Family analysis: This case dealt with the question of whether a final divorce order arising from a properly constituted, procedurally correct, application can be set aside when the application was in fact negligently made. At the time of the hearing, there were no reported cases dealing with these circumstances. The judge ruled that the final divorce order must stand. There must be certainty as to marital status given the importance accorded to that status in society. Further, the ‘slip rule’ process was not an appropriate way of dealing with the matter as the error that was made was not an error made by the court but an error made by the wife’s solicitors. There was no available judicial precedent to support an argument that in these circumstances the final divorce order was voidable let alone void and there were very good policy reasons for not allowing the final divorce order to be rescinded. A final divorce order made without procedural irregularity should therefore stand for all the world. Accordingly, the wife’s application to set aside the final order of divorce failed and her application was dismissed. Julian Ribet, founding partner of Ribet Myles LLP and solicitor acting on behalf of the husband in this case, looks at the implications.

We have assumed for the purposes of this Q&A that there is an arrangement which establishes a contractual relationship between the original supplier of the equipment and the finance company lessor; such as a tri-partite agreement between the original supplier, lessor and lessee or an agreement between the finance company lessor and the original supplier for the sale of the equipment prior to the lessor leasing that equipment on to the lessee. We further assume there are no specific industry or sector regulations applying to such arrangement between lessor and original supplier or between original supplier and lessee which might impact the analysis. This Q&A focusses on the principles of contractual interpretation and the position generally with equipment leasing and hiring contracts. Contract interpretation Where a contract does not expressly state an action that one party wishes to benefit from, it will

Deprivation of liberty proceedings For information on how to challenge an order restricting someone's freedom or to have the deprivation of P’s liberty authorised, see Practice Note: Deprivation of liberty court procedure and guidance from gov.uk. As identified in this Practice Note that there are two procedures for these applications, both of which fall outside the scope of the Case Management Pilot. Rule 3A representatives A representative for P can be appointed under Rule 3A(2)(c)

The power for the court to make spousal periodical payments orders on divorce is contained in section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). MCA 1973, s 23(1) provides, inter alia, that: ‘(1) On granting a decree of divorce, a decree of nullity of marriage or a decree of judicial separation or at any time thereafter (whether, in the case of a decree of divorce or of nullity of marriage, before or after the decree is made absolute), the court may make any one or

The court can make a lump sum order (payable either in one sum or by instalments), a series of lump sum orders or a deferred lump sum order. That power arises under section 23(1)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) which says that the court can make 'an order that either party to the marriage shall pay to the other

Undertakings are the bespoke way of including enforceable obligations in the preamble to a financial remedy order which the court would otherwise have no power to order. For example, in L v L, a party was held to their undertaking to pay maintenance beyond the remarriage of the recipient, notwithstanding a standard periodical payments order would have effluxed in that event. However, where the court has the power to make an order in the terms sought, there is little obvious benefit in including an undertaking to the like effect, as Family Procedure Rules 2010, PD 33A, para 2.1 provides that: ‘Any undertaking for the payment of money that has effect as if it is an order made under Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 may be enforced as if it was an order and Part 33 and Part 37 [of the FPR 2010] apply accordingly’. Accordingly, while an

A financial order already made in family proceedings may be attacked by a trustee in bankruptcy in the event of a spouse's bankruptcy. Transfers/payments made in pursuance of such a financial order are not immune from attack simply by reason of being made under the authority of a court order (section 39 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973). Much will depend on the timing of the financial order in relation to the stage reached in the bankruptcy. The timing of implementation is also critical, as is the distinction to be drawn between the different types of order involved. Financial order made and implemented before bankruptcy application/petition The filing of the bankruptcy application/petition will have no automatic effect on a previously-made financial order. However, such an order may be set aside within prescribed periods as a transaction at an undervalue according to section 339 of the Insolvency

You must ensure clients receive the best possible information about: • how their matter will be priced and • the likely overall cost of the matter and any costs incurred—at the time of engagement and when appropriate as their matter progresses Depending on the nature of the work being carried out, the SRA Transparency Rules may require information about costs and what these cover to be published on firms’ websites. Further guidance may be found in CPR 46.9, which sets out the basis of detailed assessment of solicitor and client costs and applies to every assessment of a solicitor’s bill to a client except a bill which is to be paid out of the Community Legal Service Fund. CPR 46.9(3) states: ‘Subject to paragraph

The authority of the executors appointed in the deceased’s Will arises on the death of the testator. Consequently, the executors are entitled to call for the deceased’s Will to be handed to them. Although dealing with the deceased’s real assets (in effect land and buildings, and some personal assets, such as stocks and shares and leasehold assets) require the executors to act jointly, for the most part, the ability of the executors to deal with the deceased’s personalty is joint and several. Therefore, technically, either executor could ask the third party to

Can firms prepare a private mortgage deed, confirming terms agreed between the parties direct, for individual clients without a licence from the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) when this work is incidental to the main retainer for that particular client?: • if so, will the agreement be a consumer credit agreement that must comply with Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA 1974) requirements to be valid? Where a firm acts for a client in a transaction it must decide if the FCA consumer credit regime applies, and if it does, whether an exemption is available (see below). Whether a transaction falls within the consumer credit regime will depend on the individual facts in each case. The regulation of consumer credit Regulation of consumer credit sits with the FCA. Parts of CCA 1974 were repealed from 1 April 2014 with regulated activities

An English court has jurisdiction to wind up a company, incorporated abroad, as an ‘unregistered company’ pursuant to section 221 of the Insolvency Act 1986: Re Real Estate Development Co, Re Buccament Bay Ltd; Re Harlequin Property (SVG) Ltd. The same English court has jurisdiction to restore a company to the register of companies pursuant to section 1029 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) where it has been dissolved,

For the purposes of this Q&A, it is assumed that it is the Foreign State which has taken the lease of the embassy and that the premises are currently in use for that purpose. The State Immunity Act 1978 (SIA 1978) confers immunity on a ‘state’ defined in SIA 1978, s 14(1) as including: • the sovereign or other head of state • the government of that state, and • any department of the government but not a separate entity distinct from the organs of government, where immunity will only be enjoyed where the provisions of SIA 1978, s 14(2) are met. Under SIA 1978, s 1(1), ‘a State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom except as provided in the following provisions of this Part of this Act'. For the purpose of this Q&A, the most important exception