Background to this Practice Note In this Practice Note, the term ‘cryptoasset’ is used as meaning a digital representation of value or rights which may be transferred and stored electronically, using distributed ledger technology or similar technology. It may include: • payment tokens (a means of exchange or payment) • investment tokens (with profit rights attached), and • utility tokens (which enable access to a specific product or service) A ‘stablecoin’ is a type of cryptoasset whose value is tied to an outside asset, such as a fiat currency or gold, to stabilise the price, or one whose value is determined by an algorithm. Supranational stablecoin initiatives IOSCO report on stablecoins On 24 March 2020, International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published a report on global stablecoin initiatives, which identifies their possible implications for securities markets regulators. The report examined the regulatory issues arising from the use of stablecoins and explored how existing IOSCO Principles and Standards could apply to these arrangements. The report concluded that, depending on

This Practice Note on financial technology (Fintech) examines some examples of work carried out by supranational organisations such as the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in relation to Fintech issues. Fintech, as defined by the Financial Stability Board, means ‘technologically enabled financial innovation that could result in new business models, applications, processes or products with an associated material effect on financial markets and institutions and the provision of financial services’. For more information about Fintech strategies and actions taken by UK authorities and regulators, see Practice Note: UK regulation of financial innovations and fintech. For more information about Fintech strategies and actions taken by UK authorities and regulators, see Practice Note: EU regulation of financial innovations and Fintech. The use of technology to deliver financial services is transforming the sector. Fintech encompasses a wide range of financial services and products that intersect with technology. These include crowdfunding platforms such as peer-to-peer lending, online payments and credit services, digital wallets and e-money, automated or robo investment advice, artificial intelligence (AI), big data analytics, blockchain

Insurance & Reinsurance analysis: The Supreme Court held that payments received under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) fall within standard ‘savings’ clauses in business interruption policies and must be deducted from the indemnity. Construing ‘reduction’ as a matter of factual economic effect, the court found that wage costs were reduced notwithstanding the insureds’ continuing liability to pay employees. It further held that CJRS payments were proximately caused by the insured peril and were not collateral benefits, rejecting arguments based on voluntariness or benevolence. The decision confirms insurers’ entitlement to deduct such payments and provides authoritative guidance on the treatment of third-party payments, reinforcing core indemnity principles and limiting over-indemnification. Produced in partnership with Josephine Higgs KC of 7 King’s Bench Walk.

Lord Briggs of Westbourne, Justice of the UK Supreme Court, delivered a keynote address at the Oxford Civil Justice Systems Conference, warning that artificial intelligence (AI) will unleash a ‘tsunami’ of civil litigation by litigants in person. Lord Briggs presented three central themes: (1) learning from the slow adaptation to digitisation; (2) preparing for the practical challenges of the AI revolution and (3) addressing what he termed ‘the democratic question’ regarding AI's role in judicial decision-making.

Lord Sales, a Justice of the Supreme Court, delivered a keynote lecture on 5 November 2025 exploring how judicial review methodology must evolve to address the challenges posed by artificial intelligence (AI) and automated decision-making (ADM) systems in government. Speaking at the Government Legal Department’s Annual Conference, he identified several key issues, including the opacity of algorithms and its impact on reason-giving duties, accountability concerns arising from statutory delegation to automated systems and the potential fettering of administrative discretion. He concluded that courts would need to adopt existing legal doctrines and procedural frameworks to ensure that the rise of the automated state remains consistent with the core principles of administrative law.

Lord Briggs of Westbourne JSC has said that common law, rather than the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), should remain the foundation of human rights protection in the UK. Speaking at the Justice Annual Conference to mark the HRA’s 25th anniversary, Lord Briggs argued that common law provides the cause of action even in cases where the HRA 1998 ensures compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. Lord Briggs added that a quarter-century of HRA influence has strengthened the common law to the extent that it could continue to function effectively if the UK were to repeal the HRA 1998 or withdraw from the Convention. He cited the development of privacy law and the incorporation of the proportionality principle as examples of lasting improvements within the common law system.

Lord Reed of Allermuir, President of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, delivered a lecture at Oxford University, examining the role of proportionality as a standard of judicial review in human rights cases. During his address, he traced the historical development of proportionality from its origins in German administrative law to its incorporation into UK domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998.

Corporate Crime analysis: The Supreme Court has refused to interfere with a High Court decision not to make a costs order against the respondent Parole Board after it adopted a neutral stance in judicial review proceedings which held that its decision not to recommend the appellant prisoner’s transfer to open prison conditions had been unlawful. Simon Creighton, consultant, at Bhatt Murphy Solicitors, examines the judgment.

Construction analysis: This is the latest instalment in a series of decisions arising out of claims by a developer (BDW) against its structural engineer (URS) in respect of structural defects in two residential developments, where the repair works were carried out at a time when it no longer had any proprietary interest in the developments and no claims had been intimated by the any third parties. In its much-anticipated judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Technology and Construction Court and the Court of Appeal, holding that: (i) the repair costs fell within URS’s scope of duty and were not too remote; (ii) the retrospectively extended limitation period in section 135(3) of the Building Safety Act 2022 meant that there was no relevant time bar at the time of the repair works; (iii) URS owed a duty under section 1(1)(a) of the Defective Premises Act 1972 (DPA 1972) to BDW as the developer; (iv) BDW was entitled to claim a contribution from URS when it had paid compensation (in kind) by carrying out the repairs. However, the Supreme Court refrained from considering the principles on the accrual of a tortious claim and preferred to leave that question to a future case. Written by Mathias Cheung, barrister at Atkin Chambers.

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal in R (Jwanczuk) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, ruling that the respondent was not entitled to bereavement support payment (BSP). The respondent, whose late wife had not worked (and thus had not paid national insurance contributions) due to her disability, had challenged the contribution condition for BSP under Article 14 and Article 1 of the First Protocol (A1P1) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The respondent’s claim had succeeded before the High Court and Court of Appeal of England and Wales, which applied a Northern Ireland Court of Appeal (NICA) decision on similar issues. Allowing the Secretary of State’s appeal, the Supreme Court noted that while rulings of the appellate courts in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland should be considered persuasive in similar legal matters arising in other UK jurisdictions, the weight given to those rulings will depend on various factors. In this case, the Supreme Court considered there were good reasons for departing from the NICA decision. On the question of unlawful discrimination, the Supreme Court found the BSP contribution condition to be justified in pursuit of legitimate aims, striking a fair balance between the rights of individuals impacted and the interests of the community as a whole. Lord Reed and Lady Simler gave a joint judgment, with which the other members of the court agreed.

The Supreme Court has overturned a High Court decision extraditing a dual UK/Lebanese national to the United States of America (US) to face seventeen counts of securities fraud and wire fraud. This judgment considers whether the alleged conduct of the appellant should not have been considered an ‘extradition offence’, as ruled by the High Court.

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal, rejecting Dream Pairs’ arguments that realistic post-sale circumstances cannot be taken into account in order to assess similarity, and that only post-sale confusion jeopardising the function of a trade mark as a guarantee of origin in a subsequent transactional context can amount to an actionable infringement. However, the Court of Appeal was not justified in substituting its view of the similarity and confusion assessments for that of the trial judge. Giles Parsons, partner at Browne Jacobson LLP, discusses the implications of the judgment, highlighting that the decision shows how difficult it can be to overturn a factual assessment, that ‘post sale’ confusion can still be relevant and that the Supreme Court is still keeping us closely aligned to EU trade mark law.