For the purpose of this Q&A, we have assumed that the public highway directly abuts the land of the developer/adjoining owner (adjoining land). If the area in question between the actual physical roadway and the adjoining land is public

Misrepresentation by a third party To make out a successful claim of misrepresentation, a claimant must prove the following elements: • a statement was made by or on behalf of the representor • the claimant was induced by the statement to enter the contract • the statement was false For more information, see Practice Note: Misrepresentation—what it is and similar claims. A principal may be liable for misrepresentations of an agent, see: Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol 76, para 725. However, in the case of a hire agreement, the dealer will generally not be considered the agent of the financier: Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd. In the absence of a principal-agent relationship,

The Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act 2002 (TAPA 2002) controls the advertising and promotion of tobacco products. Tobacco displays are prohibited under TAPA 2002, s 7A in the following terms: ‘A person who in the course of a business displays tobacco products, or causes tobacco products to be displayed, in a place in England and Wales or Northern Ireland is guilty of an offence.’ Under TAPA 2002, s 1, a ‘tobacco product’ is a product consisting wholly or partly

Tenants and leaseholders have the right to carry out improvements to their homes pursuant to the Housing Act 1985 (HA 1985) provided they have the consent of the landlord in advance of commencing repairs and they comply with certain conditions. The Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 (LRHUDA 1993) gives local authority secure tenants the right to claim compensation, at the end of their tenancy, for improvements that they have carried out. This scheme under LRHUDA 1993 was extended by the Housing Corporation Circular HC33/94 to cover the tenants of registered social landlords, eg housing association tenants. Consequently, a housing association

For general information on how an equitable joint tenancy may be severed, see Practice Note: Severance of a joint tenancy. The following Q&As may be helpful in explaining the difference between the legal and tax position where an equitable joint tenancy is purportedly severed after the death of one of the joint owners: • The Land Registry has stated that a deed of variation severing a joint tenancy completed after the death of one of the joint owners is defective under rule 16(3) of the Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/1417.

This Q&A is relevant to a situation in which the person lacking capacity has an attorney or deputy who is authorised to serve/receive the notice on the joint tenant’s behalf. Practice Note: Severance of a joint tenancy sets out the various ways in which severance can occur (including severance by statutory written notice under section 36(2) of the Law of

At common law, notice to quit by any one joint tenant under a lease is sufficient to determine a joint periodic tenancy. In practice, this may mean that where one party leaves a family home held under the terms of a joint tenancy, they can unilaterally terminate the tenancy, leaving the resident party without any right to occupy. Such notice will be effective even if there is an injunction in place preventing the party giving notice from excluding the other party from the premises. The Supreme Court considered whether this is a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and/or under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention in Sims v Dacorum BC. It considered that the unilateral severance of a joint tenancy by a single joint tenant was proportionate because this was a situation where any solution would necessarily involve a detriment

While the legal interests in land can only be held as joint tenancy where there is more than one owner (see section 36(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925)), the beneficial interests may be held as joint tenants or tenants in common. When land is conveyed with an express declaration that the beneficial interests are to be held as a joint tenancy or such a situation arises as of the presumption to that effect following Jones v Kernott, it is open to any one of the joint tenants to sever it. This has the effect of meaning that the beneficial interests are held as a tenancy in common. As Walton J put it in Nielson-Jones v Fedden: ‘…upon a severance

Section 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) is a powerful weapon. It enables the court to restrain a proposed disposition of an asset, or to set aside a disposition of an asset. As a result, a party who seeks to, for example, transfer property to a family member with a view to it falling outside of the matrimonial pot can be thwarted by the operation of the section. The disposition must be made with the intention of defeating the claim of a spouse for financial relief, which is a high bar; however pursuant to MCA 1973, s 37(5), this intention is presumed (though the presumption is rebuttable) where the disposition was made within three years of the date of the application to set aside the disposition. The section does not apply to dispositions

With regard to the context of this Q&A, we refer you to Q&A: Where an individual judgment creditor (A), prior to taking action to enforce its judgment against the judgment debtor B (a limited company) discovers that the sole director and shareholder of B has resigned and subsequently set up a new limited company (C) trading out of B’s offices and carrying on the same business as B,

A judgment creditor can seek to enforce their judgment debt by applying for an attachment of earnings order (AEO) which, in effect, directs the judgment debtor’s employer to pay a certain portion of the judgment debtor’s salary or wages to a collecting officer for payment on to the judgment creditor. AEOs are governed by CPR 89 and the Attachment of Earnings Act 1971 (AtEA 1971). There are prescribed circumstances in which you can apply for an AEO and these are largely

Within financial remedy proceedings, there is a presumption that the court will make no order as to costs (Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 28.3(5)). This means that each party will bear their own costs unless the court exercises its discretion to make a costs order as a result of the litigation conduct of one of the parties (FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 28.3(6)). Various considerations that the court must have regard to when deciding whether to exercise its discretion to make an order for costs are set