Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 9.26(1)(b) provides for both parties to file with the court, and serve on the other party, a statement of information (in Form D81) when lodging a consent order. It is not necessary for Form D81 to be accompanied by any documentary evidence in support. It should, however, set out each party's current financial position and it is vital that the client understands they have a duty to provide

The powers of the court to divide the assets belonging to parties to a marriage following the initiation of a petition for divorce, judicial separation or nullity are wide. The court has the power to direct that one party pay to another periodical payments for a specified term (which can include joint lives); require such periodical payments to be secured; make an order for a payment of a lump sum or lump sums to the other; make a property adjustment order and an order for sale of property; and a pension sharing or attachment order. The court therefore has the power to deal with the transfer between spouses of virtually all assets. However, it is often overlooked that there is no power in MCA 1973 to transfer liabilities, as this would involve impacting

Where a financial consent order provides for a property to be transferred from joint names of the parties to party 1 but party 2 is refusing to sign the transfer, what powers does the court have to enforce the order for transfer, specifically can a judge sign the transfer in place of party 2 and under what provision should the application be made? The power for the court to order that the contract and transfer be signed by a nominated person (usually a district judge) on behalf of party 2 is contained in section 39 of the Senior

The courts have only limited jurisdiction in relation to child maintenance orders, the primary jurisdiction lying with the child maintenance service (CMS). For the purposes of this Q&A it is assumed that the child maintenance order was made after March 2003. The courts are only able to make orders for child maintenance in certain circumstances, such as: • a child maintenance order is made by consent • the CMS does not have jurisdiction in that particular case (for example jurisdictional issues due to a parent living outside the UK) • it is one of a prescribed type of order, such as a top-up maintenance order See Practice

Sections 23 and 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 both provide that orders may be made on 'granting a decree of divorce, decree of nullity of marriage or a decree of judicial separation or at any time thereafter'. It is established that the court cannot make a final order before pronouncement of decree nisi but it may make an order before decree nisi on the basis that it does not take effect until the pronouncement of decree nisi or thereafter. An example is the decision of King J in JP v NP (financial

It is a common feature of financial remedy orders that a property (often the matrimonial home) will be sold, whether immediately or on the happening of a future trigger event, and the net proceeds of sale be divided between the parties in the proportions contained within the order. Consequential standard directions will also be given in respect of the parties agreeing an estate agent and a conveyancer and for the payment of any encumbrances. The court may also order that the parties have joint conduct of the sale. The order is binding upon the parties, but does not impact upon the obligations and duties of non-parties. Therefore, the relationship between the parties and the appointed conveyancer is not governed by the terms of the order but instead by the terms

In the circumstances described, the application for a school fees order may be made under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. It is unnecessary to invoke the jurisdiction of Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989. There can be no clean break in relation to children. Therefore, if the original order contained an order for child periodical payments, the application should be by way of a variation of

The relevant law regarding an application for a financial consent order is found in section 33A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973), which provides that: ‘...on an application for a consent order for financial relief the court may, unless it has reason to think that there are other circumstances into which it ought to inquire, make an order in the terms agreed on the basis only of the prescribed information furnished with the application.’ ie, a district judge has full power to approve or reject a draft order setting out the parties’ agreement. The court in its inquisitorial jurisdiction is not a ‘rubber stamp’

The authorities which must be considered are section 33A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (consent orders for financial provision or property adjustment), Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955, 9.26 (applications for consent orders for financial remedy), FPR 2010, PD 17A (statements of truth) and FPR 2010, PD 41B (procedure applicable when applying for a financial remedy consent order through the online system). Under FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 9.26, the consent order need only be signed by the respondent. However, if the consent order contains undertakings, the signature of the person giving that undertaking will be required in any event. The statement of information (Form D81) must be signed by both parties (if a joint statement) or by each

The Supervision Manual (SUP) within the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Handbook states at SUP 6.4.3G that the relevant regulator (the Prudential Regulation authority (PRA) or the FCA) will not grant an application for cancellation of Part 4A permission until the firm can demonstrate that it has ceased carrying on all regulated activities under that permission. A firm will be therefore be expected to demonstrate to the relevant regulator that it has ceased carrying on regulated activities. For example, the firm may be asked to provide evidence

It is assumed that the family member in question knows that the testator left a valid Will which appoints the firm as sole executor. Administrators are usually appointed in particular circumstances including where: • the deceased left a Will but did not appoint executors • the appointment of executors in the Will is void for uncertainty • a sole executor has renounced, or • executors named in the Will are incapable of performing the office In certain circumstances the court may pass over an executor and appoint an administrator. It is assumed that none of these scenarios apply to this question. The following also assumes that the firm which is named as executor in the Will is still

If the executor is a lay executor, they may be entirely unsure of what they require and why. It could be as simple as files relating to property transactions that are needed for inheritance tax completion or it could be in respect of a claim that the testator was pursuing which they wish to continue. The contents of the file were, on payment of costs, the property of the testator and the executor now stands in the shoes of the testator and has the duty and obligation