Property analysis: A landowner failed in his argument that adjoining owners were estopped from using toilets at his premises, due to issues with pleadings and lack of evidence.

A Tolata claim is an application to the civil courts, typically in England and Wales, to resolve disputes about the ownership of, or rights over, land or a home where the parties are not married or in a civil partnership. It most often arises in cohabitation disputes about beneficial interests in a family home, orders for sale, or regulation of occupation.The term derives from the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA), which governs how trusts of land are created and administered and how disputes are determined, including claims for a declaration of beneficial interest and for an order for sale under sections 14 and 15.Although widely used by practitioners, “Tolata claim” is not a statutory expression, but convenient shorthand for proceedings under TOLATA.Usage is specific to England and Wales. In Scotland, analogous disputes are addressed under trust and property principles, and cohabitation claims under the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006. Northern Ireland and Ireland do not use TOLATA; similar issues are dealt with through local trust, land and equity rules and, in Ireland, the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Acts.

Claim No. [insert claim number]. [IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE [ [BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION OR KING’S BENCH DIVISION] [Insert court, list or sub-list and venue as appropriate] THE COUNTY COURT AT [insert location] [BUSINESS AND PROPERTY WORK before [The Honourable Mr Justice OR The Honourable Mrs Justice OR His Honour Judge OR Her Honour Judge OR Master OR District Judge] [insert name] dated: [insert date] between: [insert name]        Claimant / [Applicant OR Respondent] and [insert name]        Defendant / [Applicant OR Respondent] _______________________________________ [

A Tomlin order is a form of consent order where proceedings are stayed on agreed terms with permission to lift the stay in the event of non-compliance with those terms) and a separate confidential schedule recording the terms agreed between the parties. The order is only kept alive to the extent necessary to enable any party to enforce the terms. Unlike court orders by consent generally, a Tomlin order constitutes a binding contract between the parties so the court can only re-open the dispute between the parties where it could intervene with any other contract.

This Practice Note considers Tomlin orders, used in settling litigation. A Tomlin order comprises a consent order and a schedule. It is used to stay the proceedings on agreed terms. The terms set out in the schedule can be kept confidential. This Practice Note explains the nature of confidentiality attaching to the schedule and sets out the distinctions between Tomlin orders and a standard consent order. Sample wording for a Tomlin order is provided together with links to precedents, as well as guidance on court approval. This Practice Note also looks at varying, setting aside and enforcing a Tomlin order, including considerations that the court will take into account when dealing with applications in respect of each. This Practice Note provides guidance on the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the CPR; however, some of the different courts and divisions make very specific provision with regard to both drafting and approval of Tomlin orders and how to approach the schedule and issues of confidentiality. It is imperative therefore that you consider the specific rules and court

This Practice Note sets out and compares the different requirements between courts concerning the submission of draft Tomlin orders and the making of these orders by consent once a dispute involving existing litigation has been settled and the parties wish to have the proceedings stayed pending the performance of the agreed terms. It covers the required form of the document that needs to be submitted to the court, the means by which this is done and what happens after the court has made an order. It also addresses the distinction between those courts (a minority) which will review the parties’ agreed terms to check if they are enforceable and the majority of courts which will not look at that aspect but will check that the order is drafted in the right form for a Tomlin order to be made. Finally, the question of which materials are retained on the court file after the making of an order is considered. Making Tomlin orders In 1927, Tomlin J, a High Court judge, issued a practice note following

NOTE: On 1 October 2026, a newly formed Business and Property Division replaces the Chancery Division—see News Analysis: The new Business and Property Division of the High Court. This Practice Note contains references to, and information derived from, the Chancery Guide. It is understood that a Business and Property Division Guide is being drafted and it is assumed this will replace the Chancery Guide. Existing links to the Chancery Guide will remain in content until a replacement is released. This Practice Note considers the different court (including court guide) specific requirements when drafting and filing Tomlin orders. For general guidance on Tomlin orders, see Practice Note: Tomlin orders. For a sample Tomlin order see Precedent: Tomlin order. For guidance on settling claims, see: Settlement and settling disputes—overview. Varied court provisions for Tomlin orders As highlighted by Warby J in Zenith Logistics v Coury, there are different practices in different courts in relation to the sealing and/or approval of Tomlin orders involving settlement arrangements. Zenith concerned the Queen’s Bench Division (as it

Law360, London: Counsel for far-right activist Stephen Yaxley-Lennon urged the Court of Appeal on 11 April 2025 to reduce his 18-month sentence for contempt of court, arguing that prison conditions have caused a 'demonstrable effect' on his mental health.

Dispute Resolution analysis: The Court of Appeal has upheld the judgment of Turner J, rejecting tort claims brought by residents of a remote area of Sierra Leone subjected to violence by the local police following protests in 2010 and 2012 against the owners and operators of a local mine. Written by Phillip Patterson, barrister, at Hardwicke Chambers.

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: This article by Paul Lowenstein QC and Josephine Davies of Twenty Essex first appeared on Twenty Essex’s website on 25 June 2021 and is republished with permission.

Dispute Resolution analysis: This judgment considered when it would be possible for multiple claimants to bring multiple claims on one claim form in the context of a group litigation. Therefore, the relevant rules were CPR 19.1 and CPR 7.3 (claim forms). The court revisited the test set out in the judgment of the Divisional Court (Lord Justice Dingemans and Mr Justice Andrew Baker) in Abbott v Ministry of Defence (‘Abbott’). Whilst not doubting the outcome in Abbott, the Court of Appeal expressly decided that the test in Abbott was not correct, being an overly restrictive formulation which departed from the pre-CPR rules and case-law where there was no evidence any such change had been intended or implemented. Thus, the test, consistent with the pre-CPR position was firmly whether trying the claims together was convenient, without gloss or further requirement. Written by Lauren Godfrey, barrister at Gatehouse Chambers.

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: Sir Anthony Mann robustly upheld a decision by ICC Judge Burton refusing the applicant joint liquidators’ relief under sections 235 and 236 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986). The liquidators had applied seeking the provision of a very wide range of records and information in connection with the business of the company from a connected company and a firm of solicitors. In upholding ICCJ Burton’s dismissal of the application, the judge gave useful guidance as to what office-holders have to establish about their needs and entitlement to information and documents under IA 1986, ss 235 and 236. In particular, the judge made clear that a desire to reconstitute the knowledge of the company is not, by itself and without more in any individual case, a sufficient reason to seek all documents relating to a company (what the judge referred to as ‘everything forever’). Written by James Knott, barrister at 4 Stone Buildings.