Unlawful marketing and publication of knives under the Knives Act 1997 The Knives Act 1997 (KA 1997) creates two offences relating to the unlawful marketing and publications of knives. These offences, created under KA 1997, ss 1 and 2, can be tried in the magistrates' court or the Crown Court. Note that where an offence is committed by a body corporate and the offence is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or attributable to the neglect of an officer of the business, the officer as well as the body corporate is guilty of the offence and liable to prosecution. Meaning of knife under KA 1997 A knife is defined in the KA 1997 as an instrument which has a blade or is sharply pointed. Unlawful marketing of knives under KA 1997, s 1 This offence is concerned with the marketing of knives and the manner in which that is done. The prosecution must prove: • a person • markets a knife • in a way which suggests that

This Practice Note on the civil economic tort of unlawful means conspiracy identifies the key elements of the tort: a combination or concerted action, use of unlawful means, knowledge of the unlawfulness, intention to injure the claimant, an overt act in pursuance of the agreement and resulting damage. For guidance on civil conspiracy claims more generally (and the distinction between lawful and unlawful means conspiracy) and guidance on pleading and evidencing such claims, see Practice Notes: • Civil conspiracy claims (economic tort) • Lawful means conspiracy (civil action) Unlawful means conspiracy is a civil cause of action (it is known as one of the ‘economic torts’) providing a potential remedy for those suffering financial (economic) damage as a result of the defendant’s actions. It requires the claimant to satisfy a number of key requirements in order to establish such a claim. For general guidance on the economic tort claims see: The economic torts—overview. For a comparison table identifying the key distinguishing features between the various economic torts, see Practice Note: Conspiracy, unlawful interference

Pensions analysis: Pension scheme members had lost much of their retirement savings as a result of having been persuaded to transfer them to Qualifying Recognised Overseas Pension Schemes (QROPS) which invested their money in a fund established in the Cayman Islands. The action was brought by the liquidators of the claimant who contended that there had been an Original Conspiracy and further conspiracy to injure the claimant by unlawful means. There were also allegations of breaches of fiduciary duty, dishonest assistance, unconscionable receipt and bribery. Written by Max Ballad, director at Freeths LLP.

This Practice Note considers the types of industrial action that fall outside the protection against tortious liabilities given by the statutory immunities: secondary action (sympathy strikes), action to enforce union membership or impose recognition, and action responding to the dismissal of unofficial strikers. At common law, industrial action will generally be unlawful. The trade union that organises industrial action will usually commit one or more of what are often called the ‘economic' or ‘industrial’ torts. Those participating in industrial action will often be acting in breach of their contracts of employment. However, statute intervenes to provide immunity against tortious liability to a trade union organising industrial action, although this protection is subject to considerable and complex statutory control. In order to qualify for immunity, the action must: • be taken in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute (as defined) (see Practice Note: The right to take industrial action—In contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute) • not be a type of action that is expressly excluded from protection (which is the subject of this Practice

The offence of unlawful wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm The offence of unlawful wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm (GBH) contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OATPA 1861) can be tried in either the magistrates' court or the Crown Court. The magistrates' court will decline jurisdiction in those cases where it considers its powers of sentencing are insufficient. To determine whether the magistrates’ court is likely to accept or decline jurisdiction, practitioners may consult the relevant sentencing guidelines, see further: Sentencing Council guidelines for unlawful wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm below. Elements of the offence of unlawful wounding of inflicting grievous bodily harm Under the OATPA 1861, the prosecution must prove that the accused: • wounded, or • inflicted GBH, and • the wounding or infliction of GBH was malicious and unlawful Wounding A wound requires that the continuity of the whole skin is broken. This means that both the dermis and epidermis must be broken. A scratch or break to the

Archived: This Practice Note has been archived and is not maintained. This Practice Note relates to the commission of data protection offences before 25 May 2018. Where a data protection offence occurred before 25 May 2018, it may still be prosecuted under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998) despite the fact that the legislation has been repealed by the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018). Where an offence is committed on or after 25 May 2018, charges should be considered under DPA 2018. See Practice Note: Offences under the Data Protection Act 2018. The offences of unlawful obtaining of personal data under the DPA 1998 Note these offences cannot be committed after 25 May 2018. DPA 1998 includes various criminal offences that can be prosecuted by the Information Commissioner or the Director of Public Prosecutions, who must give their consent for such prosecutions. Unlawfully obtaining personal data DPA 1998, s 55 makes it an offence to unlawfully obtain personal data. It states that a person must not

Arbitration analysis: On Tuesday, 10 October 2023 as part of the Australian Arbitration Week, Clifford Chance’s Perth office is hosting an event to celebrate 30 years of ArbitralWomen. The theme for the event is ‘Unleashing the Arbitration Disrupters: The Metaverse, Digitalisation and Decentralisation for a New Era of Justice’ and promises a discussion of all things ‘disruptive to our current experience of arbitration’. Leading the discussions will be Erika Williams, Williams Arbitration, Julia Dreosti, Clifford Chance, Jake Lowther, SCC Arbitration Institute, and Emily Hay, Hanotiau & van den Berg. As an event teaser, this article by Jake Lowther and Chloé Heydarian (also SCC Arbitration Institute) focuses on the following questions. First, what exactly is the level of ‘disruption’ being experienced by the traditional arbitration stakeholders due to these disrupters? Secondly, what is the effect of these new players in the meaning and the delivery of arbitral justice? Finally, are these disrupters expected to target specific industry sectors going forward?

PI & Clinical Negligence analysis: This case considered whether it is a necessary precondition to making an unless order for the court first to have determined that an order or procedural rule had been breached. It also reaffirmed that the threshold for an appellate court to interfere with a case management decision is high—the first instance judge must have been plainly wrong in making a decision which is outside the generous ambit where reasonable decision makers may disagree. The court also reminded parties of the steps that might be taken to avoid lodging an appeal out of time. Written by Ben Haseldine, barrister at 4 King’s Bench Walk.

An order directing that a specified sanction will be imposed unless the party concerned takes a specified step before a given date.

Claim No. [insert claim number]. [IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE [BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION [OF ENGLAND AND WALES OR IN [insert location] OR [Specify division] [Specify specialist court] [Insert

This Practice Note provides guidance on the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the CPR. Depending on the court in which your matter is proceeding, you may also need to consider additional provisions—see Court specific guidance below. This Practice Note provides guidance on the breach of or compliance with an order known as an ‘unless order’. The usual automatic consequence of breaching an unless order is that a sanction is applied (the striking out of a claim or defence) making it necessary to apply for relief from sanctions—see: What are the consequences of breaching an unless order? For guidance on when an unless order may be made, what it should contain, varying an unless order, debarring orders, unpaid costs orders and default judgments, see Practice Note: Unless orders—making an order. This Practice Note should therefore be read in conjunction with the following Practice Notes: • Case management—compliance • Strike out for failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or order (CPR 3.4(2)(c)) • Relief from sanctions—making or opposing an application • Relief from

This Practice Note provides guidance on the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the CPR. Depending on the court in which your matter is proceeding, you may also need to consider additional provisions—see further Court specific guidance below. This Practice Note provides guidance on a particular type of order known as an ‘unless order’. For guidance on the automatic consequence of breaching an unless order, the sanctions that may be applied and relief from sanctions, see Practice Note: Unless orders—breach or non-compliance. This Practice Note should therefore be read in conjunction with the following Practice Notes: • Case management—compliance • Strike out for failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or order (CPR 3.4(2)(c)) • Relief from sanctions—making or opposing an application • Relief from sanctions—the courts’ approach What is an ‘unless order’? An ‘unless order’ is an order by which a conditional sanction is attached to an order requiring performance of a specified act by a particular date or within a particular period (Marcan Shipping v Kefalas). CPR 3.1(3)