Surrender by operation of law For a surrender by operation of law to take place, there must be unequivocal conduct by both parties to the lease which is inconsistent with the continuation of the tenancy. In Padwick Properties Ltd v Punj Lloyd Ltd, the court emphasised that the unequivocal conduct

Unless the statement of planning policy has been quashed by a decision of the court, the fact that a particular policy statement is the subject of an ongoing judicial review does not prevent it from constituting a material consideration in the determination of a planning application or appeal. However, the weight to be attributed

This Q&A specifically considers sponsor licence applications under Tiers 2 and 5 and excludes Tier 4 applications. The Home Office Guidance for Tier 2 Sponsors does not provide separate criteria for sponsors who run their business from home. Immigration Rules, Appendix A which provides a list of documents for submission with a sponsor licence, does not provide additional or alternative documents for a business operated from a residential address. Practice Note: Applying for a sponsor licence under Tiers 2 and 5: eligibility and suitability provides guidance on the documents required for each type of business, but again does not distinguish businesses run from home. It is therefore worth noting that the documentary, recording and reporting

This Q&A does not consider any tax issues which may arise from the expiry of the leasehold interest. Section 149(6) of Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925) provides generally that any lease or underlease at a rent or in consideration of a fine, purporting to be: • a tenancy for life, or • for a term determinable on the life, or marriage of the tenant (or the tenant’s entry into a civil partnership), or • an agreement for such a tenancy takes

Would the small claims limit be £10,000, or would it be the personal injury limit of above £1000 for pain, suffering and loss of amenity (PSLA)? This query relates to the scope of the small claims track where a claim is in part for damages for personal injuries but where non-personal injury damages are also claimed in the context of the same proceedings. It is directed at the question of how allocation is affected by the non-personal injury element. The relevant provision is CPR 26.6, which sets out how a court is to determine whether a case is to be allocated to the small claims track. The relevant part of the rule states: ‘(1) The small claims track is the normal track for— (a) any claim for personal injuries where— (i)

We have assumed that: • the partnership is a general partnership formed under the Partnership Act 1890, and • the third party to whom the deceased partner’s share vests is a relative of the deceased partner, so is a ‘connected person’ for the purposes of section 270 of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (IHTA 1984) Under a general partnership, the extent of a partner’s share or interest can be summarised as comprising of three rights: • their share of any surplus arising on the sale of the partnership property on dissolution • their right to a share of the firm’s profits • their right on dissolution to the working capital they have contributed viz-a-viz, the balance of their capital account HMRC generally

This Q&A assumes that the donee was alive at the time that the donor executed the deed. Whether the fact that the donee of the gift did not sign the deed affects the validity of the gift, depends on a number of factors, including the type of deed used and the nature

We have assumed that the trust is not a charitable trust. Where all of the beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries of a trust die

When a witness is served with a witness summons, they must be offered or paid: • a sum reasonably sufficient to cover their travelling expenses to the court and back to their home or place of work

It is well established that costs are, unless any fixed or mandatory costs provisions apply, fully within the discretion of the court and that the court's discretion is very wide. Assuming the consent order has been approved and sealed, if the consent order referred to in the question seeks to resolve the application in its entirety and that order makes no provision for costs then, subject to the facts of the case, CPR 44.10(1) may apply which states: 'Where the court makes no order for costs 44.10 (1) Where the court makes an order which does not mention costs – (a) subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the general rule is that no party is entitled – (i) to costs;' Accordingly, unless the consent order makes a provision for costs there is

Under Article 5(1)(e) of Assimilated Regulation (EU) 2016/679, UK General Data Protection Regulation (UK GDPR), personal data must be kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed (storage limitation principle). As set out in the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) guidance: Principle (e): Storage limitation, the storage limitation principle is closely linked with the data minimisation and accuracy principles. Ensuring that the employer erases personal data when it no longer needs it will reduce the risk that it becomes irrelevant, excessive, inaccurate or out of date. In addition, personal data held for too long will, by definition, be unnecessary. The employer will need to consider what is the lawful basis or condition for retention, and for how long it remains necessary

A Traffic Regulation Order (TRO) is an Order made by the relevant traffic authority (outside of Greater London) under section 1 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (RTRA 1984). RTRA 1984, s 6 allows for orders similar to TROs to be made by the traffic authority for a road in Greater London. Orders may be made where it appears to the authority to be expedient for various specified reasons. By RTRA 1984, s 2, a TRO may make any provision prohibiting, restricting or regulating the use of a road, or any part of the width of