Any assessment of deprivation of assets is highly fact and circumstance specific. It requires a local authority to undertake careful and sensitive analysis of all available information and evidence. For there to have been a deprivation of assets by a service user there are two key elements which have to be established, namely: • an actual disposal of an asset • knowledge on the part of the service user or third party actor influencing the service user that care is likely to be required, therefore making the disposal a deliberate attempt to avoid contributing to the cost of their care Actual disposal The Care Act 2014, care and support statutory guidance annex E provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that may constitute a disposal of assets: • a lump-sum payment to someone else, for example as

The exercise, after 1 April 2015, of the option to extend the term of an SDLT lease will be treated, for Land and Buildings transactions tax (LBTT) purposes, as the grant of a new deemed lease for the extended period. This is in accordance

A lump sum award is an award of a future payment of money and does not confer any beneficial interest in any property. For bankruptcy orders made on or after 1 April 2005, a lump sum order—as opposed to other types of financial remedy order—is a provable debt in a bankrupt’s bankruptcy, (see: Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016, SI 2016/1024, r 14.2(2)(c)(ii) which expressly excludes such orders from being included in the list of non-provable debts). A

The courts' approach to financial claims made after a period of delay may vary depending on the specific facts of the case. In principle there is no limitation for such a claim, but the court may be unsympathetic to an applicant who applies for financial relief many years after the parties' divorce or separation. Case law Cases where the court has been concerned with the period of time since the parties’ divorce or separation include: • Wyatt v Vince—the Court of Appeal had said that although there was no limitation period for bringing claims for financial remedy, the court should not allow either party to be harassed by such claims issued many years after the divorce that had no real prospect of success; however, the Supreme Court allowed the wife's appeal on 11 March 2015 against the striking out of her claim on the basis that, inter alia, her

We have understood your query to be as to the impact of divorce on trust assets, in this case a lifetime defeasible interest in possession trust, where the husband is a beneficiary. There are three methods of approaching trusts on divorce/dissolution: • the variation of nuptial settlements under section 24(1)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) or Schedule 5, Part 2, paragraph 7(1)(c) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (CPA 2004, Sch 5, Pt 2, para 7(1)(c))—see Practice Note: Trusts—variation of a nuptial settlement • the use

STOP PRESS: The cases discussed in the below Q&A have now been decided, see Practice Note: Human rights and costs recovery in publication and privacy proceedings. What is the current position?  Following the implementation of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO 2012) under conditional fee agreements (CFAs) entered into after April 2013, a CFA litigant has to meet the success fees out of any damages recovered. The recoverability of after-the-event (ATE) premiums was abolished at the same time. These provisions are subject to transitional arrangements. Proceedings involving issues of privacy and defamation (publication and privacy proceedings) are currently exempt from the provisions, meaning that CFAs continue to be recoverable in respect of them. There are also transitional provisions protecting the recoverability of success fees and premiums (additional liabilities) in relation to CFAs and ATE insurance policies entered into prior to the coming into force of the relevant LASPO 2012 provisions (1 April 2013). Where funding arrangements were put in place

Section 233B of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) was inserted by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020. IA 1986, s 233B(3) provides that any provision in a contract for the supply of goods or services whereby the contract would terminate due to the customer entering into an insolvency procedure, or whereby the supplier would be entitled to terminate as a result of the insolvency procedure, ceases to have effect where a company becomes subject to one of the specified insolvency procedures (as defined in section 233B(2)). Further, if the entitlement arises before the commencement of the insolvency procedure, that right cannot be exercised during the insolvency period (section 233B(4)). A supplier is also prohibited from requiring pre-insolvency debts to be paid as a condition of making further supplies (section 233B(7)). A supplier can in such circumstances only terminate the contract where the company

The Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (CBIR 2006), SI 2006/1030 incorporate the UNCITRAL Model Law on cross-border insolvency. It is non-reciprocal, so English courts are bound to apply it regardless of which jurisdiction has conduct of the insolvency proceedings. The two provisions of the CBIR 2006, SI 2006/1030, Sch 1 governing pending proceedings are: • Article 20—once foreign proceedings have been recognised as main proceedings (within the meaning of the CBIR 2006, SI 2006/1030), there is an automatic stay

The UK public procurement regime is derived from EU public procurement laws, and was therefore impacted by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 11pm (GMT) on 31 December 2020 marked the end of the Brexit transition/implementation period entered into following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. At that point in time (referred to in UK law as ‘IP completion day’), key transitional arrangements came to an end and significant changes began to take effect across the UK’s legal regime. See Practice Note: What does IP completion day mean for public law? [Archived] For any procurement exercise started before IP completion day, transitional procurement rules reflecting the relevant requirements applicable under EU law still apply until the contract has been awarded, or the exercise is abandoned. After IP completion day, the EU Directives underpinning the domestic public procurement regime no longer apply to contracting authorities in the UK in the way they did before. However, most of the relevant EU law has been implemented

Taking the example of a UK online service provider (operating from a UK data centre), wishing to rely on the caching defence in Article 13 of Directive 2000/31/EC (the EU E-Commerce Directive). In response to a claim brought against it by a French claimant, is it correct that the most likely interpretation (acknowledging that this is an area which has not been tested and the courts may come to a different interpretation) is that: • as the ‘country of origin’ principle will no longer apply, the UK online service provider could not rely on the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (the UK E-Commerce Regulations), SI 2002/2013, reg 18, as retained, defence under the UK’s implementation of the EU E-Commerce Directive • the applicable law would instead be the French implementation of the EU E-Commerce Directive (the Digital

Impact on guarantee of CVA which compromises arrears of rent and reduces future rent It is possible for a company voluntary arrangement (CVA) to compromise the liability of guarantor. However, judicial scrutiny counts these instances of 'guarantee stripping' as unfairly prejudicial to landlords where adequate compensation was not given for loss of a valuable guarantee (the Prudential Assurance Company Ltd v PRG Powerhouse Ltd). Moreover, it has also been held that the compensation provided to landlords in a CVA following the loss of the guarantee must be a genuine estimate of the commercial value

The court has the power to make final orders in financial remedy proceedings on the pronouncement of decree absolute. Other than certain interim orders, this case is made clear by section 23(5) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973), which provides that where an order is made under MCA 1973, s 23(1)(a), (b) or (c) on or after granting a decree of divorce or nullity of marriage, neither the order nor any settlement made in pursuance of the order shall take effect unless the decree has been made absolute. This was made clear in the case of McMinn v McMinn, in which Black J (as she then was) made clear that MCA 1973, s 23(5) meant precisely what it said. The