Under Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), one of the European Commission’s core roles is to supervise Member State compliance with EU law. The general EU infringement procedure constitutes the Commission’s main tool of enforcement. It consists of two distinct procedures stipulated in Articles 258 and 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), each with its own subject-matter. The main difference is: • the Article 258 TFEU procedure is designed to obtain a declaration that the conduct of a Member State is in breach of EU law and that the conduct will be terminated • the Article 260 TFEU procedure is designed to induce a defaulting Member State to comply with a judgment establishing a breach of obligations, ie repetitive infringements, and it has a much narrower ambit than Article 258 TFEU (see P Sweden v API and Commission) The procedural construction thus distinguishes between compliance with Treaty obligations, ‘first order compliance’, and compliance with judgments of the Treaty regime’s dispute

This Practice Note sets out the basis of the courts’ jurisdiction in family proceedings, including the limited circumstances in which proceedings may be dealt with under the inherent jurisdiction of the court rather than under statute. The inherent jurisdiction largely relates to children proceedings and proceedings in the High Court. Transitional provisions in force after 11 pm on 31 December 2020 (IP completion day) are also considered. For guidance on the position before IP completion day, see also Transitional provisions and Practice Note: Family proceedings with EU connections—toolkit. After IP completion day, none of the EU instruments formerly regulating jurisdiction apply, subject to transitional provisions (see below). Most aspects of family law are governed by domestic statute and statutory instruments together with relevant Hague Conventions, such as the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980 (the 1980 Hague Convention), the Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children (the 1996 Hague Convention) and the Hague Convention

Inherent authority describes, in practice, the built-in power a superior court has to control its own process and to act to prevent injustice, even where no specific rule or statute applies. In the UK and Ireland this is better known as the court’s inherent jurisdiction (High Court of England and Wales, Court of Session’s nobile officium in Scotland, High Court of Northern Ireland, and the Irish High Court). It supports orders such as case management directions, stays, injunctive/interdict or anonymity orders, restraining abusive proceedings, contempt controls, and protective measures for children or vulnerable adults. It cannot override legislation or established procedural codes and is exercised sparingly where necessary to fill gaps or safeguard the administration of justice.Outside the courts, some practitioners use “inherent authority” loosely in agency and company law to suggest a manager’s authority arising from their role. UK and Irish law, however, recognises the categories of actual (express or implied/“usual”) authority and apparent (ostensible) authority; “inherent authority” is not a separate category.Usage and effect are broadly consistent across England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Ireland, subject to local terminology and procedural rules.

Family analysis: The court accepted that jurisdiction can be based on presence where a temporary order is required to safeguard a child but found that at the time of the application the child who was the subject of the proceedings was not habitually resident within this jurisdiction. The court had to decide whether the orders made crossed the statutory scheme in relation to jurisdiction and held that while the local authority had sought inherent jurisdiction orders to secure public law orders, the residual inherent jurisdiction exists to protect a child but in this case it ought not to have been exercised. Yaa Dankwa Ampadu-Sackey, barrister at Four Brick Court, examines the issues.

What is the inherent jurisdiction (IJ)? The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is a residual protective jurisdiction used to safeguard vulnerable adults who have capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005) but whose ability to make free decisions is compromised by coercion, undue influence, constraint, or other forms of vulnerability. It operates as a safeguard where statutory powers are insufficient. For details on how to make an application, see Practice Note: How to apply to the court to use the inherent jurisdiction for vulnerable adults. When can it be used? The IJ can be used in relation to a vulnerable adult who, even if not incapacitated by mental disorder or mental illness, is reasonably believed to be: • under constraint • subject to coercion or undue influence or • for some other reason deprived of the capacity to make relevant decisions or disabled from making free choice or incapacitated or disabled from giving or expressing a real genuine consent Relationship with the Mental Capacity Act

This flowchart deals with the classes of applicants that may make a claim for reasonable provision from the deceased’s estate under the Inheritance

This Flowchart provides an outline of the procedure where there is a claim under the Inheritance

Private Client analysis: Costs are the hot topic in litigation under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. A striking first-instance judgment, varied without enthusiasm on appeal, gives practitioners something to chew over while they await the Supreme Court’s decision in Hirachand v Hirachand. At first instance, a cohabitee claimant was awarded a half-interest in a property and a lump sum of £385,000, of which £140,000 was a contribution towards their litigation costs. The court then made a nominal order of no order as to costs. On appeal, the provision for costs was set aside, and a ‘traditional’ costs order was made in the claimant’s favour. But the appeal court expressed unease at the artificial separation of costs and award in this litigation. The problems with which the Supreme Court must grapple in Hirachand are plain to see. Written by James McKean, barrister at New Square Chambers.

A claim brought under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (I(PFD)A 1975) which enables certain categories of people, who were financially dependant on the deceased, to bring a claim against their estate for reasonable financial provision. The deceased must have been domiciled in England and Wales when they died. An Inheritance Act claim may also be referred to as a 1975 Act claim or a Family provision claim.

PI & Clinical Negligence analysis: A husband and wife were struck during a road traffic accident. The wife was killed immediately, and the husband was fatally injured. He lived for around 12 days afterwards. Both of the deceased’s estates brought an action for compensation against both the driver, and, since the driver was uninsured, the MIB. Had the husband survived, he would have been entitled to statutory compensation in respect of bereavement; and a more substantial compensation for loss of dependency on his wife. The MIB argued that neither claim could be brought by his estate, and successfully sought an order striking them out. This case is of interest to those practicing in areas relating to fatal accidents, and clarifies the law as to what claims can be pursued in these circumstances. Written by Robert Parkin, a barrister at Deka Chambers.

Inheritance Tax is paid on an estate when somebody dies or when trusts or gifts are made during someone's lifetime.

A tax on capital assets owned at death, some lifetime gifts or transfers, and some trust interests.