The register-of-scotland'>Land Register of Scotland is a plans-based register of titles. Properties in the register have a title sheet and title plan guaranteed by the state. The title sheet includes a property section describing a property by reference to the cadastral map and including any details of rights the property has, details of the owner, details of any standard securities affecting the property and details of any burdens affecting the property.

How a charity holds land will depend on how the charity is structured. This Practice Note looks at how land is held by charities which are: • charitable trusts (including trusts where the trustees are incorporated under section 251 of the Charities Act 2011 (CA 2011)) • unincorporated associations • companies • charitable incorporated organisations (CIOs) It also looks at the role of the Official Custodian for Charities and their ‘land holding’ service. Charitable trusts Trustees of a charitable trust as proprietors of registered land HM Land Registry will register the trustees of a charity named in the relevant disposition as the registered proprietors of the land. There can be any number of charity trustees; they are an exception to the general rule that there cannot be more than four trustees of a trust of land. A restriction may also be entered automatically on the registered title at the time of registration: • where there is more than one registered proprietor, HM Land Registry will enter a restriction in Form A • where the charity is a non-exempt

Dispute Resolution analysis: The court was considering the appropriate form of order continuing an anti-suit injunction (previously made without notice). The key issue before the court was whether to continue to include express reference to the ultimate beneficial owners of the defendant companies, a Mr and Mrs Guryev, in the penal notice to the order effecting the anti-suit injunction. The court decided that Mr and Mrs Guryev should not be separately named and should only be included in generic terms, by reference to the warning addressed to third parties more generally not to ‘help or permit’ the named respondents to breach the injunction. However, an important subsidiary issue was whether the court should also include a Babanaft provision to make it express that the order was not intended to restrain the acts of third parties who were entirely and unquestionably outside of the jurisdiction of the English courts. Such a provision is routinely included in worldwide freezing injunctions and the question was whether it was appropriate in an anti-suit injunction. There were other issues as to the need to serve Mr and Mrs Guryev, as the ultimate beneficial owners, with the Order. The court, finding this was not necessary, but expedient, was prepared to dispense with personal service on the basis that such permissive service would not, without more, change the jurisdictional position in respect of the Guryevs. The jurisdictional issue, along with any Babanaft principle, therefore could be argued if it arose on another occasion. Written by Lauren Godfrey, barrister at Gatehouse Chambers.

Arbitration analysis: The case of DQR v DQT addresses the novel situation in which a related company would have been placed in a financially advantageous position had it decided to go against another company in the same group. In such a circumstance, related companies have to ask themselves—is it better to remain on the side of the larger group or is it better to go it alone (and possibly against the group) if there is an opportunity to obtain recovery. The Singapore High Court recently dismissed an application to set aside an ICC arbitral award arising from a multi‑contract dispute, involving an unincorporated joint venture and a related services contract, both connected to the delivery of a major infrastructure project. The two claimants in the court proceedings (being the unsuccessful respondents in the arbitration) argued that the arbitral tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction by determining disputes arising under a separate joint venture deed The court held that the tribunal had, in fact, remained squarely within the scope of the submission to arbitration. Written by Dan Perera, partner, Aaron Tan, associate, and Michael Popp, trainee solicitor at HFW Singapore LLP.

Local Government analysis: The High Court has followed the dicta of the Court of Appeal in Rikha Begum (as explained and applied in Minott and Ivory) that the proper approach to whether a further ‘fresh’ homeless application amounts to an application at all involves two stages of inquiry: firstly, is the subsequent application an application at all (‘stage one’), to which the answer will only be ‘no’ if it is based on precisely the same facts as the previous application (disregarding fanciful allegations and trivial facts); and secondly, if it is an application, is it well-founded which involves s.184-type inquiries (‘stage two’). In quashing and remitting Somerset’s refusal to accept a purported second application from Ms Lyrae, Eyre J rejected Somerset’s legal submissions that (i) ‘significant’ new evidence of fact meant evidence of substance which advanced matters relevant to the issue for determination, (ii) that a subsequent application was restricted where it was based on new evidence in support of a previously asserted fact if that evidence was available to the applicant at the time of the previous application, and (iii) that it was highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. He went on to find that Somerset had erred in three respects in their decision, mischaracterising the basis of the review decision, misinterpreting new evidence and carrying out stage two inquiries into the weight of that evidence at stage one. Written by Stephanie Smith, barrister at 4-5 Gray’s Inn Square.

The answers to the following questions can be used to help you decide whether to pursue a particular opportunity to bid for work. Question Answer Do we already provide services in the relevant sector/work type? [Consider whether you currently operate or wish to operate in the prospective client’s sector/work type] Are there any additional costs to the firm in supplying the work required by the client? [Consider whether

Arbitration analysis: This case involved an application by a third party (Vale) under section 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996) to stay the Part 20 proceedings brought against it by the defendants (BHP). The court held that the application was not an abuse of process, but dismissed it on the merits after finding that the Vale failed to establish that BHP was bound by the arbitration clause of the underlying Shareholder Agreement or that the clause itself should be interpreted widely. Written by Andrew Stafford, KC, partner and Alexandra Williams, associate, both at Kobre & Kim (UK) LLP.

Commercial analysis: In a £56.4m breach of contract claim brought by Pretoria Energy, the court agreed with the Defendant that a document entitled ‘Heads of Terms of Proposed Agreement’ was not a binding and enforceable contract, other than in respect of a time-limited lockout provision which prevented either party from negotiating with anyone else. Documents labelled ‘Heads of Terms’ or various other names such as letters of intent, heads of agreement or documents headed ‘intention to proceed’ are commonly entered into during negotiations and disputes frequently arise over the whether such documents are legally binding. This case considered the legal principles relevant to determining whether such a document is legally binding. Written by Dov Ohrenstein, barrister at Radcliffe Chambers, who successfully represented the defendant and Jamie Cockfield, pupil barrister at Radcliffe Chambers.

For information: • on how to calculate a week’s pay, see Practice Note: Calculating a week's pay • on calculating holiday pay, see Practice Note: Holiday pay • on zero hours contracts, see Practice Note: Zero hours contracts • on the Employment Rights Act 1996 (Coronavirus, Calculation of a Week’s Pay) Regulations 2020 (Week’s Pay Amendment Regs 2020), SI 2020/814, see Practice Note: Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme—right to statutory redundancy and other termination payments [Archived] • on the extended Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS), see Practice Note: Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (extended version 1 November 2020 to 30 April 2021) [Archived] The concept of ‘a week’s pay’, calculated in accordance with sections 220–229 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996), is important for a number of statutory employment rights, including calculation of statutory

Arbitration analysis: Reversing a first-instance judgment, the Court of Appeals of the State of São Paulo annulled an arbitral award after concluding that one of the co-arbitrators breached his duty to disclose that he had previously served in another arbitral tribunal with one of the attorneys for the prevailing party. The court held that, under Brazilian law, arbitrators’ duty of disclosure is objective and continuous, and failure to reveal facts capable of creating a ‘reasonable doubt’ as to an arbitrator’s impartiality and independence suffices to vitiate the award, even in the absence of evidence of actual bias. This decision is significant for arbitration practitioners, as it occurs during a period of heightened scrutiny regarding arbitrators’ disclosure obligations in Brazil. Written by Renato Stephan Grion, partner at Pinheiro Neto Advogados, and Guilherme Piccardi, senior associate at Pinheiro Neto Advogados.

In answering this Q&A we have assumed that the address at which the document is to be served is within the UK. If the party or its solicitor resides or carries on business in another EEA state, you should refer to the full text of the rules identified below. The relevant provisions are these: • a party to proceedings must give an address at which that party may be served with documents relating to those proceedings. The address must include a full postcode unless the court orders otherwise (CPR 6.23(1)) • that address must be the business address of a solicitor or, where no solicitor is acting, an address within the UK at which the party resides or carries on business (CPR 6.23(2)). Where none of these applies,

Dispute Resolution analysis: In granting freezing orders to prevent the disposal of Bitcoin and Ethereum, Mr Justice Birss: i) found a real risk of dissipation where responsive evidence appeared to have been altered or simply failed to prove the asset was still held, and ii) was prepared to proceed on the basis that cryptocurrency could be a form of property, and accordingly the proprietary order should prevent the disposal of it. This 2018 judgment (only recently available, and reported by LexisNexis®) aptly demonstrates the court’s approach to technical evidence, application of legal principles in increasingly sophisticated contexts and willingness to treat cryptocurrency as property (albeit that this significant point of interest did not appear to have been in issue). Written by Danielle Carr, partner at Rosenblatt Limited.