The Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed Uber Britannia Ltd’s appeal, holding that private hire (PHV) operators outside London are not required to contract as principals when accepting bookings. Philip Kolvin KC, barrister at 11KBW and counsel for the First Respondent, welcomed the judgment, stating that it ‘conclusively upheld the right of operators, drivers and passengers to contract as they wish,’ preserving longstanding industry practice and safeguarding consumer choice. Josef Cannon KC, of Cornerstone Barristers, emphasised that ‘the decision confirms that section 56(1) creates liability without dictating contract structure, enabling continued use of the agency and intermediary models across England and Wales.

The Supreme Court has held that the Secretary of State is not required to invite representations before depriving an individual of British citizenship under section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (BNA 1981). Procedural fairness is instead satisfied by the statutory right of appeal, which allows a full merits review. The court allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal and dismissed Mr Kolicaj;s cross-appeal.

The Supreme Court has held that the Secretary of State is not required to invite representations before depriving an individual of British citizenship under section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (BNA 1981). Procedural fairness is instead satisfied by the statutory right of appeal, which allows a full merits review. The Court allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal and dismissed Mr Kolicaj’s cross-appeal.

Law360, Expert Analysis: On 22 July 2026, the UK Supreme Court handed down its judgment in Great Asia Maritime Ltd v Orion Shipping and Trading LLC [2026] UKSC 23. John Laird, counsel, and Nicola Phillips, partner, both at Crowell & Moring LLP, examine the Supreme Court's decision, including its implications for express compensation clauses, contractual termination rights and the recovery of loss of bargain damages.

The UK Supreme Court has unanimously allowed the appeal in Akbars Restaurant (Middlesbrough) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] UKSC 26, holding that a civil penalty notice issued under section 15 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (IANA 2006) must specify which limb of IANA 2006, s 15(1) the Secretary of State considers applicable. The Court held that a notice listing the mutually exclusive statutory alternatives in IANA 2006, s 15(1) without identifying which limb the Secretary of State thinks applies, fails to satisfy the requirement in IANA 2006, s 15(6)(a) that the notice state why the Secretary of State thinks the employer is liable to the penalty. The Court further rejected the Secretary of State’s fallback argument that, applying the framework in R v Soneji [2006] 1 AC 340, the notice imposing the £15,000 penalty remained valid because the appellant had suffered no detriment as a result of the deficiency, holding that the Soneji ‘middle-way’ approach was not applicable in this case because giving effect to a non-compliant notice would unacceptably undermine the purpose of IANA 2006, s 15(6)(a).

The Supreme Court has allowed MSC's appeal on the issue of whether a charterer may in principle limit liability to the shipowner under the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime claims as amended by the amending Protocol of 1996 (the 1976 Convention), but dismissed the appeal on whether the specific claims in question fell within the scope of the 1976 Convention. David Walsh KC, barrister at HFW, says the decision confirms that the right to limit liability is available in principle to charterers even for owner losses, but also underlines that only qualifying claims fall within the Convention's protective scope.

The Supreme Court has unanimously allowed the appeal in Skatteforvaltningen (The Danish Customs and Tax Administration) v MCML Ltd, overturning the Court of Appeal’s decision. It held that SKAT’s 2022 claim alleging fraudulent misrepresentation in Danish withholding tax vouchers was not barred by issue estoppel arising from Mr Justice Baker’s 2018 ruling that SKAT’s negligent misrepresentation claim was inadmissible under the Revenue Rule. The Supreme Court held that issue estoppel is confined to issues that were necessary and fundamental to the prior judgment, and that only the immediate foundation of that judgment, not wider judicial reasoning, can give rise to an estoppel. Jack Mitchell, barrister at Old Square Chambers, provides commentary on the judgment.

TMT analysis: The Supreme Court has clarified the scope of the tort of malicious falsehood, in particular the effect of section 3 of the Defamation Act 1952 (DA 1952) and the requirement to prove special damage (financial loss). It held, by a 3:2 majority, that where DA 1952, s 3 applies, it creates an irrebuttable presumption of financial loss. However, if, as here, no loss was in fact caused, the claimant will be entitled only to nominal damages. The court held further that damages for mental distress are possible, but only where the financial loss is significant and causes the injury. Written by Isabella Piasecka, Knowledge Lawyer, managing associate at Mishcon de Reya.

The Supreme Court in Lipton and another (Respondents) v BA Cityflyer Ltd (Appellant) has unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that the pilot falling ill before a flight in 2018 did not amount to ‘extraordinary circumstances’ and so was not a defence to a compensation claim within the meaning of EU Regulation 261/2004 as it applied at the time. The Court held that the Court of Appeal was wrong to apply the Regulation as amended in 2019 to the claim. That ignored the basic principle of the rule of law that the applicable law is that which is in force at the time an event occurs and therefore, the amended Regulation was not intended to apply to facts which arose before it came into force.The decision provides alternative obiter analyses supporting the conclusion that a cause of action based on the pre-Brexit version of the Regulation was carried forward post-IP completion day, with different judges showing preferences for each. The majority decided obiter that a case about pre-IP completion day facts is now based on retained EU law or assimilated law rather than by the domestic and EU law that was in force at that material time.

The Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed Dolphin Drilling’s appeal, ruling that the hire cap on tax deductions should apply to the Borgsten Dolphin vessel. The Court held that the vessel’s accommodation services were not ‘incidental to’ its drilling operations, making it a ‘relevant asset’ under section 356LA(3) of the Corporation Tax Act 2010 (CTA 2010).

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal brought by BlueCrest Capital Management (UK) LLP (Bluecrest), holding that (i) its members met Condition A (in section 863B of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 (ITTOIA 2005)) because most of their remuneration was ‘disguised salary’ and (ii) the First-tier Tax Tribunal (FTT) had applied the wrong legal test in determining whether certain members held ‘significant influence’ (for the purposes of Condition B in ITTOIA 2005, s 863C) over the affairs of Bluecrest. The Court also confirmed that (i) Condition B is concerned with members’ legally enforceable rights and duties under a limited liability partnership (LLP) agreement, rather than informal influence arising from the members’ performance or responsibilities, (ii) responsibility for high-value day-to-day investment decisions does not, of itself, amount to significant influence over the affairs of an LLP and (iii) on the facts of the case, remuneration calculated primarily by reference to individual investment performance, subject to an overall profits cap, constituted ‘disguised salary’ for the purposes of Condition A. As well as summarising the decision, this News Analysis contains commentary from Henry Bennett-Gough, Partner at Simmons & Simmons LLP, and Matt Marfani, Director at ADE Tax, on the implications of the judgment.

IP analysis: Lord Leggatt gave the Supreme Court’s decision in an appeal concerning the extent of liability as an accessory (joint tortfeasorship) of company directors where the company has been found liable of a strict liability tort – in this instance, trade mark infringement. The Supreme Court found that knowledge of the essential features of the tort was essential, and without it the imposition of joint liability on someone who has not actually committed the tort could not be justified. The court further ruled on the criteria for an account of profits to be made against an accessory. Written by Dr Tim Sampson, of Lamb Chambers, who was instructed by Ronald Fletcher Baker LLP on behalf of the Ahmeds, alongside Peter Knox KC and Adam Riley (3 Hare Court) and Laurent Sykes KC (Gray’s Inn Tax Chambers).