Freezing injunctions

6 April 2025 changes

The CPR provisions relevant to interim injunctive relief, including freezing orders, were amended with effect from 6 April 2025. In particular, CPR 25 was revised extensively and the accompanying Practice Directions, including the example draft freezing order included in Annex A of Practice Direction 25A, were revoked. In its place, a new model order for a freezing injunction came into force on 6 April 2025.

The changes were not intended to materially alter the substantive law or practice. However, the numbering and location of many of the provisions were changed. Case law and commentary which pre-dates 6 April 2025 should therefore be approached with some caution as they may refer to the old provisions, numbering and standard order.

For further background, including links to the provisions in force prior to 6 April 2025, see:

  1. Q&A: Where can I find information on the changes to Part 25 coming into force on 6 April 2025?

  2. Practice Note: Interim remedies—CPR Part 25, Practice Direction 25A and Practice Direction 25B—destination and derivation tables

For the avoidance of doubt, references in this subtopic to:

  1. CPR 25.1

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