Construction analysis: This case concerned an unsuccessful application by a contractor for an interim injunction restraining a developer from continuing with and issuing further adjudications. The developer commenced four adjudications in quick succession against the contractor and Part 8 proceedings in relation to a previous adjudicator’s decision, plus the developer threatened to launch a fifth adjudication. The court dismissed the application. Written by Jonathan Pawlowski, partner at Howard Kennedy LLP.

For the purposes of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990), a breach of planning control is subject to enforcement action. For these purposes, TCPA 1990, s 171A defines a breach of planning control as: • carrying out development without the required planning permission—this inherently requires that unauthorised operations or a material change of use which constitute development within the meaning of TCPA 1990, s 55 have occurred, and that planning permission is required for that development and not been obtained. In deciding whether a breach of planning control has occurred within this context, the guidance and case law concerned with the meaning of ‘development’ will need to be followed • failing to comply with any condition or limitation subject to which planning permission has been granted—this includes any of the limitations or conditions applied to individual permitted development rights in the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015, SI 2015/596 See Practice Note: Planning—enforcement for more information on planning breaches and enforcement action generally. TCPA 1990, s 171A

Construction analysis: The Companies Court granted an injunction to restrain the presentation of a winding up petition following a statutory demand for the amount in a sub-contractor’s final account, where the contractor had not given a pay less notice in time. The court held that there was a real question over whether the sub-contractor was entitled to serve its final account (and also whether an earlier interim payment application had been made at the correct time). In addition, the court considered that the contractor's cross claim was genuine—there was evidence supporting the amount of the cross claim and the claim had not been plucked out of thin air.

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: The court dismissed an application by Portland Stone Firms Ltd (PSF) for an order restraining Albert Goodman LLP (AG) from advertising a winding-up petition. The petition relied upon an unsatisfied statutory demand and section 123(1)(e) of the Insolvency Act 1986. The court accepted that while the precise sum owed to AG could not be calculated, it was nonetheless clear that AG was owed more than £750. That was sufficient for the petition to continue, despite PSF producing evidence which allegedly showed that it was cash flow solvent. This case provides an example of the approach which the court will take when: there are disputes of fact; the precise sum owing to a creditor is incapable of calculation; a debtor asserts cash flow solvency in support of an application to restrain advertisement. Written by Govinder Chambay, barrister at Guildhall Chambers.

Dispute Resolution analysis: Following Brexit, the UK is not a party to the Brussels Lugano regime. However, the jurisdiction to grant interim orders in relation to proceedings brought abroad, or which can be brought in the future abroad, is extensive. In this article, Steven Gee QC of Monckton Chambers, considers cross border injunctions after Brexit and the implications of the Privy Council decision in Broad Idea International Ltd v Convoy Collateral Ltd.

This Practice Note is concerned with injunctions against defendants who cannot be identified, typically referred to as injunctions against persons unknown, also sometimes referred to as ‘unidentified defendants’ or ‘John Doe’ injunctions (X v Persons Unknown (2006)). It explains the extent of the jurisdiction to grant such injunctions, whether interim or final, as well as the particular considerations that apply to ‘newcomer injunctions’, as discussed by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council v London Gypsies and Travellers (2023) and subsequently. For general guidance on injunctions, see: Interim and final injunctions—overview and, in particular, Practice Note: Injunctions—guiding principles. For summaries of illustrative decisions relevant to the principles discussed below, see also Practice Notes: • Injunctions—illustrative decisions • Injunctions—key and illustrative decisions (September 2019–2024) [Archived] The jurisdiction to grant injunctions against unknown defendants In certain cases, although a claimant is able to describe a particular person or group of people who are responsible for an infringement of their rights, the claimant does not know their true identity. In such circumstances, the courts have recognised that

Dispute Resolution analysis: The High Court granted injunctive relief restraining unidentified protesters who, in support of striking bin workers, obstructed depot access and waste vehicles. The court held that dispensing with service under CPR 6.16 requires exceptional circumstances, which were absent, but that extensive steps taken by the Council (online publication, notices, social media and targeted communications) amounted to valid alternative service under CPR 6.15 and retrospective orders were made. On the merits, the Council showed strong prospects in trespass, private nuisance and public nuisance. The Council conceded that Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (as well as section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998)) were engaged. Despite this, deliberate obstruction of essential public services was not at the core of protected protest rights. Applying a structured proportionality analysis, the court found a compelling need to protect the Council’s property rights and the public interest in waste collection, and granted time-limited relief while preserving lawful picketing and peaceful, non-obstructive protest.

Dispute Resolution analysis: Against the backdrop of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown, the court held that it would not make an order under CPR 6.15(2) permitting alternative service in respect of an injunction against persons unknown. In that context, the court also found that there had been a duty on the council, having obtained the injunction against persons unknown ex parte, to restore the matter to court for reconsideration as there had been a material change in circumstances (ie the changes in the law resulting from the Canada Goose case). In addition, the court did not grant a fresh injunction against individuals that might engage in fly tipping. Instead, Mr Justice Nicklin stated that broader consideration on the wider implications of the Canada Goose case and its effect on interim and final orders against persons unknown in cases such as this (ie against unknown and unidentifiable persons) was required. Written by Oliver Browne, partner and chair of the London Litigation and Trial Department, at Latham & Watkins.

Section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (TCPA 1990) provides that a local planning authority (LPA) may apply to the court for an injunction to restrain an actual or apprehended breach of planning control where it considers it ‘necessary or expedient’ to do so. On an application being made under TCPA 1990, s 187B, the court ‘may grant such an injunction as the court thinks appropriate for the purpose of restraining the breach’. The LPA may seek (and be granted) such an injunction regardless of whether it has exercised, or is proposing to exercise, any of the other enforcement powers conferred on it under TCPA 1990, Part VII, although a failure to consider exercising other powers is likely to be taken into account when the court is deciding whether to exercise its discretion to make the order sought. Practice Note: Injunction restraining breach of planning control sets out the detailed legal principles governing injunctions under TCPA 1990, s 187B. This Practice Note focuses on the procedural aspects. The two Practice Notes

This Practice Note considers the costs position following an application for an interim injunction, the general approach taken by the courts and in what circumstances there will be a departure from the general position. This Practice Note also considers the court’s approach to costs recovery in respect of applications concerning freezing injunctions and costs orders made in respect of anti-suit injunctions. Costs orders following applications for interim injunctions An applicant that is granted an interim injunction may understandably expect the court to order the respondent to pay the costs of the application. However, in Desquenne et Giral v Richardson (1999), the Court of Appeal held that the costs of an interim injunction application granted on (or agreed by consent on the basis of) the balance of convenience should usually be reserved until trial of the substantive issue. This is because there is no successful or unsuccessful party at this stage for the general rule to apply for the unsuccessful party to be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party (CPR 44.2(2)). The Court of Appeal in Digby

This Practice Note considers when a court has the power to grant an injunction and explains the variations in forms of injunctive relief, including reference to interim, final, prohibitory and mandatory orders. It also discusses the potential parties to an injunction, the circumstances in which an injunction might be suspended and the consequences of breaching an injunction. 6 April 2025 changes The CPR provisions relevant to interim injunctive relief were amended with effect from 6 April 2025. In particular, CPR 25 was revised extensively and the accompanying Practice Directions were revoked. The changes were not intended to materially alter the substantive law or practice. However, the numbering and location of many of the provisions were changed. Case law and commentary which pre-dates 6 April 2025 should therefore be approached with some caution as they may refer to the old provisions, numbering and standard orders. For further background, including links to the provisions as in force prior to 6 April 2025, see: • Q&A: Where can I find information on the changes to Part 25 coming into force on 6 April 2025?

This Practice Note summarises a number of illustrative cases relevant to injunctive relief. It is intended to provide a broad sense of the diverse range of factual scenarios and issues which can arise in respect of such orders, with particular focus on decisions dated from 1 January 2025 onwards. For key and illustrative decisions dated prior to 2025, see Practice Note: Injunctions—key and illustrative decisions (September 2019–2024) [Archived]. Note that the CPR provisions relevant to interim injunctive relief were amended with effect from 6 April 2025. In particular, CPR 25 was revised extensively and its accompanying Practice Directions were revoked. The changes were not intended to materially alter the substantive law or practice. However, the numbering and location of many of the provisions were changed. Case law and commentary which pre-dates the 6 April 2025 changes should therefore be approached with some caution, as they may refer to the old provisions and numbering. For the avoidance of doubt, any references in this Practice Note to: • ‘CPR 25.1’ are to the version of CPR 25 in force from 6 April 2025