Section 362A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) provides that an administrator may not be appointed by directors using the out-of-court route set out in Schedule B1, para 22 to the Insolvency Act 1986 without the consent of the appropriate regulator where that company falls within FSMA 2000, s 362(1)(a)–(c). This includes an appointed representative. The consent should be filed along with the notice of intention (NoI) to appoint administrators or, where no NoI

In respect of an estate, an administrator is, in accordance with section 55(1)(ii) of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (AEA 1925) a person to whom administration is granted, and by AEA 1925, s 55(1)(i): ‘Administration’ means with reference to the real and personal estate of a deceased person, letters of administration, whether general or limited, or with the will annexed or otherwise. By AEA 1925, s 55(1)(xi), ‘Personal Representative’ means the executor or administrator for the time being of a deceased person. As a result, where there has been

Driver liability A road user owes a duty to take reasonable care to avoid doing or omitting to do anything that they can reasonably foresee would cause injury to others. For further guidance on the duty of care owed by road users, see: Road traffic accident claims—overview and Practice Note: Duties of the road user. Vicarious liability In certain situations an employer, may be held to be vicariously liable for the negligence of a driver. If the driver was not an employee of the defendant, a potential claimant will need to consider the relationship between the driver and the defendant and the connection between that relationship

The mediation information and assessment meeting (MIAM) requirement applies to specified proceedings, including proceedings for a financial remedy per the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955 (FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 3.6(2)(b)) and as specified in FPR 2010, PD 3A, para 13. Certain circumstances attract a MIAM exemption (see

Section 23 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (LTA 1954) provides: ‘Subject to the provisions of this Act, this Part of this Act applies to any tenancy where the property comprised in the tenancy is or includes premises which are occupied by the tenant and are so occupied for the purposes of a business carried on by him or for those and other purposes’. To come within this definition there must be ‘premises’ which are capable of ‘occupation’. This immediately separates some types of easement from others. In Pointon York Group Plc v Poulton, the Court of Appeal held that there is no decided case which holds that an incorporeal

For the purpose of this Q&A, we have assumed that the tenancy is an Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 (AHA 1986) tenancy. Where the tenant quits all or part of a holding to which AHA 1986 applies, the landlord may claim compensation for any disrepair, dilapidation or damage to any particular part or parts of the holding caused by the

We refer you to the following content which you may find useful in your research: • Practice

Dispute Resolution analysis: Christos Paraskevopoulos, partner at Bernitsas Law, takes a look at the recent introduction of the Greek mandatory mediation scheme, which came into force under Law 4640/2019.

Environment analysis: James Maurici KC of Landmark Chambers considers the environmental principles policy statement (EPP), published on 31 January 2023. Maurici highlights the background to the statement, its final format, and its implications for environmental protection and the government’s approach to environmental regulation under the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill.

Tax analysis: This case concerns a challenge to HMRC's implementation of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (‘FATCA’) which requires US nationals living abroad to send personal and financial data to the IRS on a regular basis. If ultimately successful, the claim could have far-reaching implications for the global automatic exchange of tax data between tax authorities further to the Common Reporting Standard. Ms Webster was seeking a declaration that HMRC’s reporting of her UK bank accounts to the US was unlawful. Somewhat curiously Ms Webster’s litigation was funded by an anonymous third party (anonymous even to Ms Webster known only by her lawyers) which prompted much debate. The decision looks in detail at the question of whether a Claimant can refuse to reveal the identity of those funding a claim against HMRC. In rejecting Ms Webster’s application to either strike out HMRC’s defence or grant summary judgment, the High Court found that (1) HMRC’s argument (that Ms Webster’s claim was an abuse of process) had sufficient substance, reality and prospect, and (2) the funder’s identity went to the core issue of whether Ms Webster’s case was a genuine private law claim or an unregulated attack on a government department exercising statutory public functions in the public interest and therefore an abuse of process. The decision provides guidance on both the tests for applications to strike out and for summary judgment applications as well as an insight into the correct way of asserting your data protection rights against public entities. Written by Helen McGhee, partner, and Megan Durnford, associate, at Joseph Hage Aaronson LLP.

Local Government analysis: This was an appeal to the High Court in a Court of Protection matter. The appeal followed summary disposal of a contested best interests’ dispute where VT’s capacity was in question, and a medical report had been ordered by not yet provided. VT had also expressed a clear desire to return home, but her health was deteriorating. The judge allowed the appeal against summary dismissal and provided clear guidance as to when the Court of Protection should be exercising its discretion to deal with issues summarily, with the answer being rarely. The judge also commented on procedural fairness more generally, including the need to give notice to parties where the aim was to treat a directions hearing as a final one. It should not be the case that parties are being informed of such a course of action in the hours leading up to a hearing. Written by Clive Adams, partner in the social housing team at Birketts LLP.

The appellant’s notice (Form N161) should have been filed within 21 days after the decision of the lower court, unless the lower court directed a different period (Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 30.4(2)). It should then have been served not later than seven days after it was filed on each respondent and the persons referred