It is not uncommon for bankruptcy and divorce proceedings to run concurrently, or for one set of proceedings to impact on the other. For further reading on the effect bankruptcy and divorce proceedings have on one another see Practice Note: The impact of bankruptcy on divorce proceedings. Due to the impact bankruptcy proceedings can have on divorce proceedings (financial relief applications, known as property adjustment orders), there are sometimes situations where an unscrupulous divorcing party may allow themselves to fall into bankruptcy in order to defeat any ongoing divorce proceedings. In these circumstances, both the family and bankruptcy courts have the power (in the right circumstances) to challenge the bankruptcy order and its overall effect. A summary of the challenges available There are a number of challenges available to the non-bankrupt divorcing spouse, which can be pursued in both the bankruptcy and family court. These are: • an application to annul the bankruptcy order • an application to rescind the bankruptcy order • an application

What are the legislative provisions? Section 33(7) of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) provides (inter alia): 'While a care order is in force with respect to a child, no person may— (a) cause the child to be known by a new surname… without either the written consent of every person who has parental responsibility for the child or the leave of the court.' Therefore, where a parent with parental responsibility objects to a change of name in relation to a child that is the subject of a care

An undertaking is a promise given by one party to do, or not to do, something, which is binding on the person giving the undertaking. Undertakings are used where the court does not have the jurisdiction to make an order for a party to do, or refrain from doing, a particular act. When an undertaking has been given, it has the same effect

Arbitration analysis: The recent Court of Appeal judgment in Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council provides important clarification as to whether the courts can, and will, order parties to participate in non-court based dispute resolution. Up to this point, it was widely considered that the courts would be unlikely to compel parties to participate in alternative dispute resolution (ADR). This was based on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust, which was perceived to mean that mandatory ADR was an unacceptable obstruction to the right of access to the courts. However, in Churchill, it was clarified that in certain circumstances the court may stay litigation to order parties to engage in ADR. William Johnson, Graham Anderson and Hoi-Yee Roper of Farrer & Co LLP consider the case and practical implications.

Section 31(1) of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) provides that on an application for a care or supervision order by ‘any local authority or authorised person’, the threshold criteria as set out in ChA 1989, s 31(2) must be met, and a court may only make a care or supervision order if it is satisfied that: • the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm, and • the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to: ◦ the care given to the child, or likely to be given to it, if a care or supervision order were not made, the care not being such as it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give, or ◦ the child being beyond parental control See

One of the most important aspects of pension sharing is to ensure prompt implementation so that the original intention of the court, when making the pension sharing order, is not distorted by changes in valuation or other factors. One of the prime responsibilities of the family lawyer acting for the person with the benefit of the pension credit is to ensure that the pension sharing order is implemented. This could include recommending an independent financial advisor. However, the person with the benefit of the pension credit may state no preference as to an internal or external transfer, may fail to identify a destination arrangement, or may request an internal transfer within a scheme which does not offer this option.

The Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) sets out at AA 1996, s 44 the powers that an English court may exercise in support of arbitration. The powers are very much intended to support, and not usurp or interfere with the arbitral process. See Practice Notes: AA 1996—interim and/or emergency relief—tribunal or court? and AA 1996—interim and/or emergency relief—powers of the English court. AA

The court's power to extend time limits is set out in various parts of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996): • AA 1996, s 79 (extension of time to time limits agreed by the parties) • AA 1996, s 12 (extension of time for beginning arbitration proceedings)—see: AA 1996—extension of time for commencing arbitration (s 12)—Extension of contractual time limit—AA 1996, s 12 • AA 1996, s 80(5) (extension of time for bringing a challenge or an appeal)—see Practice Note: AA 1996—time for bringing challenges and appeals, exhaustion of other arbitral processes and extensions of time • AA 1996, s 50 (extension of time for making the award)—see: Arbitral awards—types, requirements and effect—Time limit for making award This Q&A focuses on AA 1996, s 79. Note that AA 1996 only applies to an arbitration seated in England, Wales or Northern Ireland (AA 1996, s 2)—for the meaning of 'seat', see Practice Note: The seat of the arbitration. Time limit agreed by the parties AA 1996, s 79(1) provides that, unless the parties

For the purposes of this response, we assume, that the debtor’s interest in the property does not pre-date the probate, ie they had no interest in the property before the death of the individual concerned. Our Practice Note: Pre-6 April 2016—charging orders—what are they and when to use them [Archived] states that, under s 2(2) of the Charging Orders Act 1979 (COA 1979): 'A judgment creditor can apply for a charging order over: • land • securities • funds in court' Halsburys

A child arrangements order (CAO) is an order made by the court under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989). A CAO sets out with whom a child, or children, should live, and when they are to live, spend time or otherwise have contact with any person. ChA 1989, s 8(1) specifically states: ‘(1) In this Act— "child arrangements order" means an order regulating arrangements relating to any of the following— (a)with whom a child is to live, spend time or otherwise have contact, and (b)when a child is to live, spend time or otherwise have contact with any person;’ If a party wishes to have a CAO in place, they can apply to the court, however in accordance with ChA 1989, s 1(5) the court must not make

A child arrangements order (CAO) is an order made pursuant to section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) regulating arrangements relating to with whom a child is to live, spend time or otherwise have contact with. ChA 1989, s 10(4) confirms those persons who are entitled to apply to the court for any order under ChA 1989, s 8 including a CAO. The list includes any special guardian of the child who would be the subject of the application. An application therefore can be made

The costs regime applicable to ‘financial remedy proceedings’ contained in the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 28.3 applies to a variation order made under section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. ‘Financial remedy proceedings’ include a ‘financial order’ with certain exceptions (FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 28.3(4)(b)(i)). A ‘financial order’ includes a ‘variation order’ (FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 2.3). Therefore, the general rule as to costs applicable