Where there is an order for child maintenance, whether agreed between the parties and incorporated into a consent order or ordered by the court by virtue of its power under section 8 of the Child Support Act 1991 to make an order for child maintenance in certain limited circumstances, it is usual for the order to set out when child maintenance payments end. However, there is scope for an application to be made by a child over the age of 18 under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) for further maintenance once this ends so long as there was no periodical payments order in force in respect of them prior to their 16th birthday. ChA 1989, Sch 1, para 2 states as follow: ‘(1) If, on an application by a person who has reached the age of eighteen, it

Within family proceedings, the court may make an order for one party to pay the costs of another. Costs are regulated primarily by Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, Pt 28, which focuses mostly on costs within financial remedy proceedings. Parts of the CPR are also relevant, ie CPR 44, CPR 46 and CPR 47, albeit some of the rules in the CPR are disapplied by FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 28.2(1). In the event the family court makes an order for costs, and the paying party fails to pay those costs by the deadline for payment, then an application may be made for enforcement which will be governed by FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955,

The power to order payment of a lump sum from one spouse to the other is contained in section 23(1)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973). Such an order can be made by the consent of the parties (with the approval of the court) at any time in the course of proceedings, or by the court following judgment at a final hearing. The effect of the order is to require payment of that lump sum within a specified time or on the happening of a triggering event. In the present scenario the order provides for payment within 21 days. For further information, see Practice Note: General principles—lump sum orders. Although an order is technically only enforceable following the pronouncement of decree absolute,

Costs Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 7.20(3), provides that in divorce proceedings: 'If the applicant has applied for costs, the court may, on making a direction under paragraph 7.20(2)(a) [that the applicant is entitled to a decree nisi]— (a) if satisfied that the applicant is entitled to an order for costs, so certify; or (b) if not so satisfied, make no direction about costs' At that stage the court has granted a certificate for costs. The order for costs will be made if appropriate at the hearing of the decree nisi. FPR 2010 is silent as to the exact date for payment of a costs order in relation to a divorce suit (and there does not appear to be any case

Non-molestation orders should be served personally on the respondent in the absence of any direction to the contrary, as soon as reasonably practicable. However, in some situations, it can be hard to locate the respondent in order to effect personal service, either because the respondent is actively evading service or because the respondent is of no fixed address or has never disclosed their address. In such a situation, an application can be made to the court for permission to serve the order, application and supporting

By virtue of the provisions of the Child Support Act 1991 (CSA 1991), the courts retain jurisdiction to make or vary orders for maintenance of children in, inter alia, the following circumstances: • a court order was made after 3 March 2003 and it is less than 12 months' old • the parties have agreed a maintenance figure and want that agreement made into an order (in most cases, this means that child maintenance has been provided in a consent order to be submitted to the court for approval and sealing) CSA 1991, s 4(10aa) provides that: ‘[(10) No application may be made [to the Child Maintenance Service] at any time under this section with respect to a qualifying child or any qualifying children if— […] [(aa) a maintenance order made on or

A prohibited steps order (PSO) is defined in section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989) as: ‘…an order that no step which could be taken by a parent in meeting his parental responsibility for a child, and which is of a kind specified in the order, shall be taken by any person without the consent of the court…’ The conduct which can be restrained by a PSO must be a step which could be taken by a parent in meeting their parental responsibility for a child and it must be of a kind specified in the order. The requirement to specify the kind of conduct which is prohibited means that the order must set out clearly what it is that the person who is subject to the order is restrained from doing. Whatever the nature of the prohibition,

The question concerns an application in England for a fresh child arrangements order which might have the effect of varying a foreign order. This is a different question to an application for enforcement. The person seeking to uphold the foreign order may wish to consider whether an application for recognition and enforcement should be made. The first issue to consider is whether there are any relevant reciprocal arrangements with the country in question. Albeit it is not an EU Member State, they may be a signatory State to some other relevant convention such as the 1996 Hague Convention, and this should be checked along with the dates of ratification. By way of example, Article 23 of the 1996 Hague Convention provides: '(1) The measures taken

Pursuant to section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 (ChA 1989), the court on disposing of any application for an order under ChA 1989 may direct that no application for a further order ChA 1989 may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without leave of the court. Such an order essentially intrudes upon the right of a party to bring proceedings before the court and to be heard in a matter affecting their child without restriction. Consequently, it is a power that should be used sparingly by the court, and such an order is usually only made after repeated and unreasonable applications but a section 91(14) order may be appropriate even where this is not the case but the litigation has

For further information in relation to the Restriction of Public Sector Exit Payments Regulations 2020 (2020 Regulations), SI 2020/1122 generally, see Practice Note: Capping the size of public sector exit payments—the revoked 2020 regulations [Archived]. We do not currently have a Precedent containing the sample clauses to which this Q&A refers to. However, such a Precedent is on our roadmap for new materials and we anticipate that it will take account of the matters outlined below. The 2020 Regulations, SI 2020/1122 do not provide an employee or office-holder with any separate, specific cause of action that would potentially need to be waived in a settlement agreement. However, the effect of the cap restrictions on existing contractual entitlements is a topic of debate. See Practice Note: Capping the size of public sector

Lease or licence Consideration will need to be given to whether or not the occupier has a licence or a tenancy. It is important to distinguish between a lease (ie a tenancy) and a licence. A lease gives rise to a relationship of landlord and tenant, and is a proprietary right. A licence, on the other hand, is a purely personal right to occupy some premises and no security of tenure can arise under a licence. The court will look at the substance of the agreement to ascertain whether or not it is in fact a tenancy. The 'hallmarks' of a lease are: • exclusive possession (which is not the same as exclusive occupation) • of defined premises • for a term which is certain While the decision in Street v Mountford suggested that payment of rent is an essential

Redundancy is a potentially fair reason for dismissal under section 98(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996). However, as with other potentially fair reasons, the fairness of a redundancy dismissal is to be determined by the test of whether an employer's decision to dismiss for that reason falls within the band of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer in those circumstances and in that line of business. Failure to follow a fair procedure when dismissing an employee for redundancy will normally render the dismissal unfair. For more information generally, see Practice Note: Reason for dismissal—redundancy. An employee is dismissed by reason of redundancy if their dismissal is wholly or mainly attributable to: • the employer ceasing or intending to cease carrying on the business for the purpose of which the employee