Arbitration analysis: The Singapore Court of Appeal upheld a decision to set aside an award (‘Award’) where the tribunal had copied and pasted a substantial portion of an arbitrator’s decision from a similar but separate arbitration. At least 212 paragraphs from a separate award were retained in the Award. The Court of Appeal found that there was a breach of natural justice. Given the confidentiality of arbitrations, where an arbitrator reproduces material from another source, such as another arbitral award, parties and the other arbitrators may not have access to the material. This may lead to reasonable suspicion that the tribunal had pre-judged the dispute, without considering the new materials in the present arbitration, or may be influenced by confirmation bias. Further, reference to extraneous materials in a separate award may not give parties adequate opportunities to review or submit on, breaching the fair hearing rule. Written by Violet Huang, counsel at Colin Seow Chambers, member of Nusa Chambers.

Dispute Resolution analysis: Norris J has dismissed an application under CPR 23.11 to set aside an order made at an application hearing in the respondent’s absence. In doing so he adopted the factors applicable to applications made under CPR 39.3 (where the hearing in question is a trial), including whether or not the respondent has an arguable case on the merits. He also clarified that the principle in Pereira, that the respondent should apply to set aside the order before appealing, applies in the case of applications under CPR 23.11.

Arbitration analysis: The Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago confirmed that parties cannot contract out of the court’s limited supervisory jurisdiction over arbitral awards by means of a ‘no appeal’ clause, holding that such provisions are contrary to public policy. The court also clarified that interim payment certificates under construction contracts are provisionally binding unless revised through the contractual mechanism, and that contractual suspension rights must be exercised consistently with the contractor’s continuing ability to resume performance immediately. The decision provides important guidance on the limits of arbitral finality, judicial review of awards and the interpretation of payment and termination provisions in construction arbitrations. Produced in partnership with Gregory Pantin and Miguel Vasquez of M Hamel-Smith & Co.

Because applications to set aside default judgment under CPR 13.3 involve the court exercising its discretion, judgments in such applications are particularly fact-sensitive. Nevertheless, it can be instructive to see examples of applications which succeeded or failed on the issues of promptness or relief from sanctions so as to get a feel for how the court approaches these issues in practice. Set out in the tables below are examples of applications to set aside default judgment which stood or fell on the issue of promptness or the application of relief from sanctions principles. For general guidance on the court’s approach to applications made under CPR 13.3, see Practice Note: Setting aside default judgment—discretionary grounds (CPR 13.3). Promptness For guidance on the meaning of promptness for the purposes of CPR 13.3(2), see Practice Note: Setting aside default judgment—discretionary grounds (CPR 13.3)—Promptly. Example cases where a default judgment was set aside despite delay Judgment and analysis Delay Commentary Regera SARL v Cohen [2025] EWHC 2107 (Comm) at paras [153]–[167] 61 days When the

Where a claimant has obtained judgment against a defendant who failed to file an acknowledgment of service or a defence (known as a default judgment or judgment in default), the defendant can ask the court to exercise its discretion to set aside that default judgment even though it was validly obtained. For guidance on the circumstances in which the court must set aside a default judgment, see Practice Note: Setting aside default judgment—mandatory grounds (CPR 13.2). For guidance on the procedure for making an application to set aside a default judgment, see Practice Note: Setting aside default judgment—making the application. For guidance on what is a default judgment, see Practice Note: Obtaining default judgment—general principles. This Practice Note provides guidance on the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the CPR. Depending on the court in which your matter is proceeding, you may also need to be mindful of additional provisions—see further in the section Court specific guidance below. The court’s discretionary power to set aside default judgment The court has a discretionary

This Practice Note provides practical guidance on making an application to set aside a judgment entered against a defendant who failed to file an acknowledgment of service or a defence (known as a default judgment or judgment in default). For guidance on the grounds on which a default judgment can be set aside, see Practice Notes: • Setting aside default judgment—mandatory grounds (CPR 13.2) • Setting aside default judgment—discretionary grounds (CPR 13.3) An application to set aside default judgment is an application for a court order—the basic procedure is therefore set out in CPR 23 and CPR PD 23A. Guidance on making a CPR-compliant application can be found in Practice Note: How to make an application for a court order (CPR 23). You should familiarise yourself with this guidance before making any application to the court—it provides the starting point for all applications governed by CPR 23 and CPR PD 23A. The following sections highlight particular aspects of the applications procedure which are specific to an application to set aside default judgment.

If default judgment is wrongly entered against a defendant the court must set that judgment aside. CPR 13.2 sets out mandatory grounds for setting aside a default judgment—if these grounds are present the court has no discretion and must set aside the default judgment regardless of the merits of any proposed defence. This Practice Note explains when the court is bound to set aside a default judgment and addresses common arguments which defendants put forward to say that a default judgment must be set aside on mandatory grounds. For guidance on the alternative bases upon which a court may, in its discretion, set aside default judgment, see Practice Note: Setting aside default judgment—discretionary grounds (CPR 13.3). For guidance on the procedure for applying to set aside default judgment, see Practice Note: Setting aside default judgment—making the application. For guidance on what is a default judgment, see Practice Note: Obtaining default judgment—general principles. What are the mandatory grounds for setting aside default judgment? CPR 13.2 provides that the court must set aside a default

Family analysis: The substantive issue in Shahzad v Mazher was the circumstances in which a court has power to set aside a decree absolute and whether that power exists when it is alleged that a petitioner advanced a false case. The subsidiary issue was whether the judge was right in the circumstances of this case to rescind the decree nisi and set aside the certificate of entitlement. There was an allegation of fraud, namely that the husband had falsely given the date of separation as 2006 when it was, in fact, 2016. In addition, there was an issue of procedural irregularity, namely that the decree had been made absolute despite the wife’s application for the decree nisi to be rescinded not having been determined. The husband appealed the setting aside of the decree absolute, arguing there was no legal basis for so doing in this case, which was dismissed. Graeme Fraser, partner and head of family at OGR Stock Denton LLP, explores the implications of this decision.

Dispute Resolution analysis: The Chancery Division held that, in highly exceptional circumstances, the court has the power to set aside a final order under CPR 3.1(7). Prior case law had suggested that if a court had power at all to set aside a final order or judgment under CPR 3.1(7), then such power was constrained to situations of fraud. However, in this case, the court held that it did have power under CPR 3.1(7) to set aside a final order or judgment, but that the court would only exercise a discretion to do so in truly exceptional instances. Analysis written by Angharad Parry, barrister at 20 Essex Street.

This Practice Note sets out the scope of the court’s power to set aside a financial remedy order and summarises the grounds upon which an application may be made. It also considers in detail the setting aside of a financial remedy order made in the absence of a party or without notice as well as applications to set aside on the grounds of lack of capacity. It examines the powers that exist in relation to executory orders (ie orders that are not yet implemented) and undertakings, and provides details of procedural matters. For detailed practical guidance on subsequent unforeseen, unforeseeable events (Barder events), see Practice Note: Setting aside financial remedy orders—Barder events. For detailed practical guidance on fraud, material non-disclosure or mistake, see Practice Note: Setting aside financial remedy orders—fraud, material non-disclosure and mistake. The Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010) provide a procedural route for applications to set aside a financial remedy order where no error of the court is alleged via FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 9.9A. This rule seeks to resolve the procedural

This Practice Note considers the court’s powers to set aside a financial remedy order following the occurrence of a ‘Barder’ event. It considers the case law on successful and unsuccessful applications, and the overlap with other grounds upon which a financial remedy order may be set aside. The Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010) provide a procedural route for applications to set aside a financial remedy order where no error of the court is alleged via FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 9.9A. There is a strong public interest in ensuring the finality of orders. However, in a small number of cases, this consideration may be overridden due to the occurrence of a subsequent unforeseen, unforeseeable event that invalidates the basis on which the original order was made. This is generally known as a Barder event after the House of Lords case in which it arose. For detailed practical guidance on setting aside orders on the grounds of fraud, material non-disclosure or mistake, see Practice Note: Setting aside financial remedy orders—fraud, material non-disclosure and mistake. For

This Practice Note considers the court’s powers to set aside a financial remedy order on the basis of non-disclosure (deliberate or not) and mistake. It considers the different ways the court will approach fraudulent or intentional non-disclosure and inadvertent non-disclosure, and the corresponding approaches to materiality, as well as case management issues and examples from case law. The effect of mistake is also considered. The Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010) provide a procedural route for applications to set aside a financial remedy order where no error of the court is alleged via FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, 9.9A. Applications to set aside may be made on the grounds that there has been fraudulent or intentional non-disclosure or inadvertent non-disclosure. In certain circumstances, an order may be set aside on the basis of certain types of mistake, other than an error of the court, which is dealt with by way of an appeal. Where non-disclosure is unintentional, there is no presumption that it is material and it is likely to be treated in a similar