ARCHIVED: This Practice Note has been archived and is not maintained. Internal complaints All higher education providers must have a complaints procedure which students who are dissatisfied with the acts or omissions of a provider should follow. This basic principle of good corporate governance is enshrined in the standards set in the following: • the Higher Education Code of Corporate governance • the quality assurance agency (QAA) in the UK Quality Code • the initial and ongoing registration requirements of the Office for Students (OfS) What is the UK Quality Code? The UK Quality Code is a sector-owned approach to ensuring quality in higher education delivery and forms the basis of the quality assurance and assessment activities expected or undertaken by a range of agencies concerned with higher education, including the following: • the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), replaced by UK Research and Innovation and OfS from August 2019 • UK Research and Innovation • OfS • the Department for Education as part of assessments for designation for student support • Tier 4 sponsorship status for

ARCHIVED: This Practice Note has been archived and is not maintained. This Practice Note considers the legal framework involved in a student’s relationship with their higher education provider with reference to student discipline. It considers the contractual relationship with the student, the interrelationship with public law, statutory duties and criminal law. It details the types of misconduct that could lead to disciplinary proceedings, as well as matters to be considered before proceedings are commenced. What power does a higher education institution have to discipline a student? While a student’s relationship with their university is governed by a number of areas of law including: • public law including discrimination law (as set out in the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010)) • statutory duties in respect of freedom of speech on campus human rights law • data protection laws • tort law, in respect of claims of negligence, and • property law in respect of student accommodation an institution’s relationship with a student is primarily contractual (Clark v University of Lincolnshire

Complaints of discrimination for acts taking place in the course of a work placement can be brought against the training provider in the employment tribunal. This is so even in circumstances where a university, governed by the education provisions of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010), affords access to the training placement. The Court of Appeal achieved this outcome by applying the Marleasing principle to interpret section 56(5) of the EqA 2010 in a way which prevented there being a lacuna of protection for work placement students. Court of Appeal: Blackwood v Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust.

Introduction This Practice Note is part of our student series, aimed specifically at students undertaking their LLB. It examines certainty of terms, a requirement that must be satisfied before an agreement will be treated as a binding contract. This Practice Note deals with certainty. It explains the level of definiteness the law requires, then addresses the two ways an agreement typically falls short: where the essential terms are ambiguous, and where they are missing altogether. The contrast between Scammell & Nephew Ltd v Ouston and Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd illustrates the first; the contrast between May & Butcher Ltd v The King and Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd illustrates the second. It also sets out how an incomplete price is resolved, including under section 8 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA 1979), and examines the weight given to performance already rendered, drawing on British Steel Corporation v Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co Ltd, G Percy Trentham Ltd v Archital Luxfer Ltd and the Supreme Court’s decision in RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v

Introduction This Practice Note is part of our student series, aimed specifically at students undertaking their LLB. It examines the doctrine of consideration: the requirement that each party to a contract gives something of value in return for what they receive. Consideration is a central element of contract formation, along with offer, acceptance, intention to create legal relations and certain terms. The Practice Note begins by explaining what consideration means in its legal sense, and why English law will not support a gratuitous promise. It sets out the classic definition from Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153 and distinguishes executed from executory consideration, addressing a misunderstanding that regularly costs marks in exam questions: the belief that consideration exists only once value has actually changed hands. It then works through the three main principles: that consideration may be executed or executory but not past, that it must move from the promisee, and that it must be sufficient but need not be adequate, each illustrated by the leading authority. It then turns to the three limitations: past

Overview This Practice Note is part of our LLB Contract Law series written specifically for law students. It provides a comprehensive overview of remedies for breach of contract, focusing primarily on damages as the central common law remedy. It begins by considering remedies within the broader structure of contract law, explaining when termination is available – particularly through the breach of conditions and innominate (or ‘intermediate’) terms. It then establishes the foundational expectation principle from Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850, emphasising that damages aim to place the claimant in the position they would have occupied had the contract been properly performed.  The Practice Note then develops the key limiting doctrines governing damages: causation, remoteness, and mitigation. It analyses leading authorities on mitigation, explaining how these doctrines restrict recovery even where breach is established. It also examines the different measures of damages (expectation, reliance, and, exceptionally, restitutionary awards) before exploring issues of quantification such as the distinction between ‘difference in value’ and ‘cost of cure’ in Ruxley Electronics v Forsyth [1996] AC 344.  Finally, the Practice Note addresses non-pecuniary loss and the modern law on liquidated damages and penalty clauses. It concludes with comparative perspectives,

Overview This Practice Note is part of our LLB Contract Law series written specifically for law students. It explains the doctrine of frustration as a mechanism for the discharge of contractual obligations under English law. It outlines the conceptual basis of frustration and distinguishes it from discharge by performance, breach or agreement. The Practice Note examines the historical development of the doctrine from Taylor v Caldwell [1861-73] All ER Rep 24 through to the modern, radically different test articulated in Davis Contractors v Fareham UDC [1956] AC 696. It analyses the principal categories of frustrating events, including destruction of subject matter, personal incapacity, non-occurrence of a contemplated event, supervening illegality and war, and considers the limits of the doctrine, such as self-induced frustration and contracts where risk has been allocated by the parties. The Practice Note also explains the legal consequences of frustration, including automatic discharge and the statutory adjustment of losses under the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943. It concludes by highlighting the narrow scope of the doctrine and its role in balancing contractual

Introduction This Practice Note is part of our LLB Contract Law series written specifically for law students. It the doctrine of discharge of obligations, focusing in particular on discharge by performance and breach, and situating these within the broader framework of contractual termination. It explores the standards required for valid performance, including exact compliance, substantial performance, entire and divisible obligations and the significance of time stipulations. It then analyses breach of contract in its various forms (actual and anticipatory) and considers when a breach is sufficiently serious to entitle the innocent party to terminate, with detailed discussion of conditions, warranties and innominate terms. The Practice Note also addresses the doctrine of election, the risks associated with wrongful termination and the consequences of acceptance in sale of goods contracts. Throughout, it integrates leading authorities and statutory provisions to demonstrate how the law balances certainty with fairness. By combining doctrinal explanation with judicial reasoning and critical insight, this Practice Note is designed to equip students with the analytical depth required for higher-grade assessment in contract law. Overview

Introduction Exemption clauses are contractual terms used to exclude or limit liability for certain breaches, acts, or omissions. They are common in both commercial and consumer contracts and serve the commercial purpose of risk allocation. However, they often raise issues of fairness and bargaining power, leading to extensive judicial and statutory regulation. The key frameworks which govern the law surrounding exemption clauses are: • common law controls: incorporation, construction, and interpretation • statutory regulation: Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA 1977) for business contexts and Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA 2015) for consumer contexts For an example of what a boilerplate limitation of liability clause looks like, see Precedent: Limitation of liability clause. Underlying policy tension: freedom of contract vs protection from unfair or hidden terms At the heart of the law on exemption clauses lies a fundamental policy tension between freedom of contract (whereby contracting parties should be able to form agreements on whichever terms they choose) and the need to protect parties from unfair or unexpected terms. On the one

Introduction This Practice Note is part of our student series, aimed specifically at students undertaking their LLB. It examines intention to create legal relations, a requirement that must be satisfied before an agreement will be treated as a binding contract. This Practice Note deals with intention to create legal relations. It explains that the test is objective, as Smith v Hughes establishes, and considers how the courts assess whether a reasonable person would regard an arrangement as legally binding, using Bowerman v Association of British Travel Agents Ltd as the leading illustration. It then works through the three presumptions the courts apply—that domestic and social agreements are not intended to be binding, and that commercial agreements are—together with the circumstances in which each is rebutted. Balfour v Balfour and Merritt v Merritt remain the clearest demonstration of how a presumption operates in practice. A case table and dedicated exam and problem question guidance follow. The requirement Intention to create legal relations means that the parties objectively intended their agreement to give rise to legally enforceable rights

Introduction This Practice Note is part of our LLB Contract Law suite, geared specifically towards students. In contract law, a vitiating factor is something that spoils or impairs the legal validity of the consent required to form a valid contract. One vitiating factor is misrepresentation, in which one party makes a statement to another which is not true. This Practice Note explains misrepresentation as a vitiating factor in English contract law, focusing on how false pre-contractual statements undermine genuine consent and render contracts voidable (rather than void). It sets out the elements of actionable misrepresentation (a false statement of fact or law, inducement and attribution), distinguishes between fraudulent, negligent and innocent misrepresentation, and analyses the leading cases and statutory framework under the Misrepresentation Act 1967. The Practice Note gives particular attention to remedies, especially rescission and damages, and the equitable bars to rescission (affirmation, lapse of time, impossibility of restitution, third-party rights and judicial discretion). Throughout, it integrates key judicial reasoning, policy considerations and exam-focused guidance, showing how modern case law balances fairness to the misled party with certainty

Introduction This Practice Note is part of our student series, aimed specifically at students undertaking their LLB. It examines the doctrine of mistake in the law of contract: the narrow set of circumstances in which the court will treat an apparent agreement as no agreement at all and declare the contract void from the outset. The Practice Note begins by explaining what mistake means as a legal term of art, and why it is far narrower than the everyday sense of the word. It sets out the rationale for the doctrine, which rests on the 19th century idea of consensus ad idem, and explains why the courts intervene only where the mistake relates to a fundamental fact existing at the moment the contract was made. The main body follows the three categories of operative mistake at common law. The first is common initial mistake, where both parties share the same erroneous belief, whether about the existence of the subject matter (Couturier v Hastie (1856) 5 HL Cas 673, now reflected in section 6 of the Sale of Goods