney • delegation by directors • the validity of an attorney signing a letter of resignation Ordinary powers of attorney There are three types of power of attorney: • lasting powers of attorney (LPAs). The provisions regarding these are contained in sections 9–14 and Schedule 1 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005). For further guidance on LPAs, see: Lasting powers of attorney—overview • enduring powers of attorney (EPAs). These were replaced by LPAs but an EPA made before October 2007 remains valid. See MCA 2005, s 66(3) and Sch 4. For further guidance on EPAs, see: Enduring powers of attorney overview • ordinary powers of attorney (also known as a general power of attorney) Ordinary powers of attorney

Under Appendix FM, it is possible to rely on cash savings to satisfy the financial requirement. Immigration Rules, Appendix FM-SE states the following: ‘11. In respect of cash savings the following must be provided: (a) personal bank statements showing that at least the level of cash savings relied upon in the application has been held in an account(s) in the name of the person or of the person and their partner jointly throughout the period of 6 months prior to the date of application. (b) A declaration by the account holder(s) of the source(s) of the cash savings.’ Immigration Rules, Appendix FM-SE,

A land transaction (ie the acquisition of a chargeable interest) may be exempt from a charge to stamp duty land tax (SDLT) if the purchaser, or (if there is more than one) each of the purchasers, is a first-time buyer who intends to occupy the residential property as the purchaser's only or main residence and provided all other conditions for the relief are met. First-time buyer relief is found in Sch 6ZA to the Finance Act 2003 (FA 2003) which sets out the eligibility for relief claims, the relief itself and the interpretation of FA 2003, Sch 6ZA. FA 2003, Sch 6ZA Pt 1, para 1(4) provides that the third condition for relief is that ‘the purchaser, or (if more than one) each of the

Vicarious liability is the transfer of liability, on a strict basis, from the party committing a tort (the tortfeasor) to another party (the principal) for the loss or damage inflicted by the tortfeasor upon the person suffering that loss. The principal is then liable regardless of whether they have done anything in respect of the causing of such loss or damage. The rule is one of policy, so as to ensure that the victim is able to recover damages awarded against an otherwise innocent payor, and is as a result restricted in

Adverse possession is the acquisition of rights over land by a form of successful taking rather than by conveyance of transfer. Where title to an estate in land remains unregistered with HM Land Registry, the applicable regime is the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980). The LA 1980 lays down the general rule that no action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued (LA 1980, s 15(1)). The piece of land will need to be in the possession of some person (ie the squatter) in whose favour the period of limitation can run. Where the estate is registered, the applicable regime is the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002). There is no limitation period on recovery of a registered estate in land. Under this regime a squatter can apply for registration as proprietor after ten years of adverse possession. The registered

Rights of way generally fall into two distinct categories; private rights of way and public rights of way. Each in essence allow a person or class of people access over land belonging to another. A private right of way is an easement giving the owner of the dominant tenement (ie the land that has the benefit of the right of way) access over a defined area (either expressly or impliedly determined) of the land of the servient tenement (the land over which the right of way is exercised). A public right of way is a right over land exercisable by the general public. Adverse possession (often colloquially referred to as ‘squatters’ rights’) was until 2003 a common law doctrine that enabled a person who had been in factual possession of land owned by another for a specified period of time (12 years), with an intention to possess (often deduced from the acts making up factual