Disclaimer is a statutory procedure which is governed by the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) and by the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016, SI 2016/1024 (IR 2016). In the case of liquidation, the relevant provisions are found in IA 1986, ss 178–182 and in IR 2016, SI 2016/1024, rr 19.1–19.11. The statutory provisions provide that liquidators are entitled to disclaim any onerous property. Onerous property in relation to a liquidation is defined as: • any unprofitable contract, and • any other property which is unsaleable or not readily saleable or is such that it may give rise to a liability to pay money or perform any other onerous act (IA 1986, s 178) See Practice Note: The process of disclaimer by a liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy under sections 178 or 315 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Onerous property

The liquidator or administrator has the powers set out in Schedules 4 and 1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) respectively and these extend to disposing of the company’s property. IA 1986 is silent on whether these powers extend to disposing of the company’s property free of any restrictions which bind the property and ordinarily the HM Land Registry would expect to see evidence that the restriction had been complied with before they will

Where a qualifying floating charge-holder (QFCH) has made an appointment of an administrator out of court and there is an outstanding winding-up petition, the petition is suspended. The suspension of the petition carries with it the suspension of the operation of section 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) which avoids dispositions of property of the company in the period between the winding-up petition being presented and the winding-up order being made (see IA 1986, s 127(2)). Therefore any disposition of the company's property during the period of suspension by an administrator who has been appointed out of court by a qualified floating charge holders (QFCH) will not be avoided under IA 1986, s 127 (see Re J Smith Haulage Ltd

When a listed UK company makes an offer of shares to investors resident in jurisdictions other than the UK, the company will need to consider the laws of the overseas jurisdictions in which those investors are resident. An offer of shares by a UK company in the US or to persons resident in the US requires registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the US Securities Act of 1933 (US Securities Act) unless an exemption from the registration requirements is available. The registration requirements are burdensome so UK companies wishing to extend an offer into the US will usually try to rely

A Tomlin order is made up of two parts: • a court order—which is a consent order between the parties that stays proceedings on agreed terms with liberty for a party to go back to the court to enforce the agreement in the event that one of the parties does not comply with it. This will be approved by the court. This is enforceable as a court order. In practice the order is kept short • a schedule—the terms agreed by the parties are not set out in the court order but in a schedule attached to the order. The schedule is a contract between the parties as to what they have agreed to do. As a consequence the terms are not enforceable by the court as a judgment, rather contractual considerations would apply. The schedule is generally much longer than the order and frequently the terms of the agreement are detailed and may contain

On the assumption that the loan company is the judgment creditor, and the attachment of earnings order has been made in their favour, there is nothing to prevent the loan company from requesting payment. However, a judgment creditor requires

Company law perspective The Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) distinguishes between two types of legal entity that might serve as a company director, namely an 'individual' (CA 2006, s 163) or 'a body corporate, or a firm that is a legal person under the law by which it is governed' (CA 2006, s 164), and requires that certain specific particulars of each type need to be recorded. Examples of the sort of entity envisaged by CA 2006, s 164 include another company or limited liability partnership, whereas a general partnership would not qualify as it is not a legal entity in its own right. Therefore, if a specific local authority is treated in law as either type of legal entity, then it would appear that it can be a company director in its own name (as opposed to simply putting forward one of its employees to serve as a director on an associated or

Adverse possession is the term utilised where a person who has been in continuous possession and use of land belonging to another, without their permission, for a specified time, acquires title to that land as a result. Before 13 October 2003, that date being the commencement date of the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002), adverse possession would occur after 12 years’ continuous possession, by virtue of section 15 the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980). Following on from the implementation of the LRA 2002, adverse possession of registered land takes place

Trusts of land This Q&A will only be applicable where the effect of the trust deed suggests that the legal owner as registered at HM Land Registry is in fact a trustee of a trust of land holding the land for the benefit of third party beneficiary/beneficiaries and as such has no beneficial interest. English law has long recognised the distinction between legal and beneficial ownership which was codified in section 1(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925). The circumstances in which an equitable interest can be overreached are described in LPA 1925, ss 2–4. Formal requirements for disposal of interests in land are set out in LPA 1925, ss 52–55,

It is assumed that this question relates to the making of deprivation and forfeiture orders in criminal proceedings following conviction and not the forfeiture of cash under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for the purposes of this response. There are a number of statutes which provide the criminal courts in England and Wales with the power to order the forfeiture and destruction of property following conviction. Whether an application to the court can be made on conviction for the forfeiture of items will depend upon the offence for which the offender can been convicted and whether specific powers of forfeiture are granted by the legislation for that particular offence or whether the general provisions of Sentencing Act 2020 (SA 2020) apply. It is the responsibility of both the prosecution and defence advocates to ensure that any application for a deprivation/forfeiture order is lawful and properly made

Diversion of footpaths, bridleways and restricted byways Section 19 of the Highways Act 1980 (HiA 1980) gives highway authorities discretionary powers to divert a path: • if it is in the interests of the owner, lessee or occupier of the land crossed by the path, or the public (HiA 1980, s 119) • where a path crosses a railway line (HiA 1980, s 119A) • for the purposes of crime prevention (HiA 1980, s 119B) • for highways crossing school premises, to protect pupils and staff (HiA 1980, s 119C) • for the protection of sites of special scientific interest (HiA 1980, s 119D) If works are required to create a new path on the diverted route, the old route will continue to exist until the authority certifies that the work on the new path has been completed. The authority has a discretionary

Where a local authority has been granted a placement order under section 21 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, the local authority is permitted to find an adoptive home for a child, regardless of the consent of the parents. Where the parents do consent, the local authority is also able to place a child for adoption, but a placement order cannot be made unless a care order has already been made or the court considers that the threshold condition for making a care order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) has been met. An adoption order can also be applied for by a couple or a single person.