Under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR) there is a choice of two claim forms and both may be applicable to Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TOLATA 1996) claims: CPR Part 7 and CPR Part 8. The former relates to particulars of claim and it is appropriate where there is a dispute of fact. Disclosure is incorporated under the CPR Part 7 process. The latter includes a shorter claim form and it is accompanied by witness statements in respect of all the evidence upon which the claimant seeks to rely. Under CPR Part 8, the first

See Practice Note: The ‘registration gap’. Legal title to the freehold does not pass until the transfer has been completed by registration (section 27(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002)).

The most common types of endeavours clauses are ‘best endeavours’, ‘reasonable endeavours’, and ‘all reasonable endeavours’. Case law on the meaning of these terms generally focuses on the distinctions between these qualifications of endeavours obligations and their variations. As noted in the Practice Note: Reasonable and best endeavours, ‘best endeavours’ are the most onerous, ‘reasonable endeavours’ are the least onerous and ‘all reasonable endeavours’ are uncertain as they are a compromise between the two

Dispute Resolution analysis: The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from the decision for a summary assessment hearing to be conducted by a different judge sitting in a different court at a later date. The court held that the rules, as currently drafted, provide that a summary assessment must be carried out by the judge who heard the matter, whether immediately following the hearing or at a later date, and that proportionality does not assist in making an alternative order. Where a party seeks the prompt recovery of their costs following a successful hearing, it is essential that their statement of costs (usually in Form N260) has been prepared sufficiently to allow the assessment, and that the advocate has been properly briefed so as to deal with the issue of costs at the conclusion of the hearing. The alternative outcome would be for the judge to make an order for the detailed assessment of those costs, which can be time consuming and result in further costs being incurred. Written by Joanne Chase, legal director and costs lawyer at Clarion Solicitors.

The Commercial Court considered what law determines whether an arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to determine a dispute in circumstances where the underlying contract provides for Indian law, there is provision for arbitration seated in London and certain elements of the Indian Arbitration Act have been specifically excluded. The court found an implied choice of Indian law.

Regulation as a medical device An app may, depending on the specific characteristics and intended use, fall within the definition of a medical device. Practice Note: An introduction to the regulation of medical devices—EU Directives regime provides a useful starting point. The regulatory regime imposes obligations on manufacturers of medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices to ensure that their devices are safe and fit for their intended purpose. In order to be placed on the market in the EU, all medical devices must meet the 'essential requirements' set out in the relevant medical device directive. To determine whether the app would fall subject to the medical device regulatory framework, the section ‘An introduction to the regulation of medical devices—EU Directives regime—What is a medical device?’ from the aforementioned Practice Note provides the definition of a medical device as: 'any instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, material or other article, whether used alone or in combination, including the software intended by its manufacturer to be used specifically for diagnostic and/or therapeutic purposes

The legislation which may be relevant to the transfer will depend on the specific facts and reasons for the transfer in question. A Measure of the Church of England is legislation given Final Approval by the General Synod (or before 1970, the Church Assembly) on which a resolution to present for Royal Assent has been passed in both Houses of Parliament and to which the Royal Assent has been signified. Please see the following source on Lexis®Library for all Church of England Measures that are currently in force: Church of England measures. Depending

Section 18 of the Statutory Declarations Act 1835 provides that ‘it shall or be lawful for any justice of the peace, notary public, or other officer now by law authorized to administer an oath, to take and receive the declaration of any person voluntarily making the same before him’ in the prescribed form. However, in practice, section 183(1), (2),

A person who has been issued with a biometric residence permit will be a person who requires and has been granted leave to enter or remain for more than six months (sections 1(2) and 3(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 (IA 1971); and the Immigration (Biometric Registration) Regulations 2008, (the Biometric Regs 2008), SI 2008/3048, regs 3, 3A, 13 and 13A). As a person in this scenario, their leave will not lapse on leaving the Common Travel Area (IA 1971, s 3(4); Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) Order 2000 (Leave to Enter and Remain Order 2000), SI 2000/1161, reg 13). Leave to Enter and Remain Order 2000, SI 2000/1161, reg 13(5) states that ‘for the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 2A of Schedule 2 to the Act (examination by immigration officers, and medical examination), leave to remain which remains in force under this article shall be treated, upon the holder’s arrival in

Assuming that each cause of action has a distinct statutory limitation period, it would be possible for one cause of action to be time-barred, and therefore fail (or be struck out), whilst other causes of action might survive and ultimately be successful upon disposal of the claim. For example, in Brent London Borough Council v Davies, a complex series of different causes of action were brought against a number of defendants. The Court considered different limitation periods both with respect to the different causes of action and, within the different causes of

What is the legislative basis for determining applicable law? The provisions of art 4(1) of Directive 95/46/EC govern the application of a member state's legislation to the processing of personal data. Under art 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(c) it is the location of the data controller or the location of equipment used by the data controller which often determines applicable law. Of significance to those questions is the issue of the data controller's 'establishment'. Recital 19 of Directive 95/46/EC provides some guidance in this regard, indicating that an 'establishment on the territory of a Member State implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements; whereas the legal form of such an establishment, whether simply branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in this respect'. Is there any additional formal guidance as to applicable

This Q&A assumes that the prize competition is a sales promotion for consumers, rather than a trade promotion or other type of competition. A controller can only lawfully process personal data in compliance with the lawfulness, fairness and transparency principle under Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the General Data Protection Regulation (the GDPR) if it satisfies one of the six conditions set out in Article 6(1) of the GDPR. See Practice Notes: Data protection principles and Lawful basis for personal data processing. The three conditions relevant to prize promotions are: • processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party • processing is necessary for the purpose of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or a third party • the data subject has given consent to the processing