This Practice Note sets out the general principles of income tax that apply to discretionary trusts, and any trusts where income may be accumulated. The income of such trusts does not belong to any individual until it is distributed to a beneficiary at the discretion of the trustees. Consequently, while the income belongs to the trustees, it is taxed at special trust rates. If and when the income is paid out to beneficiaries, there are mechanisms to adjust the rate of tax suffered to the appropriate rate for the beneficiary. See Practice Notes: Taxation of discretionary and accumulating trusts—the tax pool and Discretionary trust beneficiaries—income tax. Trustees are together treated for tax purposes as if they were a single person, distinct from the individuals who are the trustees of the trust from time to time. Where there is more than one trustee, it is usual for one of the trustees, known as the 'principal acting trustee', to deal with HMRC. The actions of the principal acting trustee are treated as actions of all the trustees. All

What are discretions in employee share schemes? It is common to see contracts include powers for a party to determine a particular matter ‘in its absolute discretion’. Does such wording in practice mean what it purports to say, ie that the discretion can be exercised in any manner which that party sees fit? The answer under English law is almost certainly ‘no’, as there are significant legal constraints imposed by law on the exercise of such discretions. The inclusion of discretionary powers in employee share incentive schemes is relatively common. There are various areas of employee share plans where such discretions may be found. For example, they may be included in relation to provisions which allow vesting/exercise of awards and, perhaps most commonly, in relation to participants who are leaving employment and who may be designated as ‘good leavers’ or ‘bad leavers’ with particular consequences for the awards held by them under the scheme. Such discretions may be drafted as ‘absolute’ discretions (under which the company purports to have discretion to take

Discrimination describes less favourable treatment of a person because of a protected or prohibited characteristic, such as sex, race, disability, age, religion, sexual orientation or other specified grounds. In legal practice it commonly arises in employment law, equality law, education, housing and the provision of goods and services. In England and Wales, Scotland and (with adaptations) Northern Ireland, the concept is principally defined in statute, notably the Equality Act 2010 (and, in Northern Ireland, a suite of separate anti-discrimination Orders and Regulations). In Ireland, it is primarily governed by the Employment Equality Acts and Equal Status Acts. Key legal features typically include: - direct discrimination (less favourable treatment because of a protected ground); - indirect discrimination (a provision, criterion or practice that puts a group at a particular disadvantage and is not objectively justified); - harassment and victimisation linked to protected grounds; - reasonable accommodation or reasonable adjustment duties for disabled persons. Usage and underlying concepts are broadly consistent across the UK and Ireland, though protected grounds, defences, justification tests, burden of proof rules, time limits and available remedies differ by jurisdiction and statutory scheme.

Employment analysis: Barely a day goes by without the media reporting the potential benefits of or threats from artificial intelligence (AI). AI is being used more and more in workplace decisions: to make remuneration and promotion decisions; to allocate work; award bonuses; manage performance and make dismissal decisions. One of the common concerns is the propensity of AI systems to return biased or discriminatory outcomes. By working through a case study about the use of AI in recruitment, James Davies, partner at Lewis Silkin, examines the risks of unlawful discrimination and how that might be challenged in the employment tribunal.

This Practice Note considers discrimination because of something arising in consequence of disability (ie arising from disability). This is one of a number of types of disability discrimination that amounts to prohibited conduct under the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010). It looks at the concept of treating someone unfavourably, justification of that unfavourable treatment, the requirement of knowledge of the disability and also notes that associative discrimination or discrimination on the basis of perception does not apply. What amounts to discrimination arising from disability A person discriminates against a disabled person if: • they treat the disabled person unfavourably because of something arising from, or in consequence of, that disabled person’s disability, and • they cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, and • they knew, or could reasonably have been expected to know, that the disabled person had the disability This provision is of relevance where a disabled person is treated unfavourably because of something arising from, or in consequence of, their disability, such as the need to

Local Government analysis: A Judicial Review brought by a severely disabled young man regarding the policy adopted by the local authority to charge for services delivered under Care Act 2014, (CA 2014). The claim was brought on the basis of discrimination relating to the differential in treatment under the policy between the severely disabled who are incapable of work, and those in receipt of similar services who can potentially earn additional income. The claim was dismissed. Central to the judgment is the context of the budget pressures facing the local authority due to financial crisis, and how far this could be taken into account when addressing the impact of the charging policy upon the claimant. Written by Kevin Long, Solicitor at Hackney Community Law Centre.

This Practice Note considers what may constitute discrimination in a social housing context and when it could arise. It also considers the social housing provider’s obligations to ensure that those with protected characteristics have their needs met and are able to remove or minimise disadvantages for them in access housing support services. Social housing providers are public authorities for the purpose of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010). This requires public bodies to publish relevant, proportionate information that demonstrates how they will comply with the public sector equality duty (PSED). See Practice Notes: Specific public sector equality duties—England and Specific public sector equality duties—Wales. What is discrimination? Discrimination is the unequal treatment of an individual or a number of people who are considered to be ‘protected’ under EqA 2010 because they have protected characteristics. The relevant protected characteristics are: • age  • disability  • gender reassignment • marriage and civil partnership • pregnancy and maternity • race  • religion or belief • sex • sexual orientation For further reading, see: Protected characteristics—overview. Public

Employment law analysis: The Central London County Court has given judgment in Ali v (1) Reason (2) Nott (representing all members of the Green Party of England and Wales except the claimant, Dr Ali). For the first time, the court had to consider the interaction between the Equality Act 2010 association provisions, the protected characteristic of belief, and the rights of political parties and their members under the European Convention on Human Rights. The decision will be of great interest to political parties and campaigners of all kinds. Declan O’Dempsey, barrister at Cloisters, considers the decision and its implications.

This Practice Note examines who is protected and can bring claims under the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010), other than ‘employees' who bring claims under the ‘in employment’ provisions of EqA 2010, covered in Practice Note: Employment events which give rise to discrimination, victimisation and harassment claims. It considers the meaning of discriminate and detriment. It looks at whether the self-employed are protected. It considers whether prohibited conduct (discrimination) claims can be brought by various classes of worker who may not be considered to be employees. They include voluntary workers, interns, Crown employees and parliamentary staff, armed forces, contract workers including agency workers, police, those in partnerships including LLPs, barristers and advocates, office-holders (office holders), qualification bodies which confer professional or trade qualifications, employment agencies and providers of vocational training or work experience, trade organisations (such as trade unions and employers’ associations) and local authority members. Occupational pension schemes There are prohibitions against discrimination, victimisation and harassment and a duty to make reasonable adjustments which apply to various persons involved with occupational

In the context of a claim for discrimination which affords a defence of justification, whether treatment, which is the direct result of applying a general rule, policy or procedure, is justified will usually depend on whether the general rule, policy or procedure itself is justified. However, where the underlying rule, policy or procedure allows for an assessment of the response on an individual basis according to the circumstances, it is the particular treatment which must be justified, not just the rule, policy or procedure. EAT: Buchanan v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis.

Local Government analysis: This decision of the Court of Appeal confirms that, where a student or applicant has a discrimination claim against a university, those claimants must issue their claims in the County Court and not the Employment Tribunal (ET). This means that they will have to pay an issue fee. The judgment considered the drafting of section 54(4)(c) of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010) and determined that, if an institution falls within the definition of ‘university’ within EqA 2010, s 91, that displaces its status as a qualification body and claims against it must be made in the County Court. The appellant in this case had not been deprived of a forum to bring his discrimination claim, but he ought to have issued it in the County Court. Written by Samantha Rose, senior associate at Penningtons Manches Cooper.

Changes in Law which specifically affect the Project itself and not similar projects or Project Co itself but no other people.