Employment analysis: Whether a contract is a ‘worker’s contract’ is a matter of statutory interpretation, not contractual interpretation. That involves taking a purposive approach which, in the employment context, is to protect those who are vulnerable as a result of their subordination to, and dependence upon, another person in relation to their work. In the case of Uber, the employment tribunal’s findings on the relative degree of control exercised by Uber and drivers respectively over the service provided to passengers justified its conclusion that the drivers were workers, according to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed the contractor’s case and allowed the appeal in Providence Building Services Limited v Hexagon Housing Association Limited [2026] UKSC 1. It held that the Contractor was not entitled to terminate the contract under clause 8.9 of the JCT Design and Build Contract 2016 where the Employer had paid late on two occasions, but the first late payment was remedied within the contractual 28–day period for curing defaults. The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s interpretation that a repeated late payment alone was sufficient, confirming that an accrued right to terminate under clause 8.9.3 is a prerequisite before clause 8.9.4 can be engaged. Helen Dennis, barrister at 4 Pump Court, provides commentary on the judgment.

Tax analysis: In News Corp UK & Ireland v HMRC, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the taxpayer's appeal, holding that the 'always speaking' principle of statutory interpretation had to be applied narrowly given the constraints of EU law. The relevant 'genus of facts' should therefore be viewed as covering only physical versions of newspapers involving the medium of print and no connectivity requirement. As such, digital editions of newspapers did not fall within that categorisation. As well as outlining the key aspects of this decision, this News Analysis also contains the thoughts of Adam Craggs, tax partner at RPC and Giles Salmond, head of indirect tax at Eversheds Sutherland.

On 6 March 2025, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia (Cultural Bureau) v Costantine [2025] UKSC 9. In a unanimous judgment given by Lord Lloyd-Jones, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that, considering the principles in Benkharbouche v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan [2017] UKSC 62, the Employment Tribunal judge was correct in the circumstances to find that the embassy was not entitled to rely on state immunity in claims bought against it by its employee for direct discrimination. The employee’s duties at no point went beyond the normal ancillary and supportive role of administrative staff and, therefore, their employment was not an exercise of a sovereign act. While the Court of Appeal erred in law by failing to give proper consideration to whether the embassy was entitled to state immunity, if the Court of Appeal had considered the issue, it would necessarily have concluded that the embassy was not entitled to immunity. Tamar Burton, barrister at Cloisters, and Joel Wallace, barrister at Littleton Chambers, both of whom were counsel in the case, provide their comments on the judgment.

The Supreme Court has unanimously held that the surviving relatives of the late Robert Crozier may recover damages under the Damages (Scotland) Act 2011 (D(S)A 2011), despite a full and final settlement he reached in 2014 with Scottish Power UK Plc after he developed pleural plaques and asbestosis, before developing mesothelioma. Rejecting the employer’s argument that the prior discharge barred further claims, the Supreme Court ruled that although the 2014 settlement did amount to a discharge of the liability to pay damages, section 5(1)(b) of the D(S)A 2011 creates a specific mesothelioma exception, meaning the relatives’ action remained competent despite the earlier settlement. The judgment clarifies that a settlement of an earlier asbestos-injury claim does not preclude bereaved relatives from claiming for distress, grief and loss of society when the employee later dies of mesothelioma.

The Supreme Court has unanimously allowed the appellant’s appeal in Bertino v Public Prosecutor's Office, Italy. The Supreme Court held that in extradition proceedings, a requesting judicial authority must demonstrate to the criminal standard of proof that the requested person had unequivocally waived their right to be present at trial. It is only then a judge can be satisfied that a requested person was ‘deliberately absent from trial’ within the meaning of section 20(3) of the Extradition Act 2003 (EA 2003). Stefan Hyman, barrister at 9BR Chambers, and counsel for the Respondents and Graeme Hall, barrister at Doughty Street Chambers, and counsel for the Appellant comment on the Supreme Court’s decision.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed both appeals. Applying ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, the court affirmed that the language of section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) does not restrict liability to those involved in the management or control of the company’s business such as directors or managers, but could very well apply to someone routinely transacting with the company in the knowledge that the company was carrying on a fraudulent business. In addition, the court held that where claimant companies had been struck off and then later restored to the register, the deemed existence of the claimant companies during the period in which they were in fact in dissolution did not necessitate assuming that they lacked directors or other officers during that time. That was a question of probability to be determined on the evidence: the burden of proof was on the claimant companies and they had failed to discharge it. Accordingly, the dishonest assistance claim remained time-barred. Andrew Westwood KC, barrister practising from Maitland Chambers, comments on the implications of the judgment.

The Supreme Court has ruled in three conjoined appeals concerning undisclosed commission payments in car finance deals. In its judgment today (1 August 2025), the Supreme Court rejected claims against lenders based on the tort of bribery and equity, ruling that car dealers arranging finance are not fiduciaries. The judgment provides important clarification on the legal status of dealer-arranged car finance while establishing that particularly high undisclosed commissions may still be challenged under consumer credit legislation. Christopher Adams, barrister at Henderson Chambers, and Kate Urell, barrister at Gough Square Chambers, comment on the implications of this landmark judgment.

Corporate Crime analysis: Should domestic courts recognise and apply the principle of lex mitior within the body of article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)? Kirsty Brimelow QC, of Doughty Street Chambers, and Philip Rule, of No5 Chambers, examine the Supreme Court’s answer in R v Docherty.

Immigration analysis: The Home Secretary should reconsider her policy on the detention, pending deportation, of the mentally ill in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in R (on the application of O), says solicitor Stefan Vnuk, of Lawrence Lupin Solicitors.

Local Government analysis: It is common for applications for planning permission to be deferred from one planning committee meeting to another, meaning that one application may come to be considered across several different meetings over a period of time. The Supreme Court has ruled that a provision in a local authority’s constitution limiting the right to vote on an application to planning committee members who had attended all previous meetings which had considered the application was lawful and did not unlawfully restrict a councillor’s democratic right to vote. Written by Matt Lewin, Barrister at Cornerstone Barristers.

Private Client analysis: Beatrice Calderbank and Paul Hewitt at Withers LLP discuss the eagerly awaited Supreme Court judgment in Futter v HMRC and Pitt v HMRC. They advise that the court’s decision in relation to Hastings-Bass follows a trend reflected in legal commentary questioning the degree to which the court should intervene when trustees make mistakes.