FORTHCOMING CHANGE: As announced at Autumn Budget 2024, the government commissioned an independent review of the loan charge. The review, announced on 23 January 2025, was to ‘examine the barriers preventing those who are subject to the loan charge but have not already settled and paid their tax liabilities in full from reaching resolution with HMRC’ and was tasked to ‘recommend ways in which they can be encouraged to settle with HMRC’ (see News Analysis: Autumn Budget 2024—Independent review of the loan charge). To assist with the review, a call for evidence, aimed at those who remain subject to the loan charge (and their advisers), was published on 28 March 2025. The Final Report of the review was published, along with the government response, at Budget 2025 on 26 November 2025. The Final Report concluded that the loan charge ‘failed as a mechanism to resolve the tax affairs of [affected] taxpayers, largely because it was not married with a settlement strategy that was both commensurate to the extraordinary legislation enacted, and equitable

FORTHCOMING CHANGE: As announced at Autumn Budget 2024, the government has commissioned an independent review of the loan charge. The review, announced on 23 January 2025, will ‘examine the barriers preventing those who are subject to the loan charge but have not already settled and paid their tax liabilities in full from reaching resolution with HMRC’ and will ‘recommend ways in which they can be encouraged to settle with HMRC’. To assist with the review, a call for evidence, aimed at those who remain subject to the loan charge (and their advisers), was published on 28 March 2025. The outcome of the review, with recommendations, will be reported and presented to the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury ‘by Summer 2025’. For more on the review, see News Analysis: Autumn Budget 2024—Independent review of the loan charge. HMRC has confirmed the operational activity it will undertake while the independent review is ongoing. This includes sending letters (and a Q&A document) to affected taxpayers setting out whether HMRC believes the disguised remuneration

STOP PRESS: Abolition of non-dom regime and remittance basis of taxation from 2025–26: Finance Act 2025 abolished the remittance basis of taxation and replaced it with a residence-based regime from 6 April 2025. The changes include the introduction of a new Foreign Income and Gains (FIG) regime, and amendments to overseas workday relief. For information on these changes, see Practice Note: The abolition of the remittance basis of taxation from 2025–26. FORTHCOMING CHANGE: As announced at Autumn Budget 2024, the government commissioned an independent review of the loan charge. The review, announced on 23 January 2025, was to ‘examine the barriers preventing those who are subject to the loan charge but have not already settled and paid their tax liabilities in full from reaching resolution with HMRC’ and was tasked to ‘recommend ways in which they can be encouraged to settle with HMRC’ (see News Analysis: Autumn Budget 2024—Independent review of the loan charge). To assist with the review, a call for evidence,

Dishonesty is to be determined according to the current standards of ordinary, decent people.

Dishonesty provides the mens rea for multiple offences under statute and the common law. It is, however, not fully defined by statute. The exception is the Theft Act 1968 (TA 1968), which goes some way towards defining dishonesty but only insofar as certain offences within the 1968 Act are concerned (see: Theft offences—overview). Dishonesty is ultimately a term that should be given its plain English meaning. It will be for the jury to decide whether a defendant has been dishonest, with the assistance of judicial directions drawn from the test for dishonesty in Ivey. The need to prove dishonesty applies to many, but not all, offences falling under the broad categories of ‘financial’, ‘business’, or ‘corporate’ crime. For example, proof of dishonesty is required for the core offences under the Fraud Act 2006 and false accounting under TA 1968, s 17. It is required for certain offences under the Insolvency Act 1986, the Taxes Management Act 1970, the Companies Act 2006, and the Financial Services Act 2012. Dishonesty is also

Dispute Resolution analysis: The High Court has held that a director was in breach of fiduciary duty in causing the companies in which he was a director to enter into transactions with parties in which he had an interest—in circumstances where he did not properly consider the interests of the companies and failed properly to address his obvious conflict of interest. The court also considered whether the claims were statute barred and whether section 21(1) or section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980) applied. These sections deal with the time limit for actions in respect of trust property and postponement of the limitation period in cases of fraud, concealment or mistake respectively. The court also considered when a finding of dishonesty is required for LA 1980, s 21(1). The court held that some of the claimants’ contentions on limitation were made out, but that in any event, there was no limitation issue since the breaches of fiduciary duty were continuing breaches.

A reduction in the rate of inflation.

A disinterested witness is a person who gives evidence or attests a document while having no personal stake in the outcome of the case or transaction. In practice, this means the witness has no financial interest, is not a party, and has no close personal relationship that might reasonably call their objectivity into question.Across England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Ireland, the expression “disinterested witness” is descriptive rather than a precisely defined statutory term, though specific legislation and case law in areas such as wills, deeds, affidavits and powers of attorney set out who may or may not act as a valid witness.The concept is important in litigation (to enhance the credibility and weight of oral or written evidence) and in transactional and private client work, where using a disinterested witness can reduce the risk of later challenge for undue influence, lack of capacity or fraud. In many practice areas, lawyers advise clients to use an independent, disinterested witness-often a solicitor or other professional-particularly where the risk of dispute is high or where formal witnessing requirements are strict.

Where an employer terminates the employment of an employee.

This Practice Note examines dismissal in the context of partnerships. It considers what happens to employment relationships when a partner joins or leaves or a partnership is dissolved and the position when the partnership is resumed after a dissolution. It also looks at limited liability partnerships. In some situations, the ordinary rules relating to dismissals do not apply or additional rules need to be considered. Two of the most important of these are when a partnership dissolves (discussed below) and when an employee is also a director of a company (for which see Practice Note: Dismissing a senior executive). General partnerships A genuine partner in a general partnership (ie one that is not a limited liability partnership) is normally self-employed rather than an employee and does not enjoy the same statutory employment rights as an employee on dismissal. The description ‘partner’ or ‘salaried partner’ is not conclusive: employment and worker status depend on the substance

The Department for Business and Trade has updated the statutory Code of Practice on Dismissal and Re-engagement which came into force on 18 July 2024. Section 52 of the guidance now further states 'the employer should ensure that the only terms which are changed are those which have been subject to the information-sharing and consultation process, and should not use this as an opportunity to make any further changes.' which was previously omitted in error. Other minor amendments have been made throughout the document.

Employment analysis: There was no need for the claimant’s dismissal claim to be remitted to the employment tribunal as the tribunal would be bound on the particular facts to find that the claimant’s dismissal was not objectively justified and, accordingly, that it constituted unlawful discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. The claimant’s beliefs that gender is binary and that same-sex marriage cannot be equated with marriage between a man and a woman are protected beliefs. Even if it was assumed that the respondent was entitled to take objection to the posts she had made on Facebook which expressed these beliefs (eg because the language was gratuitously offensive to gay and/or trans people and used in the context of sex education in schools which made it relevant to the claimant’s work), the dismissal was unquestionably a disproportionate response, according to the Court of Appeal.