This Practice Note covers the offence of acquiring, using or possessing criminal property under section 329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002), which is one of the principal money laundering offences under that Act, see Practice Note: Money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—The principal money laundering offences. For further information on the other principle money laundering offences, see Practice Notes: Money laundering offences—concealing, disguising, converting, transferring and removing and Money laundering offences—the arrangement offence. The acquisition, use and possession of the proceeds of crime offence This offence is committed where a person acquires, uses or has possession of criminal property. For detailed guidance on what constitutes criminal property and criminal conduct, see Practice Note: Principal money laundering offences—mens rea, criminal property and criminal conduct—What is criminal property? As for the mens rea of this offence, mere suspicion will suffice. Dishonesty is not required, nor need the accused know or believe the property in question is criminal property for the substantive offence although, where the prosecution

This Practice Note concerns the concealing offence under section 327 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002), which is one of the principal money laundering offences under the Act, see Practice Note: Money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—The principal money laundering offences. For further information on the other principle money laundering offences, see Practice Notes: Money laundering offences—the arrangement offence and Money laundering offences—acquisition, use and possession. POCA 2002, s 327 offence of concealing etc criminal property The offence is committed when a person does one of the following: • conceals criminal property • disguises criminal property • converts criminal property • transfers criminal property, or • removes criminal property from England and Wales POCA 2002, s 327(1)(e) is a way of committing the offence which applies when criminal property is removed from the jurisdiction. In contrast, the other ways of committing the concealing offence under POCA 2002, s 327(1) do not mention geographic limitations. In R v Rogers, the Court of Appeal

Failure to disclose offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 There are three principal offences relating to failure to disclose money laundering under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002): • failing to disclose to a nominated officer or other authorised person when operating in the regulated sector—wide application within the regulated sector, not limited to nominated officers • failure to disclose, on the part of a nominated officer operating in the regulated sector-narrow application, limited to nominated officers in the regulated sector • failure to disclose, on the part of a nominated officer operating in the unregulated sector-narrow application, limited to nominated officers in the unregulated sector POCA 2002, ss 330 and 331 together create an obligation on the regulated sector to report to the appropriate authorities suspicions of money laundering (ie the conversion of the proceeds of crime into assets which appear to have a legitimate origin). POCA 2002, s 332 creates the same obligation for specific persons (ie nominated officers) in the non-regulated sector who receive information

This Practice Note concerns the arrangement offence under section 328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002), which is one of the principal money laundering offences under that Act, see Practice Note: Money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—The principal money laundering offences. For further information on the other principle money laundering offences, see Practice Notes: Money laundering offences—concealing, disguising, converting, transferring and removing and Money laundering offences—acquisition, use and possession. The arrangement offence under POCA 2002, s 328 This offence is committed where a person enters into or becomes concerned in an arrangement that they know or suspect facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property, by or on behalf of another person. For detailed guidance on what constitutes criminal property and criminal conduct, see Practice Note: Principal money laundering offences—mens rea, criminal property and criminal conduct—What is criminal property? The prosecution has to prove that the arrangement is one which the defendant knew or suspected 'facilitates' acquisition by or on behalf of another

Tipping off and prejudicing an investigation The value to the authorities of a suspicious activity report (SAR) would be undermined if the alleged offender were made aware of the authorities’ interest in their activities, enabling them to conceal their wrongdoing or disappear. To prevent this, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002) sets out separate offences for ‘tipping off’ and ‘prejudicing an investigation’. The offences of tipping off and prejudicing an investigation share common features but are aimed at distinctly different offending actions. The tipping off provisions are triggered where a person operating within the regulated sector either discloses that a SAR (or a disclosure under POCA 2002, s 337 (protected disclosure) or POCA 2002, s 338 (authorised disclosure)) has been made, or that a money-laundering investigation is being contemplated or carried out. For further information, see Practice Note: Authorised disclosure, protected disclosure and appropriate consent). The prejudicing an investigation offence is more general in its application and is directed at an individual with knowledge of the existence of an investigation

Law360, London: Money laundering was the biggest source of fraud and economic crime by value in the UK in 2024, with the average value of individual cases increasing ten-fold compared with 2023, a professional services firm reported on 6 May 2025.

1 Introduction 1.1 We have performed a firm-wide risk assessment (FWRA) to identify the risks to our firm of becoming involved in money laundering, terrorist financing and/or proliferation financing. This document records the risks we have assessed and conclusions we have reached, including how we will mitigate the risks. The person responsible for this FWRA is [insert name/role]. 1.2 Our assessment included consideration of: 1.2.1 the profile and demographic of our client base; 1.2.2 the geographical areas in which we operate; 1.2.3 the services [and products ]we offer; 1.2.4 the type of transactions in which we are involved; 1.2.5 delivery channel risk; 1.2.6 the sectors in which we operate; 1.2.7 terrorist financing risk; 1.2.8 proliferation financing risk; 1.2.9 business model and external support; 1.2.10 our internal or operational risks. 1.3 This document does not record details of our sanctions risk assessment, which is separate to this assessment. See separate Financial sanctions organisation-wide risk assessment. 2 Overview of the firm Size and nature of the firm [Insert details, eg the firm is very large, large, medium, small or a sole practice][Insert details, eg the firm is a full service firm, commercial, private client, high street or niche/specialist][Insert

1 Introduction 1.1 We have performed an organisation-wide assessment of the areas where we are most at risk of involvement in money laundering, terrorist financing and/or proliferation financing. This document records the risks we have assessed and conclusions we have reached. The person responsible for this risk assessment is [insert name/role]. 1.2 Our assessment included consideration of: 1.2.1 the profile and demographic of our customer base; 1.2.2 the geographical areas we operate in; 1.2.3 the sectors we operate in; 1.2.4 the [services AND/OR products] we offer; 1.2.5 the type of transactions we are involved in, including delivery channels; 1.2.6 existing and future business partnerships and opportunities; and 1.2.7 our internal or operational risks. 2 Overview of the organisation Size and nature of the organisation [Insert details, eg the organisation is very large/large/medium/small][Insert details, eg the organisation is a high street/niche/specialist][Insert details, eg the organisation’s reach is global/multinational/regional/local] Staff [Insert details, eg composition of staff base, staff turnover and any other relevant employee metrics] Description of practice areas and their relative size/significance to the business [Insert details] Customer types [Insert details eg, our customers are individuals/UK corporate entities/overseas entities/entities listed on regulated markets/credit or financial

This Checklist signposts relevant Precedents you can use or adapt to comply with the requirements of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (MLR 2017), SI 2017/692, as amended, and related recommendations. There is a section for you to mark whether you have completed each requirement and also to insert comments or note action points. You should check whether the MLR 2017 contain additional or varied requirements for your sector and whether your regulatory body has any additional, sector-specific requirements. Nominated officer For more guidance, see Practice Note: Money Laundering Regulations 2017—nominated officer. Requirement Compulsory or recommended? Comments (if any) ☐ Determine:—are you required to appoint a nominated officer?—if yes, who will be your nominated officer?—if no, will you voluntarily appoint a nominated officer? Compulsory to appoint a nominated officer if you are caught by the MLR 2017 (subject to exception for genuine sole practitioners).Some organisations that are not caught by the MLR 2017 may still choose to appoint a nominated officer

This Checklist signposts relevant Precedents you can use or adapt to comply with the requirements of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (MLR 2017), SI 2017/692, as amended, and related recommendations. It pulls together requirements in the MLR 2017, as amended as well as in the: • National money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessment • Legal Sector Affinity Group (LSAG) Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Guidance for the Legal Sector • SRA Sectoral Risk Assessment—Anti-money laundering, terrorist financing, proliferation financing and sanctions, and • various SRA and Law Society publications The Checklist signposts relevant Precedents you can use or adapt to comply with these requirements and recommendations. There is a section for you to mark whether you have completed each requirement and also to insert comments or note action points. Governance Money laundering compliance officer (MLCO) Requirement Compulsory or recommended? Comments (if any) ☐ Determine:—whether you have to appoint a board-level (or equivalent) person as the officer responsible for the firm’s compliance with MLR

1 Assemble an incident management team You need to be able to demonstrate that you have taken a genuinely proactive approach, so get the right people involved from the outset. The nominated officer is ultimately responsible for making any external reports, so they should be involved at the earliest stage, if this is not already the case. ☐ Inform the nominated officer, if this has not already been done. ☐ Consider if any further (and/or external) assistance is required to handle the incident. This may not be necessary. ☐ Appoint someone to lead the team—the nominated officer (if you have one) is likely to be best placed to take on this role. 2 Contain the report Once concerns have been raised, it is important to keep this information as confidential as possible to avoid inadvertently committing one of the tipping-off offences contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 2002) or the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000). ☐ Nobody should disclose the details of the

The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has secured a confiscation order against a convicted money launderer, Richard Faithfull, following his conviction in September 2021. On 28 July 2023 Southwark Crown Court imposed an order of £562,636 against Faithfull, who was part of a trans-national organised crime group which laundered the proceeds of at least seven professionally run overseas investment frauds.