The Department for International Trade (DIT) has released a joint declaration with Her Majesty’s Trade Commissioner (HMTC) on the establishment of the UK-Uruguay Trade Dialogue. DIT has said that on 15 September 2021, the Minister for International Trade, Ranil Jayawardena, met with the Foreign Minister of Uruguay, Ambassador Francisco Bustillo, to discuss strengthening the nations' trading relationship. Following this visit, HMTC to Latin America and the Caribbean, Jonathan Knott, met with the Director-General of International Economic Affairs to formally establish the United Kingdom-Uruguay Trade Dialogue. The Trade Dialogue aims to promote trade and investment between the nations.

The Extradition Treaty which is in place between the UK and Kuwait has been presented to Parliament. The Treaty was signed in Kuwait on 15 December 2016 and entered into force on 10 March 2021. The Treaty provides for the extradition of any person who is wanted for trial or punishment in the requesting state for an extraditable offence.

Law360, London: Since the launch in November 2022 of ChatGPT, an artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot, there have been numerous articles asking whether it or other forms of AI will replace the need for lawyers, or even put them out of business altogether.

An accident that is more serious than the one the plant was designed for.

Beyond a reasonable doubt describes the very high standard of proof required in criminal trials before a defendant may lawfully be convicted. It requires the jury (or judge sitting alone) to be sure of the accused’s guilt so that no reasonable uncertainty remains on the evidence.Across England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Ireland, it is the criminal standard of proof and is generally explained to juries in everyday language such as being “sure” or “satisfied so that you are sure.” Courts emphasise that it does not require absolute certainty, but goes significantly beyond the civil standard of “balance of probabilities.”The phrase is largely a common law concept rather than precisely defined in statute. Its meaning and practical application are developed in appellate case law, including guidance on jury directions and summing‑up. Misdescribing the standard of proof, or diluting it, can amount to a material misdirection and ground of appeal.Usage and effect are broadly consistent across the UK and Ireland, with minor differences in judicial wording and practice. It is central to safeguarding the presumption of innocence and minimising the risk of wrongful conviction.

PI & Clinical Negligence analysis: The High Court dismissed a claim for negligence arising from a collision in which the first claimant (M) sustained life-changing injuries. Also dismissed was M's twin sister's secondary victim claim for alleged psychiatric injuries resulting from witnessing the event. His Honour Judge Howells held that the defendant driver was not negligent. The court found that the defendant was driving at no more than 20mph, which was deemed reasonably careful driving adjacent to a school 25 minutes after closing. Crucially, the evidence established that the young child emerged from behind a parked or stationary vehicle. Expert evidence confirmed that where a parked vehicle was present, the driver would have had insufficient time to react and avoid the collision, meaning no breach of duty was committed. Practitioners should note that this judgment reinforces the heavy burden on claimants to establish driver negligence in 'darting-out' cases, even when tragic injuries occur. It confirms that adherence to advisory speed limits (20mph) in school areas, combined with a finding that the child emerged from behind an obstruction, successfully defeats allegations that the driver failed to meet the standard of the reasonably careful driver. Written by Jennifer Dickinson, barrister at Cobden House Chambers.

We have assumed that, given the reference to communal areas, the property referred to in this question is a block of flats. For two years from completion of the first purchase of a newly built property, cover for defects is provided, under National House Building Council (NHBC) Buildmark, by the builder and it is responsible for rectifying any defects that occur in the property and that are covered by the policy. After this period ends, insurance protection is provided (in accordance with the terms of the

Scope of bias and pre-determination in planning cases Bias and pre-determination can be an issue in planning cases where a planning decision-maker, including a local planning authority (LPA) or planning inspector/Secretary of State, is determining a planning application or appeal. Bias arises where a planning officer and/or councillor and/or inspector and/or the Secretary of State (the decision-maker) forms or shows bias against or in favour of a person, company or group, or a particular development. Pre-determination is where the decision-maker approaches a decision with a ‘closed mind’. Planning decision-makers are under a duty to act fairly. Clearly, where a decision-maker is biased or has pre-determined a decision, they will not be acting fairly. The decision will be unlawful and liable to be quashed if challenged by way of judicial or statutory review. Where the impugned decision is that of the Secretary of State or an inspector acting on the Secretary of State’s behalf, the challenge may, in particular, proceed by way of statutory review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA

This Practice Note considers judicial bias and recusal in civil proceedings. It explains the different forms of bias and the legal test for apparent bias. It also considers circumstances in which a judge may be required to recuse themselves, including personal and professional relationships, prior judicial involvement and the conduct of proceedings. It also addresses the position of judges who continue to practise as solicitors or barristers, judicial disclosure of potential conflicts, the procedure for raising a recusal application and waiver of the right to object. This Practice Note should be read in conjunction with Practice Note: Bias and recusal of judges—illustrative decisions, which provides illustrative examples of how the courts have applied the principles governing judicial bias and recusal. Guide to Judicial Conduct The bias/impartiality of those holding judicial office is addressed in the Guide to Judicial Conduct (the Guide). The Guide is described as containing a set of core principles to help judicial office holders reach their own decisions but is not a code. In dealing with the three guiding principles of

This Practice Note provides illustrative examples of how the courts have applied the principles governing judicial bias and recusal. For general guidance on bias and recusal of judges, see Practice Note: Bias and recusal of judges. Case details and analysis Judgment date Summary of decision El Haddad v Al Rostamani [2026] EWHC 1885 (Ch) 21 July 2026 The claimant applied for Rajah J to recuse himself from hearing an application to extend an extended civil restraint order (ECRO). The judge was the named judge under the ECRO and had refused most, although not all, of the claimant’s applications for permission, including applications concerning appeals from his own decisions under the ECRO. The claimant also relied on the judge’s initial proposal of a one-hour time estimate and the fact that the matter had been listed before him because of his familiarity with the proceedings.The application was refused. Applying Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357, [2002] 1 All ER 465 and Otkritie International Investment Management Ltd v Urumov [2014]

Local Government analysis: CPRE (Somerset) (a countryside charity) brought judicial review proceedings challenging a District Council’s decision to grant planning permission for some buildings to store carnival floats. CPRE argued that the decision was unlawful because two of the councillors who had voted in favour of the scheme when it was before the Council’s planning committee were involved with other organisations which supported the scheme, meaning they were either biased or should be held to have predetermined the application. The High Court rehearsed the law on apparent bias and predetermination of decisions. In this case, the High Court held that, contrary to the advice given to the councillors by their monitoring officer, they both had ‘prejudicial interests’ under the terms of the Council’s code of conduct. The court held that, against that backdrop, a fair-minded observer would consider that there was a real possibility of bias. Accordingly, the court quashed the planning decision. Written by Alexander Campbell, barrister at Cornerstone Barristers.

Law360, Expert analysis: On 22 February 2024, in H1 v W, the Commercial Court, King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales removed a sole arbitrator under section 24 of the Arbitration Act 1996 due to justifiable doubts about his impartiality and a real possibility of bias, offering further guidance on the disqualification on arbitrators. Written by Andrew Connelly, associate, and Ian Meredith, partner, at K&L Gates LLP.