ADR and dispute resolution clauses

The Practice Notes in this subtopic provide users with an understanding of what alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is, the different types of ADR that are available and the key differences between them, as well as considering the development of ADR and the court’s power to encourage or order the parties to consider ADR as an effective means of resolving civil disputes otherwise than in the court system. It also considers the different types of dispute resolution clause which parties may include in their commercial agreements, including those providing for different forms of ADR (including tiered and hybrid clauses).

Although the Commercial Courts refer instead to negotiated dispute resolution (NDR), for ease of reference the term ADR is generally used throughout the content in this subtopic.

For cross-border disputes, see also: Cross-border ADR—overview.

For guidance on recent developments in ADR, see Practice Note: Tracker—ADR developments.

For general guidance on settling disputes, see:

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Settlement and settling disputes—overview
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Part 36 offers—overview

What is ADR?

The importance of ADR as a key element of the English civil justice system cannot be overlooked.

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Latest Dispute Resolution News

Law Society welcomes government's new AI action plan for justice system

The Law Society of England and Wales has endorsed the UK government's new AI action plan for justice, which prioritises the responsible integration of AI technologies within the legal system. The Law Society's CEO, Ian Jeffery, stated that while the plan highlights AI's potential to enhance legal services, it also recognises the need to address associated risks. The Law Society’s AI strategy, based on innovation, impact, and integrity, aims to ensure technology is used ethically for the benefit of both the public and legal professionals. The Law Society reiterated its position from the 21st Century Justice project, advocating for modernising the justice system to improve accessibility. It proposed developing a free AI-powered tool, similar to the NHS 111 service, to help individuals understand and navigate common legal issues such as divorce, employment, housing and wills.

Supreme Court confirms that undisclosed car finance commissions are not unlawful in landmark judgment (Hopcraft and another v Close Brothers Limited; Johnson v FirstRand Bank Limited (London Branch) t/a MotoNovo Finance; Wrench v FirstRand Bank Limited (London Branch) t/a MotoNovo Finance)

The Supreme Court has ruled in three conjoined appeals concerning undisclosed commission payments in car finance deals. In its judgment today (1 August 2025), the Supreme Court rejected claims against lenders based on the tort of bribery and equity, ruling that car dealers arranging finance are not fiduciaries. The judgment provides important clarification on the legal status of dealer-arranged car finance while establishing that particularly high undisclosed commissions may still be challenged under consumer credit legislation. Christopher Adams, barrister at Henderson Chambers, and Kate Urell, barrister at Gough Square Chambers, comment on the implications of this landmark judgment.

Insolvency–fraudulent trading and dishonest assistance (Bilta and others v Tradition Financial Services)

Restructuring & Insolvency analysis: The Supreme Court held that liability for fraudulent trading under section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) is not limited to directors or other persons exercising management or control over the company in question. Rather, liability can attach (as the natural meaning of section 213 admits) to any person who is knowingly party to the carrying on of the company's business in a fraudulent manner. The Supreme Court further restated that an isolated act of fraud in an otherwise legitimate business would not amount to fraudulent trading. The Supreme Court was also asked to determine whether claims in dishonest assistance, parasitic on the directors' breaches of their fiduciary duties, were statute barred under the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980). The claims were issued more than six years from the dates of those breaches. The claimants sought to postpone the accrual of the limitation period under the LA 1980, s 32, ie until the time the claimants either discovered the fraud or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. On the assumed facts, and notwithstanding the intermediate dissolution and restoration of the companies, the claimants could not rely on LA 1980, s 32 and were consequently stature barred. Written by Sam Fenwick, partner, Suleika Horrocks, trainee solicitor, and Isabelle Burnett, solicitor apprentice at Wedlake Bell LLP.

Dispute Resolution weekly highlights—31 July 2025

This week's edition of Dispute Resolution weekly highlights includes: analysis of a number of key DR developments and key judicial decisions including the 185th, 186th and 187th Practice Direction updates to the Civil Procedure Rules and the Court of Appeal decision in Mold Investments Ltd v Holloway (evidence and interim injunction application); dates for your diary; details of our most recently published content; and other information of general interest to dispute resolution practitioners.

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