Under section 23(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973), the court may make an order for such lump sum or sums as may be specified on the granting of a decree of divorce, a decree of nullity or a decree of judicial separation or at any time thereafter. As indicated, the order will not take effect until decree absolute has been granted. See Practice Note: General principles—lump sum orders, in particular the section on the ‘Court’s powers’. In McMinn v McMinn, Black J (as she then was) noted (at para [46]): ‘[Counsel for the applicant] invites me to consider the purpose behind [MCA 1973, s 23(5)] which he says, probably correctly it seems to me, is to enable the court to resolve financial disputes prior to the ending of a marriage but to ensure that the spouses are not entitled to have the resulting orders enforced whilst they

The section 14A(11) of the Children Act 1989 provides that 'The court may not make a special guardianship order unless it has received a report…[from the Local Authority]'. Within that report, pursuant to the Special Guardianship Regulations 2005, SI 2005/1109, the local authority should provide detail of any financial provision that is required: • to facilitate or support the placement (regulation 6) • to remunerate former foster parents (regulation 7) Before making a special guardianship order (SGO), the court must be satisfied with the support services to be provided and any financial support or remuneration proposed. The financial support available under regulation 6 cannot include direct remuneration

Special Guardianship Orders and the remuneration of former foster carers Section 14A(11) of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) provides that 'The court may not make a special guardianship order unless it has received a report…[from the Local Authority]'. Within that report, pursuant to the Special Guardianship Regulations 2005, SI 2005/1109, the local authority should provide detail of any financial provision that is required: • to facilitate or support the placement (regulation 6), and • to remunerate former foster parents (regulation 7) Before making a special guardianship order (SGO), the court must be satisfied with the support services to be provided and any financial support or remuneration proposed. The financial support available under

For the purposes of this Q&A we have assumed that the transfer of equity is in a family law context. Pursuant to section 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973), the court may make orders in relation to the transfer of property on the granting of a decree of divorce, a decree of nullity of marriage or a decree of judicial separation. Orders the court may make include an order that a party to the marriage shall transfer to the other party to the marriage, to any child or the family, or to such person as may be specified in the order for the benefit of the child, any property to which the first-mentioned party is entitled, either in possession or reversion. A primary carer of the children in occupation of the matrimonial home at the time of separation may well seek a transfer of the property to them, whether or not it is held in joint names

Section 7 of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) provides that a court considering any question with respect to a child under ChA 1989 may either ask an ‘officer of the Service’ or ‘a Welsh family proceedings officer’ or a local authority to report to the court on such matters relating to the welfare of the child as are required to be dealt with in the report. ChA 1989, s 105 states that ‘officer of the Service’ has the same meaning as in the Criminal Justice

The Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 29.4(1) provides that any application in proceedings under: • FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, Pt 7 (applications in matrimonial and civil partnership proceedings, although see also FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 7.9, which suggests that an application under this Part may be withdrawn at any time before it has been served simply by giving notice in writing to the court) • FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, Pts 10–14 or under any other Part where the application relates to the welfare or upbringing of a child or; • where either of the parties is a protected party (namely, a person who lacks capacity to conduct litigation) may only be withdrawn with permission of the court. A person seeking permission to withdraw must file a written request for permission setting out the

Family analysis: Do courts have the power to strike out or summarily dismiss applications under the Hague Convention and, if so, in what circumstances? Richard Harrison QC, of 1 King’s Bench Walk, examines the Family Division’s approach in the recent case of Re D (Children) (Child Abduction: Practice).

Where the landlord and tenant cannot agree, the rent of the renewal lease will be determined by the court under section 34 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 (LTA 1954). The rent is a matter of valuation, based on various legal disregards, rather than one of discretion and LTA 1954, s 34 sets out the formula that should be used. However,

Section 42(2)(b) of the Family Law Act 1996 (FLA 1996) provides the court with the power to make a non-molestation order of its own motion in any family proceedings. Family proceedings are defined in FLA 1996, s 63(1). The test is two-fold. Firstly, the person(s) to be protected by the order must either be 'associated' with the potential respondent or be a 'relevant child' (FLA 1996, s 42(2)(a)). FLA 1996, s 62(3)(d) defines ten forms of connections that fall within the definition of 'associated' for the purposes of FLA 1996. Notably, this includes relatives, which is given a broad enough definition so as to encompass maternal and external family irrespective of marriage. FLA 1996, s 62(2) broadly defines 'relevant child' so as to incorporate any child whose interests the court considers to be relevant. Having been satisfied that the person in whose favour the order is to be made is either 'associated' or a 'relevant child', the

A covenant is a form of contract. Under the doctrine of privity of contract the rights and liabilities created by a contract will bind the parties to it, but no-one else. However, in the case of a covenant over land, property law may allow it to be enforced by and against persons other than the original parties: • in most cases the benefit of a restrictive covenant will benefit successors in title by 'running with the land' both in common law and in equity • subject to certain

The availability of the residence nil rate band (RNRB) where property is left on a discretionary trust and in relation to the downsizing allowance is considered in Practice Note: IHT—residence nil rate band Q&As (in the section titled ‘Property left by deceased on discretionary trust’) and in Q&A: Would the RNRB be available where a deceased individual died in 2020 leaving their estate to their children but where they had sold their only residential property in 2018? We consider that it should be possible to make an appointment out of a discretionary Will trust

While there is no statutory prohibition on the members of a non-charitable company limited by guarantee participating in its profits and on such a company distributing its profits to its members by means of a distribution, it is relatively uncommon. Many guarantee companies actually prohibit distributions of profits and assets in their articles of association. Accordingly, the articles of association of the company should be carefully checked for any relevant prohibitions or restrictions. However, a company limited by guarantee might instead choose to have bespoke provisions in the articles of association permitting distributions and setting out how they can be made and are divided between members. Any distributions would be subject to,